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ABSTRACT 
PERFORMING THE SELF AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY 
AND PERFORMANCE 
by 
MATTHEW THOMAS WELLINGS 
This thesis sets out to examine the idea that self-identity can be 
coherently viewed as a performance event. If such a proposition is 
supportable, it would seem to argue for attention to be paid to the 
nature of the activity of performing as a means to better understanding 
the processes of human identity. Beginning with an analysis of an early 
example of such a theoretical position, this thesis examines some of the 
central issues involved in viewing the self as performative. The 
agenda dictating the direction of this analysis can be summarised as an 
effort to provide a model of the performative self that is affirmatory 
rather than negative; that establishes it as a positive, rather than 
debilitating, fact of existence. The construction of this model is 
achieved in large part by the adoption of the ontological outlook 
contained in the philosophy of Frederich Nietzsche which, it is argued, 
offers a reading of the nature of human identity that avoids the 
sometimes reductive elements of more contemporary theories such as post-
structuralism. Allied to this elaboration of a theoretical model of the 
self is the recognition that the theory produced within and around 
radical theatre practice in the West over the last century can be seen 
as a field of activity that has consistently argued for, and 
experimented with, new conceptualisations of the constituent factors of 
human social identities. Because of this, such theatre writings are 
proposed as being genuinely potent political activities; ones which 
continuously seeks to extend, rather than reduce, the sphere of c·. 
influence of individuals in society. The contribution this thesis makes 
to research in the field of theatre studies, then, is in the provision 
of a theoretical framework within which it becomes possible to see 
radical theatre as a paradigmatic site of liberatory activity. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
This thesis sets out to provide a theoretical notion of 
the human self that is consistent with the radical approach 
to the matter underlying the work of avant-garde theatre 
in the West this century. It therefore offers, in effect, 
a fully theorized version of the type of conceptualisation 
that has been explored, developed, questioned, attempted 
and performed in such theatre. Its central assertion is 
double-edged : that such a notion of the self is important 
for an understanding of this type of performance, and that 
performance itself is important for an understanding of 
this notion of the self. 
The intention is to present a schematic of this self 
that operates on two levels, asserting that the 
structuration of consciousness that is this 'self' is· a 
secondary aspect of the human organism, which is founded 
primarily upon two basic 'building blocks' of identity - a 
'capacity to learn' and a 'will to power'. This notion of 
the self presents it basically as a dynamic process that 
occurs within a more 'fixed' containing device. This 
containing device is characterised as 'innate' , since it· 
involves the presence of certain 'pre-conditions' of human 
existence, such as embodiment 1n a certain form, a basic 
psychic topography (a capacity to learn), and a particular 
dynamic trajectory (a will to power). All of these things 
are described as 'prior' by this thesis, and their 
determining function for human life is asserted, together 
with an insistence on their dialectical relationship to a 
given exterior world. The lived experience of human life 
as that of a 'cohesive, unitary self' is problematized, 
and revealed to be a 'secondary' phenomenon which has 
attached to, and grounded itself in, the basic structure of 
the prior factors of the human form. As Richard Foreman, 
the American theatre practitioner points out, "society 
teaches us to represent our lives to ourselves within the 
framework of a coherent narrative, but beneath that 
conditioning 111e feel our lives as a series of 
multidirectional impulses and collisions," (in Drain [ed], 
1995, p68). Psychic activity - self-consciousness is 
described as basically performative in nature, meaning that 
it is viewed as having, metaphorically speaking, the same 
structure as might be found in any performance event. The 
energising factor of this 'performance event' of self-
consciousness is described as 'agency', or 'creative 
agency'; and it is stated that without this 'force' the 
production of meaning would not occur. At its most basic 
level, the schematic of self presented here describes an 
energising force known as the will to power, which operates 
the 'instinct' of the capacity to learn and is contained 
within the psychic structuration known as the 'self'. 
This basic schematic of the self 1s advanced and 
defended throughout the thesis, in order to test its 
coherence as a concept. This is done, as will become 
clear, since this version of what the 'self' is is viewed 
as allowing for more ambiguity and freedom of movement for 
the individual than those versions which emphasise notions 
such as innate 'character' or 'human nature'. In this way 
the thesis attempts to help the drive to avoid what Paul 
Kornfeld held to be the crime of Naturalism its~~'-
dependence on characterization and its subsequent 
'imprisoning' of humanity "in the simplicity of an 
aphorism," (in Drain [ed], 1995, p258). 
It is the contention of this thesis that the activity 
of making non-naturalistic theatre in the West over the 
last century generally exhibits a similar outlook to this. 
To return to Foreman once again, we might describe this 
outlook as a suspicion that "it might be· desirable to 
reconstitute our very way of being," (in Drain [ed], 1995, 
p70). As Elizabeth Burns notes, it may well be the case 
that the theatre is particularly well suited as a medium to 
support this attempt at reconstitution : 
The theatre is an innovative laboratory for . 
the exercise of the capacity to transcend 
the personage - the reified typifications into 
which we may be trapped. It serves as a 
constant renewal of the claim to escape from 
a ritualized personage into other moods, 
different representations of oneself, 
(in George, 1986, p360). 
The basic methodology of the thesis is that of the 
construction of a theoretical position that can cope with 
the radical problematizations of the notion of the 'self' 
offered by examples of post-structuralist theory, which is 
seen as that body of writing most sceptical towards 
traditional notions of the self, whilst at the same time 
showing how such a position can avoid a simultaneous 
reduction of the notion of agency. 
This particular approach is taken, 
ensure that agency as a concept is not 
usefulness; and this agenda is, in itself, 
view that the fundamental structure of 
basically, to 
reduced beyond 
the result of a 
~ performance 
event is founded on the ramifications of effective agency. 
The underlying ontological position of the thesis as a 
whole is drawn from the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
who held that the aesthetic practice of the 'self' was a 
genuine site of liberatory practice for individuals (l). 
Therefore, whilst seeking, like post-structuralism, to 
dismantle the myth of the autonomous 'subject', he did not, 
at the same time, seek to reject the effects of individual 
agency. 
Post-structuralist theory is represented within these 
pages by the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan; and 
through an analysis of their positions that is grounded in 
a Nietzschean perspective, a coherent notion of the self is 
developed that can support a notion of agency and operate 
effectively with a radical scepticism towards the notion of 
the self per se. 
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The thesis closes with an examination of how such an 
expanded and critical notion of the self is, as has been 
mentioned, that which has been, and is, operative in much 
of the theory produced within and around much of what might 
be termed 'radical' performance practice in the West over 
the past century. 
Chapter One (The Performance Event) introduces the 
general field of inquiry, and sets forth a theoretical 
model for looking at performance that can operate with a 
problematized notion of the 'self', but still depends on a 
positive notion of creative agency. This chapter should be 
seen as advancing a set of hypotheses which it is the task 
of the remainder of the thesis to substantiate through a 
critical scrutiny of the assumptions it is based on. 
Chapter Two (The Problematized. Performing Self) 
introduces the original notion of the self as 
'performative' as advanced by Goffman, and conducts an 
early review of its radical import when compared to the 
post-structuralist conceptualisation of the matter, 
indicating why a more critical inquiry into the concept of 
'subjecthood' might be needed, and where it might be aimed. 
It also introduces the basic schematic of the 'self' being 
adopted by this thesis, and begins to suggest where, and 
how, this conception might find itself in conflict with 
post-structuralist theorisations. -· 
Chapter Three (The Problematized, Post-structuralist 
Self) is by far the largest and densest section of the 
thesis, and gives an overview of the nature of the critique 
of the notion of the 'self' found in post-structuralism by 
focusing first on the work of Michel Foucault, and then on 
the theory of Jacques Lacan. The analysis is worked around 
a defence of the basic schema of the 'self' advanced in the 
previous chapter, and conducted from within a Nietzschean 
perspective that deliberately critiques the findings of 
both writers on the matter of their affirmatory intent. 
Chapter Four (The Problematized Self as a Performance 
Event) examines the Nietzschean concept of a 'will to 
power', adding it to the basic schema of the 'self' 
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advanced so far, and sets forth the positive pathways of 
action that Nietzsche believed were available ·to 
individuals as so described within the sphere of aesthetic 
activity, which are then seen to have been mirrored by a 
variety of Western theatre practitioners over the last 
thirty years and beyond. 
The conclusion makes clear the radical import of the 
concept of the self developed within the thesis and argues 
for its suitability as a contemporary theoretical example 
of the notion of self underlying avant-garde theatrical 
practice in the West this century. 
• 
,t•. 
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The Performance Event. 
[T]o create space for the imagination, free 
space for the imagination to counter the 
imperialistic occupation of the imagination, 
and the killing of imagination by 
prefabricated cliches and the standards of 
the media. I believe this is a primary 
political responsibility, even when the 
content has nothing at all to do with 
political realities, 
(Muller, 1990, p188l. 
Acting is the specialized practice of that state of 
experience that is constitutive of human psychical 
existence. It is the creation of a crafted form out of 
what 1s "shifting raw material, unformed and undefined" 
(Brecht, 1965, p54); and as such, it is defined by the 
basic structure of this 'raw material', which is that of a 
reflexive attention to itself. For this is a basic 
defintion of performance it is that state of being 
wherein one exhibits a state of reflexivity towards one's 
actions, as opposed to normative 'consciousness', where one 
experiences this state of reflexivity, but does not 
necessarily exhibit it. As Richard Schechner notes, • the 
evidence is accumulating that the only difference between 
'ordinary behaviour' and 'acting' is one of reflexivity : 
professional actors are aware that they are acting" (in 
Schechner & Appel (eds], 1990, p30). 
So, can it be stated that where there 1s a 
'performance' there must necessarily be a distance between 
the doer and the thing done ? In other words, is a 
reflexive attention always a part of any act of 
performance; and if it is, then how important is it ? Is it 
possible to suggest that this notion of 'distance' in what 
can be called a performance might be an important one ? 
And if this is the case, then why is this so ? 
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To enable satisfactory answers to these questions to 
be forwarded here, it will be constructive to establish a 
basic structural framework within which the notion of 
performance can be contained for the purposes of the 
discussion ( 1) . 
This thesis formulates the basic model of performance 
along the following assumptions - any performance is based 
on a stable triadic structure; within this structure, 
movement of the elements is essentially fluid, dynamic, and 
relatively and potentially unfixed; and the idea of this 
structure begins to make less sense if too great a 
challenge is raised against the effectivity of 'creative 
agency' as a conceptual tool. 
These assumptions can then be represented in three 
straightforward propositions 
1) A performance is necessarily an interactive dynamic 
relationship between three things : performer, 
audience and space. 
2) The dynamic is that of the processes of meaning-
production, processes that are in themselves 
'performative'. 
3) The dynamic of performativity can be seen as centred 
around the notion that : identity is the performance 
of meaning, meaning is the performance of identity; 
and that meaning identifies a performance, whilst a 
performance means an identity. 
The first of these propositions, obviously, gives us 
our framework for looking at 'performance', for it states 
that every performance must be an interaction between three 
things - a performer, a space and an audience. 
Now, there is an important issue to be clarified here, 
concerning the distinction between those acts which can be 
termed 'performative', and those that are 'performances'. 
The clue to the nature of the distinction is given by the 
words themselves. Both include the term 'perform', a term 
which can be seen to be descriptive of the same event as 
the theatrical term 'acting'; and, therefore, as this 
thesis defines it, both describe what 1s a state of 
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reflexivity towards one's actions. However, ~n the case of 
a 'performative' act, this reflexivity can be either a 
public .Q.L a private event, whilst ~n the case of a 
'performance', it is always a public one. In other 1-10rds, 
'performativity' describes what ~s a state of being, whilst 
'performance' describes a state of affairs in the world. 
To clarify this point further, we -can refer to the 
fact that one of the drives of Schechner's establishment of 
a body of 'performance theory' over the last twenty years 
has been directed towards the extension of the concept of 
performance on the level of the microcosmic, which has been 
complemented by Victor Turner's construction of the 
macrocosmic importance of performance through his theories 
of the 'social drama' ( 2) . Schechner and Turner have 
attempted ~n their writings to establish a concept of 
performance that is an effective scholarly instrument 
across a range of disciplines, and to this end they have 
engendered and encouraged the notion of a discourse of 
'performance theory'. 
The problem this leads to, for Schechner at least, and 
the one which the explication of terms above was intended 
to resolve, is that it motivates Schechner to describe 
microscopic activity in the brain, and events such as the 
opening of the Berlin wall, with the term 'performance' 
since, for him, they both contain an element of~· 
'performativity' (3). 
question 
He himself states that the main 
is whether a performance generates its own 
frame, that is, is reflexive (self-conscious, 
conscious of its audience, the audience 
conscious of the performer being conscious of 
being a performer, etc.); or whether the frame 
is imposed from the outside 
(in Schechner & Appel [eds], 1990, p28); 
and, as the above quote indicates, it does not appear that 
he is arriving at an answer to the question as much as 
simply generating new questions. 
If there are answers to be had, it may be that they 
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can be provided by the nature of the structure that 1s 
being used to describe what is a 'performance' here; for, 
as the schema states it, there must be present the three, 
physically distinct terms - performer, audience and space -
for the designation 'performance' to apply. So, even if it 
is a fact that the nature of self-consciousness is that it 
1s reflexive in the same way as acting is, unless the three 
terms of the proposition are present in a physically 
distinct sense, the experience remains nameable only as 
'performative', not as a 'performance'. It is, clearly, of 
the same nature as a performance, but it is, nevertheless, 
not one. 
It seems evident that, if there is confusion over this 
issue, it is because the activity under review can be 
constructively looked at as operating the same systematic 
structure as a performance, whether it is visibly 
recognisable as a performance or not. 
It is a fundamental contention of this thesis that 
this apparent interchangeability of the two terms is due to 
the fact that the one event - performance - is the concrete 
representation in the material world of the basic structure 
of the human experience of life, that of 'performativity'. 
The fact that a state of reflexivity towards one's actions 
is described by both terms does not mean, however, that 
they are therefore usefully viewed as commensurate. If they>. 
are viewed thus, the all-pervasiveness of 'performativity' 
in the human world often leads to the idea that the concept 
of performance is as widespread also, which is simply not 
the case. 
It might be of use here to note that a large part of 
the extension of the concept of performanc~ that has taken 
place 1n the thirty years since Erving Goffman ( 1959) 
introduced it into mainstream academic discourse, can be 
traced precisely to this conflation of its target of 
reference with that of the notion of performativity; and 
likewise, this notion of performativity has itself 
benefited from a burgeoning interest, itself dependent on 
the post-structuralist problematization of the notion of 
1 1 
the self (4), 1n the 'performative' character of meaning. 
The basic argument of this approach to meaning is to 
see that where there is a limit to meaning there is also a 
limit to the human world, and that the two things - meaning 
and humanly-produced meaning - are not only co-extensive 
but are in fact the same thing. In other words, the view 
of meaning as 'performative' rejects the notion of 'innate' 
meaning, of the 'thing-in-itself' 1n the world, which 
interacts with the senses of the observer to produce an 
overall meaning of what the thing is, and replaces it with 
the idea that any meanings that can be attached to a thing 
are the result of the enactment of the processes of 
meaning-production around it, and are contained entirely 
within that process, leaving the object itself untouched 
and unknown. Obviously, it follows from this that if there 
is meaning, there must also have been the performative 
process necessary to achieve and produce it. In light of 
this, it becomes logically possible to state that where 
there is human interaction and activity that is meaningful, 
there is always also present the dynamic provided by 
performativity. 
Better still, make the spectators themselves 
the object of the spectacle; make them into the 
the actors so that each sees and loves his o1-m 
image in the others and thus all will be better 
united 
(Rousseau, in Hilton, 1987, pl6). 
Rousseau asserts above that a powerful performance 1v-ill 
occur when an audience member sees and loves his 0\·m image 
in the others, when he/she is made the active producer of 
the import of the spectacle, and when that import relates 
to an extension of the self. This mirrors the manner in 
which meaning is said to be produced by the contentions 
advanced just now, 1n that it relies on an act of 
'projection' rather than mere reception. 
It will be remembered here that the second and third 
of our three 'propositions' concerning the nature of the 
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performance event indicated an apparent acceptance of this 
portrayal of meaning as 'performative', and in fact 
characterized this performative nature of meaning as being 
the dynamic aspect of performance, since the triadic 
structure represented in the first proposition was, as was 
stated, really little more than a containing device. As 
Eugenio Barba notes, "the condition for the germination of 
meanings is the existence of a performer-spectator 
relationship" (Barba, 1995, pl05). 
Now, although they are not 'fixed', and are therefore 
capable of alteration and transformation, the three points 
of the triad of performer, audience and space ~ 
indissoluble to the extent that they must be present, and 
in some sense distinguishable from one another, in order 
for the event being described with them to continue being 
registered as a performance, rather than just as 
performative. It is not a harsh rule, but it is one 
nevertheless since, unless there is some general framework 
for the common recognition of what constitutes 
performances, there is little point 1n retaining the 
concept as a useful one. In other words, although not 
straightforwardly referential in the sense that they always 
represent the very same referenced things, the terms of the 
triad are used in a referential way to point to the 
material structure of the human activity under question.~­
This 1s clearly not an argument for the unproblematic 
nature of the three terms involved, attempting to suggest 
that the concepts 'performer', 'audience' and 'space' are 
finished and fixed entities always existing in the world; 
but it is a recognition of the fact that, in any event 
wanting to be accepted as a performance, there will, 
necessarily, be present the three points of the triad. 
Without this ability to have its elements subsumed within 
the structuration imposed by this performance triad, and tQ 
be seen to contain the elements that are referenced by its 
three terms, an event remains, for this thesis, not validly 
recognisable as a performance, even though it may be 
justifiably named as performative. In other words, the 
13 
performance triad ~s a methodological tool, relying on 
direct referentiality for its effectiveness which, as will 
become apparent, is a definite theme ~n the overall 
theoretical approach of this thesis. 
In some senses, the other propositions in the trinity 
presented operate with a different theoretical emphasis, 
involving themselves with the characteristics of 
relativisation to an extent that the initial proposition 
does not. This is a result of their emphasis on 
performativity, which is nothing if not pure dynamic. As 
Hilton (1987) notes, the very nature of performance as a 
dialectic between being and representing means that 
"theatre is an analogue to the natural scientific concept 
of relativity" (p31). This performance dynamic, the energy 
produced by this 'dialectic', rests entirely on what might 
be called a necessary distance from the self. 
It is around this issue that some interesting points 
begin to appear. For example, we have already seen how 
meaning can be advanced as being tied to 'performativity', 
and how both things can be seen as co-extensive and 
defining of the human world. It is possible now to add 
that performativity is a defining feature of the human 
world because it, in fact, describes what is a defining 
feature of human identity - a critical distance from the 
self. In other words, the structure of self-consciousness,~· 
with its distance from its object of attention - the self -
is never anything but performative. Performativity is the 
central structure of the human experience of life. If this 
were not so, the world, it can be stated, would remain 
largely meaningless. 
If we take a closer look at the nature of the 
'performance dynamic' here, which my second proposition 
suggests can be found in the processes of meaning-
production, it might help to clarify the point being made 
here. 
The term 'performance dynamic' describes the active 
event of the production of meaning within the structure of 
the triad of performer, space and audience. It links 
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directly to the statements of the third proposition, and 
asserts the existence of an exchange of some sort between 
two of the points ~n the triad, the performer and the 
audience. As such, it accepts the relativity inherent in 
the conception of 
earlier, but works 
installs a notion 
meaning as 
to contain 
of exchange 
performative presented 
it within a model that 
between two distinct 
agencies. This is a crucial point, since it is on the back 
of this conceptualisation that the approaching defence of 
the ramifications of agency is mounted; and it is because 
of this representation of performance as an exchange 
between two referential points that a positive notion of 
dialogue, of social existence, can be asserted. This is 
why it is crucial to separate the notion of performativity 
from that of performance. The former represents a 
monologic existence, whilst the latter upholds the 
possibility of dialogue; and, as Lacan suggests, this is 
important because "in itself, dialogue seems to involve a 
renunciation of aggressivity" (Lacan, 1977, p12). 
The drive within post-structuralism to discredit this 
sort of reliance on referentiality is a direct result of a 
desire to disturb what has been seen as the falsely 
established hierarchical structure of meaning, where 
meaning is viewed as flowing in one direction only, from 
the performer or author to the audience or reader. This is-:::·· 
seen as placing audiences as the recipients in a 
communication model based on a simple sender-receiver 
schema (5), which supposedly asserts that the performer 
produces a series of actions that it is the job of the 
audience to interpret 'correctly', so that they might then 
glean the meanings from the performance that the performer 
intended them to. The possible parallels between this 
presentation of the performance event and the view of 
meanings as being 'innate' in things should be clear here. 
In opposition to this, post-structuralist theory has moved 
to wrest the means of production of the processes of 
meaning-generation from the hands that previously held them 
(the authors, performers, directors and so on), and 
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redistribute the potential wealth of these means amongst 
all participants in the event. Thus, the interpretive gaze 
has been re-described as unlimitedly active and capable of 
generating unlimited meaning, unless coerced to contain and 
compromise itself by old structures of authorial dominance, 
or, as Foucault called this function of the author, "the 
ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which 
we fear the proliferation of meaning" (in Rabinow [ed), 
1986, pll9) (6). An early example of this type of 
approach to the interpretive gaze operating 1n Western 
theatre practice 1s discussed by Fischer-Lichte (1995) 
where, analyzing Reinhardt's 1910 production "Sumurun", she 
notes how it was constructed with the knowledge that the 
spectators' processes of reception 
depend on the subjectively determined 
conditions of each spectator and, thus, 
differ from spectator to spectator. Not 
only does the process of reception turn out 
to be a process of production but each 
spectator brings forth her/his own performance. 
The process of reception is realized as a 
subjective construction of reality 
(p102) . 
It is, then, the effectivity of agency that decides 
the specific functioning and particulars of a 'performance· 
dynamic', which itself is the possibilities for the 
restriction, relaxation, containment, challenging and 
general mastery of the processes of meaning-production by 
the participants in the performance event. As Fischer-
Lichte puts it, "theatre turns out to be a field of 
experimentation where we can test our capacity for and the 
possibilities of constructing reality" (p104). For the 
performer, the point of the performance is to display 
(directly, indirectly, deliberately, ironically, 
spontaneously and so on) his or her mastery of whatever 
aspects of the processes of meaning-production that he or 
she is involved with; and, depending on the form of the 
performance event, the audience member's mastery can range 
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from an enjoyment of aesthetic coding, to active 
participation, following of plotline, constitution of ·an 
interpretation and so on. Without the effectivity of 
agency, as can be seen, the notion of performance would 
generally be reduced beyond worth. 
So far, then, there has been proposed here the 
existence of a structure for any performance which requires 
that there be present at the same time something that can 
be named 'performer', something that can be named 
'audience', and something that can be named 'space'. Once 
this triad has been constituted, it has then been suggested 
that there will operate between these points a 'performance 
dynamic', which is a more fluid entity than the tied 
structuration of the triad, and denotes whatever particular 
practices are in occurrence that represent the general 
mastery of the processes of meaning-production by the 
participants of the performance event. This dynamic can 
range from the total dispersal of meaning into ambiguity 
right through to the recognition of strict codes and 
narratives of more formalistic performance events. The 
fluidity of this performance dynamic is inscribed by the 
nature of the performance itself and its internal attitude 
to its position as a producer of meaning. Generally 
speaking, the performers and audiences of a particular 
culture have available to them the semiotic resources that~·. 
constitute their own cultural form. A culture's semiotic 
resources are taken to be the entire range of meanings, and 
the means to produce them, that are available at any one 
time in that culture; and as such they are never in a point 
of stasis, being in continuous interaction with other 
cultures and new developments in their own. This means 
that in any performance situation, the range of meanings 
that can be produced by, from, because of, and within it 
are largely malleable and generally incalculable, unless 
the performance is an example of one of the more formulaic 
types, whose purpose is the enactment of certain codes 
according to certain traditions; and even then, the range 
of meanings that will be generated across the audience base 
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can be seen as, to some extent, undefinable ~n advance, 
since the speci fie inclinations and resources of the 
individual audience members will act on the processes of 
meaning-production in essentially incalculable ways (7). 
Obviously, this ~s a situation well known to any 
practitioner of performance, whose job is to edit, refine, 
manipulate and structure the raw materials of meaning to 
the end of constructing a piece that offers a certain range 
of meanings as opposed to others. Without this process of 
deliberate selection from the available semiotic resources, 
it is difficult to know what the point of a practitioner 
might be. As Sergei Eisenstein commented in 1926, the 
point of performance is the effort at "the moulding of the 
audience in a desired direction" (in Drain [ed], 1995, 
p88). In o.ther words, to retain the idea of performance as 
an expressive activity, as a craft, as a practice that can 
be learnt and developed and achieved by focusing on certain 
things over others, it ~s fundamentally insensible to 
remove the notion of agency. Without the possibility of 
being able to effect the range of meanings likely to be 
developed by the audience on watching a performance, it is 
difficult to know why any performance practitioner would 
bother to continue working at all. The point here is that 
it is the effectivity of the agency of both performer and 
audience that constitute the particular character and·_> 
dimension of any particular performance dynamic. 
Foucault, again, ~s clear about the ramifications of this 
"form of culture ~n which fiction would not be limited by 
the figure of the author." 
concerned, 
It would be, as far as he is 
pure romanticism .... to imagine a culture in 
which the fictive world would operate in an 
absolutely free state, in which fiction would 
be put at the disposal of everyone and would 
develop without passing through something 
like a necessary or constraining figure 
(in Rabinow [ed], 1986, p119). 
18 
However, we have a third proposition to discuss yet, 
which states that the dynamic of performativity, what -we 
have been calling the 'performance dynamic', can be centred 
around the notions that - identity is the performance of 
meaning, and meaning is the performance of identity; whilst 
a performance means an identity, and an identity means a 
performance. What might these statements be supposed to be 
suggesting ? 
Their function is to indicate several things. 
Firstly, that 'identity' is defined and structured in the 
same way as 'meaning'; and secondly that, essential to both 
of these things (which are 1n fact one thing) are t:he 
notions of performativity and performance (which, in fact, 
centre around one term, agency) . 
So what does it mean to say that 'meaning' and 
'identity' are 1n fact one thing ? It actually means 
little more than that what an identity is, whether it be 
the identity of a thing or a person, is what that thing or 
person means or, more accurately, is taken to mean. The 
identity of any thing is the meaning that it has for 
whatever is attempting to identify it. This is because, 
for every thing that registers at all in the human world 
(in other words, that has a meaning, even if that meaning 
is defined as a lack of meaning - for example, a void, a 
vacuum, nonsense and so on), the closest one could come to.:-. 
obtaining the complete identity of the thing would be to 
access every meaning that has ever been, and will ever be, 
attached to it at any time, for there is no sense in 
speaking of the identity of a thing without referencing 
what the thing is taken to mean (8). 
Most things, of course, operate in the social realm 
and are commonly identified since what they mean has 
already been prescribed; and this is one of the functions 
of theatrical or performance space - as a potential site 
for the examination of the meanings that have been attached 
to things by the society, and as an opportunity to ponder 
why this might be so, and possibly to act as a diruptive 
influence (9). As Howard Barker (1989) puts it, "the task 
19 
of theatre is not to produce cohesion or the myt:h of 
solidarity but to return the individual to himself. Not, 
'We must act ! ' but 'Are we thus ?" (p20). 
So, what is it that might be said to constitute 
identity, then ? Where does it 'rest' ? With the thing 
itself ? Or in the public realm of the recognition of the 
thing for the thing that it is (10)? And if this last is 
the case, and the locus of identity of any thing is outside 
of itself, 
identity ? 
is there any point of speaking of 'innate' 
What might this imply for the notion of 
identity when applied to human beings ? Are people simply 
the sum of meanings that are attached to them by themselves 
and others ? 
It might be helpful here if we go back to the notion 
of the 'thing-in-itself' that we touched upon earlier. In 
that earlier reference, I mentioned that an aspect of the 
relativisation of the processes of meaning-production was 
its reliance on a rejection of the notion of 
referentiality, of a level of reality that is outside of 
discourse. In the rejected theory, the world is proposed 
as 'objectively', 'innately' meaningful, but overlaid with 
the relativities of specific cultural locations, and is 
described as that level of reality that grounds the 
particulars of any act of evaluation or interpretation of 
the world. It is this same schematic - again problematised~· 
in post-structuralism - that represents the individual as 
having a 'real self', which is seen as somehow 'secreted 
behind', and directive of, the public 'expressions' of the 
individual. This 'real self' is, like the 'objective' 
world, that level of the thing that is held to be 'true', 
and therefore acts as a foundation (11). 
However, accepting this simplified formulation of the 
notion of the self of an individual tends to mean that 
performative acts, 
are registered as 
and the concept of performance itself, 
'indirect', and therefore less-than-
complete or honest expressions of the self. This is a 
direct result of locating the 'truth' of the individual as 
somehow exterior to his or her performative acts; and is a 
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logical consequence of installing the 'ego' as a cohesive, 
unified entity beyond the reach of the effects ·of 
discourse. This notion of the self does the concept of 
performance a disservice by implying that where there is a 
distance between the self and its actions there is, 
necessarily, a lack of integrity about the acts of 
'expression' In other words, using such a 
conceptualisation of identity necessarily installs a value-
system that locates performative acts as somehow more false 
than acts which are directly expressive of this 
mythological 'self'. It is, therefore, a schematic that is 
based on the false assumption that there are meaningful 
acts that are not in structure performative. In fact, it 
is the problems raised by a dualistic understanding of 
human beings that is being discussed here and again, this 
is an issue that has troubled Western theatre practitioners 
this century as they have searched for the 'authentic' in 
performance. Logie ( 1995) states that this search has 
focused on the body, and that it has encountered the 
problems automatically installed by a dualistic approach -
.,. 
Some theories on expressive movement for 
actors have been published, but the discussion 
has tended to be confused and confusing. 
Hardly surprising, since the subject is the 
complex philosophical question of the 
relationship between mind and body . ,r: ~ 
(p255). 
Such problematics can be approached differently, 
however. The description already given here of how meaning 
and identity are co-extensive and eo-determinant, which 
explained how the generation and operation of the processes 
of meaning-production are always performative, is one such 
attempt to do so. The fact that this structuring of the 
matter represents, in fact, a structuring similar to that 
of self-consciousness means that human identity can 
possibly be seen as itself constituting a performance triad 
with the three points - performer, space, and audience -
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all present 1n the sense of a metaphor. This notion of 
consciousness places performativity as necessarily 
inescapable, and relies on the acceptance of the distancing 
function of self-consciousness from its objects of 
attention (including its own 'self'). 
Now, if we focus again on the last of our initial 
propositions, we can see that if the possibility of innate 
meaning is removed from all things, then clearly nothing 
will register as meaningful unless it is made to do so, 
since it loses the ability to impress itself on 
consciousness in any meaningful way under its own power. 
For a thing to be meaningful, then, and therefore to have 
an 'identity' attached to it, the active consciousness of 
the individual must operate the processes of meaning-
production around it. 
Any theatre practitioner knows that the attachment of 
codes, or values, or meanings to any object is socially 
prescribed, but not fixed. As Peter Brook (1987) says, 
"man is more than what his culture defines" (pl29). Any 
individual at any time can attach any meanings to any 
object, but in doing this he/she will inevitably always 
have access to only those cultural semiotic resources that 
are available to him/her at the time. No individual exists 
1n an entirely alternative world, full of objects and 
entities that are held nowhere else in the culture,-~·­
although he or she may indeed not operate their 
classificatory abilities in the 'usual' way. 
So, presuming there are no innate meanings in things 
to dictate or at least be determinant to a degree of what 
the things are taken to mean, individuals must make the 
world meaningful by activating the stimulant dynamic 
supplied by the processes of meaning-production, which they 
will have acquired through socialisation in their culture. 
If this schematic is accurate, then it is impossible to 
describe the processes of meaning-production without 
utilising a notion of performativity. Following from this, 
it is unlikely that the activation of these processes could 
be achieved without the effectivity of agency. Identity 
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and meaning are always performed; and this, once again, is 
why it makes no sense to evaluate performative acts as 
somehow less valuable than acts that aren't performative. 
It is these acts themselves, and not some primary 'cohesive 
self' regulating them from the 'inside', that constitute 
the nature and extent of the identity of the person in 
question. 
Agency performativity would appear to be the 
determinant factor in all this, and it might be interesting 
to finish with a brief description of what is meant by the 
term here. 
Agency, the effectivity of which is the characterising 
feature of the individuality that can be traced in any 
collected examples of meaning-production from one source -
one person - is two things the ability to operate with 
some level of mastery the available processes of meaning-
production to achieve acts of 'expression'; and the general 
trajectory of this operation, prescribed by the desires and 
drives of the individual in question. It is specifically 
in the field of the operation of agency that the activity 
of performance takes place, and it is specifically on the 
capacities of agency that performance is focused. As 
Brecht states it, the reason for theatre 1s "to put living 
reality in the hands of living people in such a way that it 
can be mastered" (in Drain [ed], 1995, p189J. 
We have, then, a concept of performance that relies on 
the effectivity of agency. What we need to do now is 
develop this concept further what 1s the ability to 
operate the processes of meaning-production, and how can we 
describe the 'general trajectory of the drives and desires 
of the individual'? 
the concept of the 
questions. 
The next chapter begins an analysis of 
self that attempts to answer these 
To conclude this chapter, we can summarise as 
follows performativity describes the human state of self-
consciousness, and defines the extent and nature of both 
meaning and identity; performance spaces, with their 
separation of performer and audience in a special space, 
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are the objectifications of this base structuration of 
experience, ones which, as the remainder of this thesis 
will argue, make manifest in material reality the basic 
form of human psychic existence. 
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I, 
The Problematized, Performing Self. 
Peoples were the creators at first; only later 
were individuals creators. Indeed, the individual 
himself is still the latest creation, 
(Nietzsche, 1961, p85). 
Post-structuralist theory is often seen as being 
largely concerned with the abolition of the 'subject' as 
'founding principle', as the originary point of meaning in 
the world (1). Its aim in this is to replace this 
conception with a new one, which has become known as the 
notion of the 'de-centred' self (2) - a self which no 
longer occupies a central position in the process of the 
construction of the world as meaningful, but is instead 
dispersed, seen now as the result, not the cause, of the 
structuring principles of language. The motivation behind 
this attempt to transform the way that identity is 
conceptualised would seem to be of a not only radical, but 
a radically political, nature (3). 
[P]olitical revolution cannot be fulfilled 
until the very character structures inherited 
from the older, pre-revolutionary society, 
and reinforced by its instinctual taboos, 
have been utterly transformed, 
(Jarneson, 1977, p346). 
As we saw in the introduction, the attempt to challenge 
historical notions of identity is present throughout 
radical theatre writing in the West, and can be seen in a 
range of texts produced by practitioners, from Kornfeld's 
1918 call to escape "the cult of reality" via Expressionism 
(in Drain [ed], 1995, p258), to Artaud's demand that man 
"fearlessly makes himself master of the unborn" (1970, p6), 
through to Grotowski's performances, "conceived as a combat 
against traditional values" (1969, p90). All these 
practitioners, and many others besides, were clearly 
attempting to re-examine and re-formulate what it was that 
was defined as reality, and what it was that constituted 
identity. What follows below is a tracing out of how this 
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what it was that constituted identity. What follows 
below is a tracing out of how ·this problem of identity 
has been approachedin the realm of theory in recent 
years. 
Generally, allowing for the many guises in which 
the theory can be presented, it is broadly describable 
as materialist, meaning that it rejects the notion that 
there is some essence within things which transcends .the 
material level of life; which is an approach that is 
similar to the conceptualisation of meaning outlined in 
the introduction. 
Early performance theory and tb.e 
notion of the self. 
Performances •take place' all along the continuum 
from brain events to public events of great 
spatial and temporal magnitude, 
(Sc:::hechner, 1990, p32); 
Feathers tone ( 1991) points to the emergence of the 
notion of a 'performing self' around the turn of the 
twentieth century, as a new emphasis on 'personality' : .. 
replaced the old concern with 'character' (4.). 
This new type of scrutiny held the 'self' to be, ~n 
essence, a performance, a performative ritual; and it 
gave rise to a body of theory - performance theory -
capable of, and willing to, argue for its discreteness 
from the other disciplines concerned with the social 
behaviour of man, such as sociology and anthropo!l:ogy 
( 5.) . Nowadays, as the above quote from Schechner 
intimates, it sees its field of inquiry as covering all, 
not just the obviously 'performed', aspects of social 
existence. Everything that happens is seen as in some 
sense 'performative', and not to be taken as necessarily 
revealing of the 'real'. Many writers within 
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performance theory believe this expansion of their field 
of inquiry is due to the fact that the conceptual tools 
being developed by them, their way of looking at things, 
is crucially relevant to the current drive by bodies ot 
theory such as peat-structuralism to transfigure the 
received notions of selfhood. The subject's life in the 
meaningful world of discourse has come increasingly to 
be seen - at least in most performance theory - as 
essentially a matter of performance. 
Now, this is not the simple viewing of performance 
as the thing in which people engage for specific, 
probably public, situations, when it is required that: 
they present a •front' to the world (which it is assumed 
is different from 'who they actually are'). It is, as 
Wilshire (1990) explains, the conceptualization of 
performance as a fundamental element of the constitution 
of identity, whether that identity is at the time of a 
consciously performed nature or not 
There is, then, a particle of fictionality within 
the very actuality of human life. It is, moreover, 
a vastly important particle, for we do not have 
our nature set in advance, determined mainly by 
instinct ; it must be formed through a kind of 
'performance• .... 'Performance•, with its 
ineliminable particle of fictionality, is essential 
to our actuality as selves. 
(p174). 
This extension of the notion of performance is at the 
same time a reduction of the credence given to prior 
notions of the self which rely on a schematic containing 
the 'ego' (the real self) and the roles/masks/fronts 
that this ego 'puts on' for various reasons and with 
varying degrees of success. The idea that individuals 
have public and private •selves', the one an authentic 
core which determines the structure of the other. has 
found itself under attack as 'performance theory• has 
disregarded the old constraints that reserved for it a 
function of designation of events only in the public 
realm and invaded the private life of the subject to 
28 
stake its claim for existence there too. The 'ego • 
once complete in itself and sealed off from scrutiny (at. 
least by the methodology of performance) has been 
toppled from its directorial chair to find that what it 
once thought to be outside of it is now a part of it. 
That the ego 'plays parts' is accepted, but it is only a 
part of the playing of those parts. It does not exist 
in some exterior dimension to its roles, but is itself 
simply a role. 
A landmark text 1.0 this enlargement of the notion 
of what constitutes a performance, and also in the 
separating off of performance theory as an identifiable 
discipline, is Erving Goffman's The Presentation of the 
Self jn Everyday r.; fe, (1959), which set out to describe 
the nature of this 'performing self •. It is an early 
entry ~n the development of the concept of 
'performativity', and this is evident in the extent to 
which a simple sender/receiver model of social 
communication operates to ground the analysis (7). 
Goffman does, in fact, go no deeper into the 
primary motivating impulses of the • performer • and his 
actions than to suggest that they are 'psychobiological' 
in nature (p246) ; although, to be fair, the task he set 
himself was the description of the structures of social 
interaction, not the exploration of the ·· ontological 
reasons behind them. It is clear, though, that the 
analysis of what might be termed •performative effects' 
- the actions of •subjects' in the social world is 
necessarily compromised by this exclusion of the 
principal forces ultimately responsible for their 
particular structuration. This means, basically, that 
Goffman settles for a public/private characterization of 
the •self' much like the version discussed above, as is 
explicit in statements such as the following uThe 
expressive coherence that is required in performances 
points out a crucial discrepancy between our all-too-
hwnan selves and our socialised selves, " (p63) . This 
approach almost inevitably leads him to regard the ego 
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'transcendent', 
performances it 
self-contained entity, as a somehow 
undertaking the 
fulfilment of its aims. The 
requires 
extent to 
to achieve 
which any 
individual invests his energies in a particular 
performance is therefore, for Goffman, a matter of 
personal choice throughout, being decided by the 
specific needs of that individual. so that •we often 
find that the individual may deeply involve his ego in 
his identification with a particular part, 
establishment, and group" (p236). This depth of 
involvement is, says Goffman, not always to be 
recommended, since the individual must remain 
"affectively dissociated from his presentation in a way 
that leaves him free to cope with dramaturgical 
consistencies as they arise" p210). 
Clearly, this seems to imply a schema of the self 
that states that it is the transcendent ego of the 
subject which is the director of all the performances it 
produces, so thst if the 
proper distance is maintained, then the competent 
execution of the performance is more likely to be 
achieved. As has been indicated above, this is the type 
of picture of the self in action that post-structuralist 
theory has sought to dismiss, by advancing an 
alternative picture which places the self as dispersed 
within the meanings it forms a part of. In this version 
the subject is not a director at all, but an element of 
what is directed. Goffman does, however, seem to begin 
to problematise the notion of a coherent 'inner' self to 
some extent towards the close of his text. In a series 
of speculations, he begins to sketch the outlines of a 
'performing self' that seems to move beyond the form of 
the self so disparaged by post-structuralism. This 
'performing self', he argues, "does not derive from its 
possessor, but from the whole scene of his action, being 
generated by that attribute of local events that renders 
them interpretable by witnesses" (p244) . The performer 
in this new schema is not the site of the self, •for he 
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and his body merely provide the peg on which something 
of a collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time,". 
(p245); and it would therefore be a mistake to see this 
performer as the origin of the self that he performs. 
In this new formulation, it is the audience that imputes 
a self to the performer as a result of his successful 
manipulation of the elements of 'selfhood', and so this 
self is "a product of a scene that comes off, and is not 
a capse of it" (p245). In fact, it is only a matter of 
illusion, or rather shared 'suspension-of-disbelief', 
that "the firm self accorded each performed character 
will appear to emanate intrinsically from its performer" 
(p245). 
It would seem in this that the kernel of the 
public/private schematic, the transcendent ego, is, in a 
manner comparable to that evident in post-structuralist 
theory, being offered up to the disseminating forces of 
meaning-making and revealed in its dissolution as simply 
a construction of social processes. An important 
distinstion between the two approaches, though, is that 
Goffman emphasises the fact that the individual 
nevertheless retains a level of causality within these 
social processes; which is an aspect of the existence of 
the individual that is generally subject to reduction in 
post-structuralist readings. In effect, depite his 
problematization of the notion of the self, Goffman 
reserves a function for the creative agencies of his 
'performers' . 
The self, then, as a performed character, is 
not an organic thing that has a specific location, 
whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, 
and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising 
diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the 
characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is 
whether it will be credited or discredited, ' 
(p245) . 
What Goffman moves towards describing in these 
assertions is a version of the self that seems similar 
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to the problematized conception offered by post-
structuralist theory, and it is perhaps possible to. 
suggest in light of this that he therefore provided the 
seeds which later performance theory was to germinate in 
order to provide itself with the notion of the self as 
'pure performativity' that we have already encountered. 
Perhaps, then, Goffman needs to be seen simply as 
having been happy to leave blank what post-structuralism 
has been intent to fill in - the 'essence' at the centre 
of this self. In a sense, as has been mentioned, to 
judge Goffman on his own agenda would be to grant that 
he characterises with some insight the processes by 
which the social actor seeks to be successfully received 
and the obstacles that can be encountered in this. For 
example, the anti-rationalist drive of post-
structuralist philosophy would have no argument with the 
description Goffman gives of a 'social establishment' 
(read 'discourse' ) as "any place surrounded by fixed 
barriers to perception" (p231) This fixing of reality, 
Goffman says, limits the possibilities of credible ways 
of expression for the self and apparently is, "there are 
grounds for believing ... a natural development in social 
organisation," (p37); and Lacanian theorists would, as 
we shall see, be happy to accept the statement that 
"underlying all social interaction there seems to be a > 
fundamental dialectic" (p45), concerning the need to 
recognise and be recognised. However, it is with 
Goffman' s positive description of each performance as 
"an expressive rejuvenation and reaffirmation of the 
moral values of the community, (p45), thatthe difference 
in radical intent between his project and post-
structuralism's does become clear, since this constant 
re-inscription of the status quo is specifically what is 
critiqued by the latter. This use of the dynamics of 
identity-formation by the societal systems of normative 
regulation is also, as we have already touched upon, the 
reason for the attacls upon normalised identity that are 
found within radical theatre writings. Instead of 
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seeking to re-affrim the moral values of society at 
large, such writings generally attempt to de-stabilize 
or challenge them. 
So, whilst it could be said that the foundation for 
a perhaps more radical critical project is there in 
Goffman, it might also be said that it is not built upon 
to any great extent; and therefore his theory remains, 
in the best scholastic tradition, non-interventionist. 
This is interesting because his field of inquiry is 
clearly so close to someone like Lacan' s, and yet the 
end result can be read as much less incisive. This 
disparity in critical force between the two approaches 
seems to stem from the extent of the problematization of 
the notion of self practised by both parties. In his 
own words, Gof fman set out to simply 'look at' "the 
individual's own belief in the impression of reality 
that he at tempts to engender in those among whom he 
finds himself," (p28); whereas it is precisely this 
process of the self's relation to itself that is the 
object not only of attention, but also of 
deconstrJJctjqn, in the Lacanian project. 
So, although the notion of the self found in early 
performance theory such as Goffman's shares similar 
concerns with post-structuralist conceptions of 
identity, it is generally less radically motivated . 
. · It will be helpful now to move deeper into the 
intricacies of what is involved in constructing a notion 
of the self, since this will enable a clarification of 
the initial sketch that we have analyzed ~n Goffman. 
This is likely to require that the nature of the 
discussion will become somewhat more abstract and a good 
degree more dense. It should be remembered, therefore, 
that what is being undertaken is simply the exploration 
in the discourse of contemporary theory of the same 
object of inquiry - the self that has consistently 
been explored in many aspects of the discourse of 
radical theatre over the last century. 
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Problematizing the Self. 
How is it best to approach 'filling in the gaps' in 
Goffman's theory of self-identity ? 
Using a selective dredging technique on Goffman's 
text, with the nets set to hold only the fleeting and 
indirect descriptions of the primary processes of the 
self that we are after - not the specific performances 
of the self, but the driving force behind them - wi 11 
perhaps allow us to gather enough partial shapes and 
semi-forms to be able to construct at least an outline 
of what this primary self looks like to Goffman. We 
already know from him that the motivations of the 
performing self are upsychobiological in nature" ( 1959' 
p246); but now a closer look reveals that they are 
joined to "a capacity to learn" (p245), which is, 
Goffman tells us, innate. This 'capacity' is described 
as actually a natural predicative ability, which leads 
people to urely on assumptions as to the persistence and 
generality of psychological traits as a means of 
predicting ... present and future behaviour" (p13). 
Goffman's individuals then apparently use this ability, 
together with their memories of formere similar 
situations, to gauge the potential risks and benefits of 
the various events they take part in. That they do take 
part, despite what is apparently a constant risk of 
failure, is due to the fact that it is, as we have seen, 
fundamentally important to be credited as a successful 
performer. The self as Goffman presents it must have 
recognition from others in order to feel complete; and 
this recognition is sought out in performative 
interaction with others, which involves the self in a 
"fundamental dialectic" (p241). The context of 
operation for this 'dialectic' is the social world in 
which the self seeks to meet its needs, a place 
"surrounded by fixed barriers to perception" (p37). 
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This fixing of reality, Go f fman says , limits the 
possibilities of credible ways of expression for the self 
and apparently is, "there are grounds for believing ... a 
natural development in social organisation" (p37). 
We have only to think of the efforts made by theatre 
practitioners to extend the possible ways of seeing the 
world to recognise the conservative nature of that last 
assertion. As Heiner Muller (1990), the radical East 
German playwright puts it : "The horrifying thing for me in 
this is the occupation of the imagination by cliches which 
will never go away. The use of images to prevent 
experiences, to prevent the having of experiences," (p165). 
To contend, as Goffmann seems to above, that the delimiting 
of reality and identity is the result of a natural process 
tends to deny the possibility of alternatives. As we shall 
see, the starting point for radical theatre practice, and 
for theory such as Foucault's, is the belief that the 
social regulation of identity is far from being a natural 
phenomenon. 
If we were to sum up Goffmann•s portrayal of the 
primary level of human identity at this point, we could say 
that it is a picture of the human organism as a 
psychobiological 'thing', capable of learning by inference 
and desiring of recognition by others, that utilises the 
naturally-given possibilities of expression to gain th~·.·. 
recognition that it needs in order to survive. Where does 
such a description lead us ? And is it possible to clarify 
the terms involved to any greater degree ? 
The Will to Power and the capacity 
to learn : 
(T]he capacity to acquire knowledge is the 
most important 'organ' of the body, 
(Lash, in Featherstone et al, 1991, p270). 
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It will be helpful to the discussion at this point to 
accept Goffman's formulation of the self for a while, and 
to then accept it as having primary and secondary. 
characteristics. Secondary in this schema would be the 
desire for recognition; whilst the description of the 
psychobiological nature of the self, and its capacity to 
learn, would be termed primary. 
The analysis of the post-structuralist conception of 
the self developed below presents the self as following 
the same framework as Goffman's although, as will become 
clear, there is some argument to be undergone before this 
can be asserted with any weight. 
The first of Goffman' s primary features, the 
'psychobiological' drive, will be postulated by this 
thesis as an innate 'Will to Power' - a term drawn from 
the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. This will to 
power is regarded as being inseparably joined to what 
might be termed the 'innate capacities' of the human form 
- those aspects of its form which make its expression and 
fulfilment at all possible. This will to power is 
therefore, in terms of the structure of the self just 
proposed, a primary rather than a secondary 
characteristic of identity. A major example of an 
'innate' capacity is what Goffman termed the ·capacity to 
learn'; and other examples would be the capacity to move, 
capacity to feel and so on. All of these features of the 
human form are primary attributes. The capacity to 
learn, it will be remembered, was presented by Goffman as 
a dialectic that operates between individual memory and 
new experience, thereby engendering the possibility of 
inferential deduction, which is its basic method of 
operation. 
So, underway here is the construction of a 
theoretical model of the human form that presents it as 
consisting of primary and secondary characteristics. Up 
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to this point, we have a conception of that basic form .as 
consisting centrally - in terms of psychic structure - of 
the two basic building blocks of a will to power and a 
capacity to learn. The 'blocks' will be dealt with in 
reverse order in the discussion to come. 
Now, we have already seen how Goffman elucidates the 
capacity to learn no further in his text than stating that 
it is there, that it is of a certain fundamental character, 
and that it must be innate because it is something that 
everybody has. It might be helpful here, then, to seek out 
a body of theory that achieves what might be regarded as a 
more rigorous examination of this characteristic of human 
identity. 
David Best is a writer whose philosophical project can 
be described as of the Wittgensteinian school ( 8) . A 
major aspect of the conceptual framework that Wittgenstein 
developed in his philosophy was a concerted attack on the 
notion of a 'private' self that expressed its own unique 
thoughts through the medium of language but was 
otherwise invisible to public scrutiny (9). This critique 
was encapsulated in what has become known as the 'private 
language' argument, of which Best's work is a development. 
(Hopefully, it is clear that, as such, his work centres on, 
and scrutinizes, the type of dualistic notions of selfhooct.:· 
that were touched on in Chapter One). 
Phi 1 oso:oby and Hllman Movement ( 1978) , for example, is an 
attempt to demonstrate that the expressivity of dance 
is not due to the fact that movements express the inner 
emotions of the dancer, but is instead the result of 
the fact that the movement and the expression are the same 
thing - the insertion of a space between them is simply 
the inscription of a dualism where none exists (10). 
In other words, it might be said that Wittgensteinian 
philosophy is 'materialist' in the sense that it seeks 
to remove the need to refer to some inner essence or self 
in the attempt to understand the public utterances 
of individuals. It takes this stance because it 
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understands that the idea that language expresses the 
pre-formed 'thoughts' of subjects will inevitably 
install a divide between what it is that can be thought 
and what is, after this, expressible in language. This 
is seen to necessarily posit an 'identity' that is 
prior to the public medium of its expression, and it is 
this idea exactly that Wittgenstein, and therefore Best, 
are concerned to debunk in their writings. In doing so, 
it is surely not difficult to see how they might offer 
new conceptual tools to those involved in the cricique 
of traditional notions of identity, whether the method 
of critique is the creation of theoretical writings or 
the development of theatrical practices. They are an 
instance of what Muller (1990) terms the effort to 
dismantle the "prefabricated cliches" of identity 
(p188). 
Best introduces 
Wittgenstein's later 
his work 
philosophy, 
as 
where 
building 
language 
on 
is 
presented as "a development from, sometimes replacing, 
various ways in which human beings instinctively act and 
respond" (1985, p3). This conception of language 
includes the view that "language itself is a network of 
forms of behaviour, but it is underlain by pre-
linguistic behaviour" (p3). In following through the 
logic of the 'private language' argument, Best uses his 
texts to develop the notion of language as a response 
just as immediate as instinctual actions, and therefore 
not productively viewed as indicative of a distance 
between experience and its •expression'. 
Of particular interest to this thesis is Best's 
formulation of the process through which the individual 
acquires linguistic capability. For example, he states 
that "the change from non-linguistic to linguistic 
behaviour consists in the learning of different 
behaviour" (p3) . This may seem a statement so 
undemandingly obvious as to seem of little consequence 
perhaps; but it is pulled from its context and held up 
here because it represents the first mention of a 
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capacity to learn in another theory since we moved on 
from discussing Goffman. Best then goes on to explain 
after this how the act of 'learning' is based on certain 
'natural responses' •which are instinctive, and to which 
appeal must be made for any learning to be possible• 
(p3) . For Best, these 'natural responses' are 
absolutely fundamental to human development, since 
•unless there were something which humans just .do., some 
innate, instinctive re~ponse, there would be nothing to 
which learning could appeal, nothing on which reason 
could get a grip• (p4). 
There are, according to Best, two main examples of 
these 'natural responses' , which are the innate 
capacities that underly learning. The first of these 
capacities is 'induction', and the second is the notion 
of the 'reactive attitude'. Best describes how 
induction 'hooks onto' the (already present) human 
'expectation of continuation', and this means that the 
innate human capacity of induction can be seen as 
•rooted in the instinctive expectation, revealed in 
immediate ways of acting and responding, that things 
will continue in the future as they have in the past • 
(p4). The 'reactive attitude', 
"consists in the ways we act 
Best 
and 
goes on to say, 
respond to other 
people• (p8) ; and it is •an essential 
understanding other people and 
society ... [because) ... it gives sense 
reasons in relation to them" (p9) . 
living 
to ·the 
It is, 
"ultimate, in that it is not underlain by 
hypothesis • (p9 J • 
part of 
in a 
notion of 
he says, 
reason or 
Now, of the two notions being discussed here, this 
one seems to be somewhat the weaker, since it does 
appear to be edging towards a description, much like 
Goffman' s, of social structures as natqral ly engendered; 
because of this. it is not adopted here as being able to 
add anything useful to the position being developed. 
This leaves us with Best's formulation of an innate 
inductive ability (the capacity to learn) in human 
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beings; and this is presented as acting as a determining 
influence on, and grounding for, the world of concepts, 
language and reason "The roots of concepts and the 
reasons which express them are, then, ways of acting and 
responding which have been absorbed as the norms of the way 
of life of a society" (p7) . Developing this idea, Best 
says it is possible to state that even in the case of 
obviously learnt behaviour, where there may well have been 
training, that training still "needs something on which to 
work, in that a child must already share attitudes and 
responses with us if the training is to be possible at all" 
(p7) . It is perhaps clear that a major aspect of this 
'shared' dimension must, necessarily, be the infant's 
experience of practical interaction with the physical 
environment that it shares with other hwnan beings. In 
other words, it shares its sphere of practice in the 
empirical world. 
Now, despite rejecting one aspect of Best's thesis, it 
is still useful to have found a basic 'capacity to learn' 
advanced from within another materialist postion. That it 
is characterised as a concept in the same way as Goffman's 
was - as a structure of induction - is perhaps a return 
that justifies the space given to it, if only because it 
shows that the positing of a prior capacity to learn in ·. 
hwnans is justifiable on materialist grounds. 
It might be worthwhile to note here, in· light of the 
'realist commitment' 
this chapter would 
presented by this 
that it 
underlie 
thesis, 
was 
the 
that 
signalled at the start of 
model of the self to be 
Best uses such a model 
in fact attack realism -
which he describes as a belief in a singular •real' world 
- what he is actually criticizing is the idealist 
version of that philosophical position, one which 
himself ( 11) . Although he does 
holds out for the existence of a prior, 'real' world 
which is unsuccessfully mirrored by language, and 
knowledge to reach which it should be the object of 
towards so that human experience can finally come to 
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know in an urunediated fashion the "pre-existent, pre-
conceptualised phenomena" that supposedly comprise 
reality (p22). Best dismisses this version of realism 
for supposing that "there are facts about the world 
which are independent of, and determine, the concepts 
expressed in language" (p22) . However, if, as can 
happen, . Best • s attitude to the • real' world is taken to 
be one which rejects the idea of any notion of an 
objective world entirely, then it becomes difficult to 
make much sense of his claim for the 'ultimacy• of the 
'reactive attitude'; since what he is surely claiming 
with such a notion is that it is a • fact about the 
world' which is • independent of', and determines, 'the 
concepts expressed in language•. Indeed, if his 
rejection of the • real' world is presumed to be of an 
absolute kind, then it becomes similarly hard to 
decipher any longer the notion of induction he is 
advancing the 'intrinsic expectation ... that things 
will continue in the future as they have in the past' 
since it would clearly no longer be possible to view it 
as the dialectic between the infant and the things about 
which it is forming expectations, which in this case are 
its own physical form and the way this relates to the 
world around it. Clearly, this makes no sense. For the 
concept of induction, as Best is using it, refers to ·the 
process of observation, projection, interiorisation and 
reflection conducted by the infant, and it follows from 
this that what the infant interacts with will, in all 
probability, have a determining effect at some level on 
what, and even and why it observes, projects, 
interiorises and reflects upon. It is clear from 
this that it can be said to be Jogjcally necessary to 
posit the existence of a world external to the infant" 
which, from the stage of pre-linguistic maturation to 
beyond, is determining to the extent that it forms part 
of the dialectical process by which humans relate to the 
world. In light of this, it can be asserted that the 
'realist commitment' adhered to by this thesis is noL an 
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idealist version, and in fact closely follows the same 
assumptions that best bases his work on, making it, 
also, a properly materialist position .. 
We can possibly clarify the problematics of this 
issue further if we expand the discussion for a little 
while longer. Firstly, it can be proposed that the 
experiential context of each new infant in the world is 
equally unique and equally valid. This would, if 
accepted, also propose that there can necessarily be no 
one, 'real' world, since the potential for variation in 
what this world might be held to be mu£L be of the same 
proportion as the possible number of perspectives, which 
in this case is, possibly, infinite. 
(Again, it will hopefully be seen here how this 
issue relates to the rejection of the notion of 'innate' 
meaning which was discussed in Chapter One. This should 
indicate the methodological progress of this thesis, 
whereby the initial concepts and problems are being re-
worked, extended and made more complex, as their 
philosophical and theoretical ramifications are 
scrutinized in more depth). 
So, if it can be said that there is no such thing 
as the 'real' world, this is because it needs to be 
acknowledged that there are any number of variations of 
what the world is, since there any number of ways of >-
experiencing, and therefore interpreting, it; and the 
concept of relativity suggests that no single 
interpretation can be held to be the 'right' one. Ic 
therefore becomes impossible to assert that any 
particular experienced world is, in fact, the 'real' 
one; and this makes the very not ion of a 'real' world 
extremely problematic. 
Against this position, though, we can assert the 
results of empirical observation and state that, despite 
the possibility of infinite variation in the approaches 
taken to, and responses engendered by, these singular 
worlds, the observable actions and reactions of pre-
linguistic infants are of such _a regularity as to 
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foster the strong suspicion that they experience the 
world in suprisingly similar ways, which in turn leads. 
to the thought that the world might be of a standard 
character for them, and perhaps even they for it. Thus 
it becomes possible to re-assert the existence of some 
sort of prior 'objectice' world outside of the influence 
of personal interpretation. 
Actually, it is possible to extend the argument 
here by using Best's own methodology against him, as it 
were, to assert the necessary existence, alongside the 
'natural reponses' of the infant he has already 
described, of an assortment of 'natural facts' about the 
world. These might include, for example, the existence 
of matter and non-matter, light and dark, hot and cold 
and so on (all of which it might be noted are rooted in 
the sensual experience of the materiality of the world) . 
The argument that these 'natural facts could be used to 
support would progress by maintaining that, in just the 
same way as Best's 'natural responses' , these 'natural 
facts' have 'been absorbed as the norms of the way of 
life of a society', and underlie the developments of 
language and reason. It would be possible to assert, 
given this, that the 'natural responses' Best describes 
are actually nothing more than examples of such 'natural 
facts'. 
That there are 'natural facts' about human 
existence in the world, and that they act as a 
determining factor on human life is, as has been stated, 
the character of the realist commitment of this thesis. 
To deepen the idea of what a realist commitment 
involves we can turn our attention at this point to an 
essay by the anthropologist Norbert Elias, entitled, "On 
human beings and their emotions" (12). In it, Elias 
employs a set of 'facts' about the world (facts of human 
existence such as birth, death, climate and so on), 
since he sees them as useful 'markers' - useful in that 
they provide a common frame of reference for commonly 
experienced objects and events in the world. His basic 
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proposition is that, whereas biological evolution created 
generic diversity as the method of dominance in other 
animals 
'birds' 
different species of the generic grouping 
fly at different heights and speeds, eat 
different things, live in different climates etc. to 
ensure their combined survival - and thereby fostered a 
vast number of distinct species within generic groups of 
the same animal to cope with different settings, "in the 
case of humans, the same species adapted itself to vastly 
different conditions on earth mainly by means of social 
differentiation," (in Featherstone, M. et al [eds], 1991, 
pl07) . The argument of the essay characterises all life 
forms as being comprised of two basic methods of 
development 1) a capacity to enact unlearned 
(instinctual) conduct; and 2) a capacity to learn. Human 
beings, for Elias, represented an evolutionary 
breakthrough because, in all other animals, "although the 
scope for learning in relation to the scope for unlearned 
conduct has been growing ... the unlearned genetic 
programme of reactions remained dominant" (pl08) . This 
mean' t that "in all pre-human forms of living, steering 
conduct with the help of individually made and remembered 
experiences remained subordinate to unlearned forms of 
steering conduct" (pl08). 
says, 
In contrast to this, Elias 
the learning potentials of humans had grown 
to such an extent that they, and they alone, 
came to be totally dependent on learned forms 
of knowledge for their dominant form of 
communication and for their orientation in 
the world, 
(pl09) . 
So, Elias is clear that not only is this 'capacity 
to learn' an innate quality possessed by humans, it is 
the possession of this capacity to the degree that they 
do possess it that defines things as human. 
capacity to learn forms part of the 
It - the 
'natural 
structures' that mark something as being specifically 
'human' : "Learning, accumulating experiences, acquiring 
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knowledge - they are all based on the utilization and 
patterning of natural structures" (p112). This concept. 
of 'natural structures', it will be seen, describes 
those things that this thesis has just described as 
'natural facts'. For Elias, his term refer to those 
structures "which are completely inaccessible to change 
as a result of stored and remembered experience - that 
is, as a result of learning" (pllO) and covers such 
things as the limitations of the human form as 
prescribed by the fact of its being a warm-blooded 
mammal, for example. He also goes on in his discussion 
to make the related point that it is a logical necessity 
to allow for the existence of a world exterior to the 
individual since "most attributes and properties of a 
human being have functions which can only be understood 
if one considers people's relationships with existences 
other than themselves" (p11 7) . The example he cites as 
an illustration of this is 'the stomach and food', which 
is a case, he maintains, where the one is not 
comprehensible without the other. 
Elias's points help to add 
picture being presented here of 
to 
the 
the developing 
human infant as 
operating, as a basic method of maturation, a capacity 
to learn. It becomes more possible to suggest, if his 
analysis is accepted, that such a capacity might indeed 
be a defining feature of the human species, and that it 
has the character of a dialectical engagement with an 
exterior 'objective' world. 
Perhaps it is becoming clearer now why a certain 
'realist conunitment' might need to be seen as a IU:.e=-
rec;vJj site for a theoretical position ·that intends to 
posit a 'capacity to learn' as innate to human beings. 
The postulating of such a capacity, if it is defined as 
a form of interactive dialectic as it has been above, 
presupposes certain assumptions. These assumptions take 
the form of an acceptance of certain 'facts', such as : 
1) The infant exists as something. 
2) The world exists as something. 
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3) The infant exists in a dialectical, mutually defining 
relationship with this world. 
4) The infant perceives the world through its senses. 
5) The infant has an innate 'capacity to learn'. 
6) This capacity to learn involves the ability to infer 
'events' and recognise 'causes' in what it observes. 
7) This ability to infer involves observational, 
analytical, classificatory and memory ability. 
8) The data collected by these senses and abilities can 
be individually made and remembered. 
9) The ability to infer is rooted in a human expectation 
of continuation (forms a circuit with 6,7 & 8). 
10) The world is determining of the infant to the extent 
that it forms part of a dialectic, established by the 
infant's perceptual methods and capacities. 
(It might be highlighted here that later discussion of 
the nature of the 'will to power', the second 'building 
block' of identity, will lead us to want to pas it another 
characteristic to be added to this list, one which we 
encountered in the Introduction and which is, arguably, 
also a defining feature of human beings, namely that human 
consciousness is reflexive, and represents the world to 
itself in symbolic form, [13]). 
This above list, then, provides examples of the type 
of assumptions that are necessary to ground the postulation 
of something being called here the 'capacity to learn'. 
Describing them as empirical means that, in the view of 
this thesis, they are facts which are not available to be 
relativised. They are prior to the particular 
transformations of any cultural imposition, and, in fact, 
must be present to act as the foundation for all the 
variations to be found in specific societal formulations 
of what being a human being involves. 
Therefore, as a concept, the capacity to learn as it 
1s offered now is an expanded account of what Goffman 
described in his text as simply the 'capacity to learn'; 
and thus we still have the same concept, but now in a more 
defined and useful form. 
The discussion to this point has shown how, as a 
natural structure, the capacity to learn is prior and 
therefore needs no rational justification for its 
existence. It is, in Best's words, 'something which 
humans just du'. The level of determinacy and objective 
existence being advocated for the external world through 
this is, it might be seen, not necessarily a bar to 
radical readings of the processes of identity formation 
such as would be found in post-structuralist theory, 
then, in as much as such theory implicitly operates with 
it anyway, since the nature of the objective world being 
postulated places it prior to the objects of inquiry of 
such theory. 
On a political note, it is arguable that such an 
explicit commitment to certain empirical facts about the 
world and the life-forms that constitute a part of it 
should be defended on the grounds of necessity. Kate 
Soper, for example (14), points out how political action 
always operates from a system of values that define the 
worth of human beings ( 15) ; and notes that the current 
academic debate about value engendered by postmodernism 
is due to the latter's "repression or evasion of the 
realist commitment that may be essential to 
any consistent argument over valuesn (in 
(ed), 1993, pl9). In another essay (16), she 
sustaining 
Squires,J. 
highlights 
how, in implementing political projects of social reform 
of whatever character, "overcoming scepticism about the 
universal and objective quality of human needs may be an 
essential first moven (1993, p115). Both of these 
points are important ones. 
The assertion of the dialectical nature of the 
capacity to learn possessed by humans can then be seen 
as an explicitly 'political' strategy, which allies it 
to the Marxist notion of 'practice' ( 17) , defined by the 
philosopher Chris Harman (1983) as 'interaction with an 
external reality'. Harman quotes Marx in order to show 
where his formulating of 'interaction with an external 
world' as being the foundation of human thinking has 
been taken from : 
The question whether objective truth can be 
attributed to human thinking is not a question 
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of theory but a practical question. Man must 
prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the 
this-worldliness of his thinking, in practice. 
The dispute over the reality and non-reality of 
thinking which is isolated from practice is a 
purely scholastic question ... All social life is 
essentially practical. All mysteries which 
lead theory into mysticism find their rational 
practical solution in human practice and in the 
comprehension of this practice, 
(Marx, in Harman,l983, p74). 
After this, Harman moves on in his essay to criticise 
another writer within Marxism, Alex Callinicos, for making 
what he sees as 
the mistake characteristic of much academic 
philosophy of seeing the development of 
concepts and the development of practice as 
two different things - and then getting involved 
in endless worries about how concepts can 
relate to reality, 
(p79) 0 
According to the line of argument Harman is following, 
it is because human beings are actively involved with 
reality, through practical interaction to transform it, 
that they come to know which ideas about it are true and 
·• 
which are not. He notes that uconcepts do not come out of''· 
nowhere. They are generated by human beings' interact ion 
with each ··other and with the world" (p79) . It becomes 
possible, on this basis, to say that it is human practice 
which is determining of the ideas accumulated about reality 
by a society, and this then leads inevitably to the 
acceptance of the existence of an external world since, "by 
definition, practice involves human beings interacting with 
an external reality" (p81). 
As a recapulation, then, we can say that the 
concept of human identity advanced so far in this thesis 
states that the human infant, comprised of a body, a 
capacity to learn and a will to power, interacts via 
practice with an external reality, and this practical 
interaction forms the basis of its later development of 
the conceptual apparatus with which reality is 
interpreted. 
We can perhaps move on from this now to a firmer 
encapsulation of what this picture of the human infant 
represents. To achieve this, we need actually only 
borrow from Best the structure of one of his proposals 
and re-write it to fit the facts as they now stand. In 
other words, where Best insists that •unless there were 
something which humans just do. .... •, we can respond by 
insisting that it should, instead, read as •unless 
there were something which humans just .a.r:.e. ••• •, (which 
is really not a re-writing at alL but is certainly a 
change of emphasis). The full hypothesis of this thesis 
so far could then be read as 'Unless there were 
something which humans just are, there would be no 
explanation for the coincidences of acting and 
responding that are empirically observable in human 
beings' interaction with the external world. Therefore, 
there are certain 'natural structures' of the human form 
and the material world that it interacts with that are 
determining features of existence for it.' 
Having established this as the basic schematic of 
identity that this thesis has constructed so far, it 
will help to broaden the discussion if we undertake an ·.~-­
analysis of the conceptions of identity found in Michel 
Foucault • s and Jacques Lacan • s texts. This will enable 
us to do several things. Firstly, it will introduce 
into the debate some primary post-structuralist 
contentions, and allow us to see what aspects of the 
schema of self developed up to now may, or may not, be 
under threat from these contentions. The analysis 
conducted should also serve to clarify and deepen the 
whole question of self and 'subjecthood', and will 
highlight some of the areas of interest for those 
theories working to problematise received societal ideas 
of what it ~s that constitutes self, and social, 
identity. It will also act to contextualise the 
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discussion just conducted, and show the relevance of 
trying to discover the sensible extent of the drive to 
relativise all aspects of human existence. It is 
intended that, 
the writings 
by the close of 
of Lacan and 
this investigation into 
Foucault, a better 
understanding will have been gained of just what it 
means to 'problemat ise' the not ion of the self; and of 
what positive paths of action there are available to 
individuals in the aftermath of such problematization. 
The simple fact that man can be recognised 
in a certain way creates a sense of triumph, 
and the fact, too, that he can never be 
recognised completely, never once and for 
all, that he is not so easily exhaustible, 
that he holds and conceals so many possibilities 
within himself (hence his capacity for 
development), is a pleasurable recognition. 
That man can be changed by his surroundings, 
and can himself change the surrounding world, 
i.e. can treat it with consequence, all this 
produces feelings of pleasure, 
(Brecht, in Benjamin, 1966, p13). 
50 
., 
.r·_ 
t. 
I 
I~ 
' 
~.' .. 
C:HAPllER liHR:EEa; 
'51 
The 
Problematized, Post structuralist 
Self. 
Every person carries within him a hierarchy 
of values according to which he approves or 
condemns. The theatre offers the possibility 
of seeing whether these values have been 
imposed from the outside or whether they are 
truly part of one's convictions, 
(Brook, 1987, p235). 
What the post-structuralist critique of the 
'subject' represents on one level is a systematic 
interrogation of the rationalism that has dominated and 
defined the development of human societies from the time 
of Plato to the present day. This is often manifested, 
and more importantly perhaps is seen as manifesting, in 
a rejection of the notion of 'value' the 
differentiation of things according to a system of 
evaluative criteria; a rejection which is motivated by a 
disregard for the appeals to unjustifiable qualities 
that most valuations implicitly employ (1). The 
grounding for this refusal to ascribe value to objects 
is the perception of the world as possessing no 
particular innate qualities whatsoever, having no 
defined shape or purpose, and therefore being unusable 
as a support for any statements about the value of any 
one aspect of it in regard to others (2). In just the 
same way as it removes the referential effectivity of 
language, proposing that 
other than itself, least 
structuralism views the 
generally justified by 
it never refers to anything 
of all a 'real' world, post-
system of value ascription as 
nothing other than its own 
discourse. However, as Steven Connor points out ( 3) , 
any 'critique' of rationalism is, of necessity, likely 
to be a paradoxically loaded endeavour 
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The various versions of such a critique need 
to be taken very seriously indeed, but it is 
precisely their force and seriousness, which 
is to say, the rational and ethical claims that 
they exercise, that reveals them to be value-
claims in themselves, 
(in Squires, J. [ed], 1993, p36). 
As we move through the work of Foucault and Lacan, the 
strains exerted on their theoretical structures by this 
resident paradox will perhaps become clear. 
Firstly, however, it will be useful to clear up one 
particular aspect of the notion of identity so far 
proposed by this thesis. 
The core of natural structures that have been 
identified so far as defining human beings are, 
obviously, 'uni versals' , in that they can apply to all 
beings that can be named as 'human' to some degree or 
other (4). These universals are, as has been explained 
previously, those concrete facts of existence that have 
been arrived at by a process of interaction with, and 
observation of, the material world; and as a grounding 
for actions and decision-making they will therefore be 
utilised or departed from according to the same process. 
They constitute, then, a collection of 'contingent 
facts' , and they retain the power and status of facts 
only for as long as they prove their effectivity and 
functionality in that role as regards human practice 
(5). The ability of these universals to have their 
status as facts removed at any time is actually what 
makes them effective as such in the first place. (As 
Nietzsche himself teaches, "Truth has never yet clung to 
the arm of an inflexible man," [1961, p79]). 
So, the universals put forward here as 'facts' of 
existence need to be seen as knowledge gleaned by 
humanity from the dialectical process of interaction 
with the material world. They are therefore not 
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necessarily the basis for any essentialist hypothesis 
about the character of human nature; but are rather a 
collection of observations about the structure of the 
physical world which can serve as the framework for the 
advancement of a materialist theory. The nature of 
their universality is not such that they can be the 
target for relativist dissatisfaction, since relativity 
is, in fact, inscribed in them by their relation to 
practice. As Harvey points out, uuniversality must be 
construed in dialectical relation with particularity. 
Each defines the other in such a way as to make the 
universality criterion always open to negotiation 
through the particularities of difference" (in Squires, 
[ed], 1993, p116). With that clarified, we can now 
move on to an analysis of Michel Foucault' s particular 
critique of rationalist subjectivity. 
Nietzsche, acknowledged by Foucault as an 
influence, had a clear vision of what Mankind's destiny 
ought to be, and wrote that uit will have to be the 
will to power incarnate, it will want to grow, expand, 
draw to itself, gain ascendency not out of any 
morality or immorality, but because it lives, and 
because life is will to power" ( 1973, p194) . As we 
shall see, the difference between Nietzsche's position 
and Foucault's as regards the potentiality of this will 
to power lies ~n their respective optimism concerning 
its eventual liberation. For Foucault, the history of 
humanity was the history of the continual expansion of 
an accretion to Man's basic potential, which had taken 
the 'toxic' 
knowledge' 
shape of what he called a 'will to 
"History is the concrete body of a 
development, with its moments of intensity, its lapses, 
its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting 
spells ... " (1984, _.p80). And, for Foucault as for 
Nietzsche, this history of Man's development was 
something to be viewed negatively, since the essential 
character of this 'will to knowledge' acted as a 
cancerous growth within mankind, its debilitating 
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effects causing other 
and die. This is 
possibilities of living to fade 
the purpose behind Foucault 's 
'power/knowledge', by which he inscription of power as 
intended to highlight the fact that the one thing 
(power) has found an effective point of articulation and 
expression in the other (knowledge) but, crucially, not 
the only possible one (6) : 
You have to understand that when I read -
and I know it has been attributed to me -
the thesis, "knowledge is power", or "power 
is knowledge", I begin to laugh, since studying 
their relation is precisely my problem ... The 
very fact that I pose the question of their 
relation proves clearly that I do not identify 
them, 
(in Raulet, 1983, p211). 
In other words, it is not so much ~ the will to power 
has manifested as a certain type of rationalism that 
Foucault is examining, as much as it is the precise 
nature of this manifestation - ~ it has been achieved. 
What interested Foucault "were precisely the forms of 
rationality applied by the human subject to itself"; and 
this in order to discover "at what price ... subjects 
speak the truth about themselves", (p202). The 
essential task in this investigation seen as being to 
isolate "the form of rationality presented as dominant, 
and endowed with the status of the one-and-only reason, 
in order to show that it is only Qlle possible form among 
others", (p201) . 
This, it might be noted, places Foucault's project 
in proximity to Howard Barker's notion of the role of 
the artist, whom he saw as being someone who "uses 
imagination to speculate about life as it is lived, and 
proposes, consciously or unconsciously, life as it might 
be lived" (1989, p33). It also seems reminiscent of 
what Artaud intended by his call for the theatre to 
'reconquer' "the signs of existence" (1970, p46). What 
is common to all these writers is the focus on the need 
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to indicate, or create, alternatives to the dominant 
version of reality. Foucault said that what he sought 
to do in writing his genealogies was "give new impetus, 
as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of 
freedom" (1980, p46). Nietzsche, similarly, saw himself 
as calling out to "the heart of him who still has ears 
for unheard-of things" (1961, p52). 
Foucault' s texts can be represented as an analysis 
of the functioning of norms, their methods of operation 
and naturalising function, and as intended to reveal how 
something called the 'will to knowledge' has constructed 
a network for the observation, naturalisation and 
construction of its objects of attention (looming large 
amongst which is, clearly, the 'self'), which operates 
in such a way as to leave its inscriptive presence 
effectively concealed (7). His conceptualisation of the 
productive function of norms is due to his perception of 
them as constituting the objects on and from which they 
then operate. This productivity, according to Macherey 
(8), is characterised by Foucault as 
like an extensive movement which, progressively 
withdrawing the limits of its domain of 
action, itself effectively constitutes a field of 
existence in which norms find their application 
.... the norm itself 'produces' the elements on 
which it acts, at the same time as it elaborates 
the procedures and the real means of this action 
- that is to say, it determines their existence 
by means of the very fact that it undertakes to 
master them 
(in Armstrong,J. [ed], 1992, p 178). 
This returns us to Foreman's desire, mentioned 
earlier, to 'reconstitute our very way of being human', 
and meets it with the argument that societal processes 
may be so deeply ingrained in the workings of human 
identity as to make such a reconstitution very difficult 
indeed. 
The intent of Foucault 's analyses (or, as he called 
them, •genealogies') can be represented as the 
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exposure of the processes of a 'will to knowledge' that 
constructs for itself 'subjects' out of the raw material. 
of life, to show how these 'subjects', the selves that 
individuals regard as natural to them, are, in fact, the 
constructions of a particular power formation, a 
particular form of rationalism. In attempting this 
task, Foucault is, in what 1s now seen as a 'post-
structuralist' fashion, seeking, like Nietzsche, to 
remove the 'subject' from its percieved position as the 
'maker-of-meaning' in the world. Such a critique 
works on the premise that individuals believe themselves 
to be the creators of their own meanings, but that this 
experience of originatory and centralised 'being' is 
actually the effect of a web of techniques and 
strategies - generally called 
in human beings by a 
power/knowledge relationship 
internalised and naturalised. 
'discourses' installed 
symbiotically entwined 
that the individual has 
What this might be taken 
to mean in practice is that each individual human being 
- essentially, remember, a will to power with a capacity 
to learn - must make of itself a 'subject' in order to 
be allowed to exist at all. This 'subjecthood' can be 
achieved ~ by following, or conforming to, the 
particular possibilities of being that are made 
available by whatever specific set of prescriptive and ~'­
prohibitive norms are operating, at that time, in the 
society in which it finds itself, for it is these, 
rather than any such thing as a 'soul', or 'human 
nature', that prescribe what and how it is possible to 
be in order to be accepted and recognised in a social 
world. 
Foucault 's efforts to reveal these systems of the 
containment of individuals can be seen as similar in 
emphasis to Brecht' s attempts to use his dramaturgy to· 
expose the cultural forces which shaped the actions of 
the characters in his plays. The prologue to Tba 
Exception and the Rllle, for example, calls on the 
audience uexpressly to discover, that what happens all 
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the time is not natural" (in Drain [ed], 1995, pllO); 
and this desire to offer up the workings of society for 
scrutiny, in its acknowledgement of the naturalised 
status of social mexhanisms, and of the need to remove 
this status from them, is a parallel concern for both 
writers. 
In the Foucauldian schema of identity, then, the 
range of possibilities of Being - what Nietzsche calls 
the "will to the concievability of all being" (1961, 
p136) - has been, is, and will continue to be controlled 
and reduced by an opposing will to knowledge. This will 
to knowledge, says Foucault, uses its most effective 
weapon -normalisation - to structure and confine the 
experience of this 'will to the concievability of all 
being' in the shape of the unitary 'self' of the 
'subject'. It is this insight, which Foucault 
acknowledges as deriving from Nietzsche, that can be 
seen to underlie Foucault's entire project 
Eanlet 
Fouca11lt 
At any rate, Nietzsche represented 
a determining experience for the 
abolition of the founding act of the 
subject. 
Exactly" 
(Raulet, 1983, p199), (9). 
In fact, it is possible to trace Nietzsche's 
principal insights onto the form of the total inquiry 
conducted by Foucault. The terms are not al1-1ays 
identical in the description of 
their work, but the things 
nevertheless largely equivalent. 
specific elements in 
being described are 
What, for example, 
Foucault calls 'power' in its manifestation as the 1-1ill 
to knowledge, is present in Nietzsche as 'the Good' 
( 10) ; and Foucault' s description of the structures of 
regulation imposed by the operation of the 'norm' is 
likewise translatable to the Nietzschean concept of a 
'table of values'. 
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A table of values hangs over every people. 
Behold, it is the table of its overcomings; 
behold, it is the voice of its will to power, 
(Nietzsche, 1961, p84). 
There is, it can be argued, encapsulated in the above 
quote, the same perspective as is found in the 
Foucauldian examination of the will to knowledge's 
installations of webs of discourses, where each is a 
register of an area of life that has been colonised and 
made to speak itself as an object of, and for, 
knowledge, rather than as •itself'. This is the sense 
in which those areas of life have been •overcome'. For 
Nietzsche and Foucault, where there is a table of values 
- a system of norms - there is also always in place the 
system of evaluation that this represents in practice, 
and as soon as a thing enters such a system it becomes 
not what it is, but what it is presented, or made to 
present itself, as being. In this way, the table of 
values which each generation bequeaths to the next 
during socialisation, denies the individual his/her own 
'true• life 
It 
by 
is 
bestowing 
in this 
all that s/he can be upon 
respect that Nietzsche notes her/him. 
that " [ i It is dangerous to be an heir" (1961, p102) . 
This inherent antagonism towards the conformity imposed 
by social existence is, as we shall see, a clear 
thematic concern for both Foucault and Nietzsch 
"Almost in the cradle we are presented with heavy words 
and values this dowry calls itself 'Good' and 'Evil'. 
For its sake we are forgiven for being alive" (p2ll). 
Nietzsche was also, if we cast the matter for a 
moment in a Foucauldian light, concerned to examine the 
process of the 'naturalisation' of the norm's 
functioning, since it was only by doing this that 
normative regulation's practice of obscuring any other 
possibilities for living could be exposed. For 
Nietzsche, there is nothing that can be named - not one 
. object of and for power/knowledge - that does not take 
part in this limiting structure, since each 'name' is 
59 
"really no more than a fat word taking the place of a 
vague question mark" (1956, p266). The task of 
criticism, then, becomes to show that all statements of 
value, all judgements and definitions, all 'objective• 
facts and 'truths', whether made by 'scientists', 
'artists', 'philosophers' or anyone else, are never 
neutral, and never objective. They are 'perspectival' 
( 11) , and as such they can only ever represent a point 
of view, never the 'whole'. It is necessary, says 
Nietzsche, to see that in every statement of fact that 
results from an individual's research in any field 
there is something arbitrary in the fact 
that he stopped, looked back, looked around 
here, that he stopped digging and laid his 
spade aside here - there is also something 
suspicious about it. Every philosophy also 
conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also 
a hiding place, every word also a mask 
(1973, p216). 
This sense of the necessarily arbitrary reality of 
any world-picture presented as founded on the • truths • 
of existence is, as we have seen in this thesis so far, 
often the insight that lurks behind the post-
structuralist attempts to deconstruct such pictures. In 
possible contrast to this approach is the work of 
theatre practitioners such as Richard Foreman who, 
despite an awareness of the limited nature of any 
perspective, do not seek to thereby disparage the 
creation of pictures of the world. For Foreman, the 
acceptance of the relativity inherent in perception is 
always alraedy acknowledged by art : 
Art is a perspective; all perspectives are lies 
about the total truth; so art is a lie that, if 
it is strategically chosen, wakes people up. 
Art is a lever to affect the mind. The truth of 
art is in the audience's, the individual's, 
awakened perception. It is not in the work of 
art, 
(in Drain [ed), 1995, p68). 
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This positive approach to the problems raised by 
the relativity of perception, such as the inability to 
postulate with conviction the existence of 'truth', is 
an example of the affirmatory energy generally present 
in the activities of radical theatre. It is a 
positivity that, as we shall see, is advocated strongly 
by Nietzsche, but which Foucault and Lacan seem to find 
harder to support. 
According to Foucault, his genealogies oppose 
History since their task uis to discover (against 
History] that truth or being does not lie at the root of 
what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of 
accidents" (in Rabinow, 1984, p8l). Nietzsche seems to 
be making the same point when he states that: 
That which we now call the world is the 
result of a number of errors and fantasies, 
which came about gradually in the 
overall development of organic beings, 
fusing with one another, and now handed 
down to us as a collected treasure of our 
entire past - a treasure : for the value of 
our humanity rests upon it 
(1984, p24). 
This apparent similarity of intent and of form in 
the two writers continues in their attitudes towards the 
concept of the 'self'. For Foucault, the 'self' was an 
"empty synthesis" (1984, p81); and for Nietzsche it was 
uthe synthetic concept 'I'" (1973, p49); and both worked 
to reveal the paucity of the concept against its 
standing as a founding 'truth' of existence. 
Foucault did so in a rigorously systematic manner 
in his main texts, covering the mobilisation of the 
techniques of confession by Christianity (1978); the 
exclusion of unreason (1967); the containment of 
criminality (1977); the construction of sex and 
sexuality as the registers of identity ( 1978); and the 
specific techniques of self-formation in the Roman 
{ 1987) and Greek { 1989) eras, to show how the \vill to 
knowledge had demarcated the boundaries of possibility 
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for life in accordance with the demands of the 
particular social formation (12). For example, 'bio-
power' was Foucault 's term for the speci fie techniques 
of power/knowledge that were made both necessary and 
possible by the removal, by better technology, of the 
immediate threat of death from the lived experience of 
most people ( 13) • This new level of normative 
regulation was, says Foucault, achieved through the 
systematic imposition of the effects of these advances 
in technology, and proved, also, to be an essential tool 
in the advancement of industrial capitalism : 
This bio-power was without question an 
indispensable element in the development 
of capitalism; the latter would not have 
been possible without the controlled insertion 
of bodies into the machinery of production 
and adjustment of the phenomena of population 
to economic processes, 
(1978, pp140-1). 
The rigorous systematicity of Foucault' s work, and 
the field of its areas of inquiry, means that it can be 
seen to represent a penetrating 
Nietzsche' s original insights into what 
exploration 
the notion 
of 
of 
the 'self' represented in rationalism. Nietzsche 
himself, it might be felt, was far from being thorough 
in the same way ( 14) . He wrote on specific topics such 
as morals (1956); tragedy (1973); religion (1990); but 
many of his major works (1984, 1973, 1961, 1968) were 
more general philosophical outporings than they were 
disciplined examinations. Nevertheless, it is these 
'outporings' that provided the foundation upon which 
Foucault seems to have constructed his critical project. 
In the same way that Foucault regarded 
power/knowledge's ability to naturalise its structures 
within individuals as its most insidious characteristic, 
so too did Nietzsche speak out 
secretion of its table of values 
against the Good's 
within people. For 
Nietzsche, the individual's 'creation' of a 'self' was 
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the imposed, but disguised, construction of a prison for 
the pure 'will to power' that was human life . 
Perhaps the most illustrious and famous example of 
the myth of self that both Foucault and Nietzsche were 
attempting to dispel was the essentialist notion of some 
sort of ineffable 'essence' that formed the core of 
human identity. This 'essence' was, and is, generally 
described by such theories as a 'soul' that gazes out 
at the world from inside the body, having a specific 
'character' of its own. It is this soul, or the extent 
that people act as an expression of it, that determines 
the nature of individuals, and therefore effectively 
determines what human nature is. It was against this 
type of characterisation that Foucault moved to describe 
the soul as, in fact, "the prison-house of the body" 
(1974, p30), intending by this to illuminate the 
practice of the strategic containment of embodiment 
within a set of discourses, a structure, designed to 
silence the thing itself as a representation of it was 
offered. Nietzsche, also, was clear that it was 
only a subjugation of the body that made the 
construction of the individual's experience of a soul 
possible in the first place : All instincts that are not 
allowed free play turn inward. This is what I call 
man's interiorization; it alone provides the soil for 
the growth of what is later called man's 'soul'" {1956, 
p217). It was, for Nietzsche, entirely logical that, 
as a result of the repression of the body's natural 
drives, one would find the type of extroardinarily 
perverted evolutionary development that was evident in 
human history - uwhat strange notions occur to him, what 
bestialities of idea burst from him, the moment he is 
prevented ever so little from being a beast of action 
I, (p226). 
It is, however, despite their clear similarities of 
approach and focus around this issue of the body that 
the apparent point of division between the two thinkers 
signalled earlier is seen, by some· writers, to make its 
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loudest claims for recognition (15), concerning the fact 
that both Nietzsche and Foucault site the pure •will to 
power' as in the body, in its libidinal drives and 
multiple nature, but do so with different emphases. 
In the sphere of performance, too, the body was 
gaining attention as a possible site of the 'truth' of 
human identity from early this century, leading Adolphe 
Appia to exclaim in 1902 that it was, in fact, "the one 
reality worthy of the theatre" (in Drain [ed], 1995, 
p16). This was an attitude and attention that was to be 
mirrored in a constellation of theatrical experiments 
ranging from those of Meyerhold and Craig, to Artaud, 
through to Grotowski, the work of companies such as The 
Performance Group and The Living Theatre and onwards 
into the present-day work of performance artists such as 
Carolee Schneeman, Rachel Rosenthal and others. In all 
of this work, thebody has been centralized as the 
instrument of performance in the belief that it gives 
access in some way to a new level of the 'reality' of 
the human condition; and in this sense it joins 
Nietzsche in Vle\·nng the body as a genuine site of 
liberatory potential. 
Foucault's conception of the situation of 
individuals is usually seen as more pessimistic than 
this, with the discourses of power/knowledge presented 
as all-pervasive ( 16). Nietzsche' s is seen as more 
positive since it offers, amongst other things, a 
vision of what he terms the 'Ubermensch' that 
individual who has passed 'beyond Good and Evil' and 
therefore beyond the hold of power/knowledge. As Scott 
Lash points out, the discrepancy between the two 
positions is clear, since "to argue as Foucault does 
that 'desire' is a servant of power, is effectively to 
break with Nietzsche" (in Featherstone et al., 1991, 
p260). This characterization of desire as contained 
registers as a breaking with Nietzsche since it is 
usually seen that it was in the body's drives, passions, 
and desires that Nietzsche saw the shape of the true 
64 
will to power; and he does not, as Foucault does, regard 
the body as itself constructed bt its specific insertion 
into the politicaleconomies of Western societies and 
therefore, in some senses, written out of existence. 
Indeed, Nietzsche goes so far in this affirmation of the 
materiality of existence, as to move to contain aLL 
aspects of human identity within the extent of the body. 
He says of the 'ego' - "And this most honest being, the 
Ego -it speaks of the body, and it insists upon the 
body, even when it fables and fabricates and flutters 
with broken wings" (1961, p60); and then moves on to 
state that "there is more reason in your body than in 
your best wisdom" (p62). 
Nietzsche, however, was as aware as Foucault that 
existence in a rationalistic society represented an 
imposed perversion of the force and multiple 
potentiality of what human life might be. It was 
because of this sense of oppression through alien forms 
that Nietzsche condemns language as the process by which 
the indifferent flux of life is categorised, reduced and 
structured. It was clear to him that "the history of 
language is the history of a process of abbreviation" of 
life's possibilities (p205). Language, to Nietzsche, 
represented the domination of all possible forms of life 
by a single actualisation, acting as a filter on 
perception and closing off other possibilities of 
perception until they became unattainable, and therefore 
unimaginable. He presented the basic character of 
language as being that of a centering pull, structured 
around a unifying impulse within the individual; and 
said that, because of this, it was possible to recognise 
the operations of the will to knowledge - of rationalism 
in every area where there appears to have been a 
solidification, or resolution of life's flux into the 
controllable units of logic or facts uout of 
multiplicity it has the will to simplicity, a will which 
binds together and tames, which is imperious and 
dominating" (1973, p160). 
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This characterisation of rationalism leads 
Nietzsche to the recognition, which he shares with 
Foucault, that, having colonised and invested the body, 
rationalism has created in individuals what Foucault was 
to term a 'symbiotic' relationship between power and 
pleasure. This is a presentation of human existence 
which states that rationalism, unable to neutralise the 
fact of embodiment as a site of sensory experience, and 
therefore of meaning, for individuals, has constructed 
'subjects' out of these individuals; a strategy which 
has acted to establish a containing structure within the 
drives and desires of their bodies, a structure that 
registers as a system of internal 'valves' and 
'circuits' which act as a cohesive influence on the 
anarchy of the various somatic energies. The intention 
behind this, says Nietzsche, "is the incorporation of 
'new' experiences', the arrangement of new things within 
old divisions - growth, that is to say; more precisely, 
the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power" 
(1973, p160). 
However, in Nietzsche' s schematic of existence the 
bodily drives can never be fully neutralised, "for every 
drive is tyrannical" (1973, p37); and the interplay of 
the releas and containment of these drives therefore 
forms the structure upon which any containing device for -;:.-._ 
the production of the 'sensual natures' of human 
'subjects' must be based. In this way, it can be seen 
that Nietzsche is asserting that it is the 'real' of the 
body's materiality that supports the forms and 
structures imposed upon embodiment by the classificatory 
strategies of rationalism, since it - the body - ~ be 
included as context and content of any effort to 
represent it (17) . As Nietzsche points out, the whole 
edifice of rationalism is built on this material basis 
since "all belief is based on the feeling of pleasure or 
pain in relation to the speaking subject" (1984, p25); 
and therefore rationalism cannot establish itself more 
succesfully, and naturalise its operations more 
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completely, than by effecting a circuit where a feeling 
of empowerment, of pleasure, for the 'subject' is the. 
register of its own extension of form. This is akin to 
the concept of the 'symbiotic relationship' of knowledge 
and power that Foucault uses his analysis of sexuality 
to describe. That such a structure exists in the 
individual is, for both Nietzsche and Foucault, the 
result of rationalism's recognition of its need to take 
account of the primacy of the body in the lived 
experience of subjects. As Nietzsche put it, there 
would be "no life without pleasure, the struggle for 
pleasure is the struggle for life" (1984, p73). 
It can be said, then, as we have seen, that 
Nietzsche drew on the body as the source of inspiration 
for the vision he presented of the overcoming of the 
will to knowledge by the attainment of the state of the 
'Ubermensch' (18). This 'superman' would be, it seems 
possible to say at this point, the creativity and 
spontaneity of the liberated drives and desires of the 
body, and would therefore be undefinable, 
unrecognisable, unspeakable and unimaginable within the 
terms laid down by rationalist discourse. In other 
words, the individual freed from the human into the 
inhuman. This type of being was what, for Nietzsche, 
lurked under the 'rectitude' and 'righteousness' of the 
moral order of rationalism; and to misunderstand this 
was to ascribe to that morality a purity that it was far 
removed from having the right to claim for itself. 
Indeed, the historical institutionalization of that 
moral order was, for Nietzsche, little more than the 
historical triumph of particular acts of violence : 
Force precedes morality; indeed, for a time 
morality itself is force, to which others 
acquiesce to avoid unpleasure. Later it 
becomes custom, and still later free 
obedience, and finally almost instinct; then 
it is coupled to pleasure, like all habitual 
and natural things, and is now called virtue 
(Nietzsche, 1984, p69). 
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-----
In terms of thinkers who have attempted to work 
through similar ideas in the sphere of the theatre, it 
is surely Artaud who most closely meets the extreme 
radicalism we see here in Nietzsche. His widely taken 
up notion of actors as a whirl of 'moving hieroglyphs' 
was an attempt to find a metaphor for that theatrical 
form which would act on the spectator "violently enough 
to make any transactions into logical discursive 
language useless" (1970, p39). This effect was needed, 
Artaud maintained, since "the unendingly repeated jading 
of our organs calls for sudden shocks to revive our 
understanding" (p66); this 'understanding' being that 
which brought the audience •back to the subtlest ideas 
through their anatomies" (p62), and these 'subtlest 
ideas' being to do with what it is to be human. For 
Artaud, the purpose of the theatre was to ·be an ·enraged 
and scrupulous pounding" of the •insufficiently refined 
and matured forms" (p36) of a rationalistic presentation 
of life. In this sense, Artaud' s notion of theatre 
clearly reaches towards new visions of the possibilities 
of the human form in the same way as Nietzsche's 
philosophy does. 
Foucault, on the other hand, although granting the 
body a similar status to that afforded it by Nietzsche, 
seems unable to offer a positive vision that is the 
equal of his predecessor's. The reasons for this 
apparent lack might involve Foucault' s particular 
conception of power/knowledge; and it might be 
productive here, having briefly sketched out some of the 
points of relation and divergence between Nietzsche's 
project aP.d Fcucault's, to take a more specific look at 
some of the iP.sights and inconsistencies internal to the 
Foucauldian discourse (19). 
--
There are times in life when the question of 
knowing if one can think differently than one 
thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, 
.... ; 
is absolutely necessary if one is to go on 
looking and reflecting at all, 
(Foucault, 1987, p9). 
It might be said that Michel Foucault's work 
stands as both a blessing and a curse to a desire for 
the fulfilment of the type of vision of freedom that we 
have seen in Nietzsche's writings. A blessing in its 
ability to penetrate and reveal previously undisclosed 
techniques and strategies of rationalism or as he 
usually termed it, the will to knowledge but a curse 
in its seemingly concomitant evacuation of the bases for 
any possible retaliatory action. 
inability to forward a vision of what 
the webs of 
from the 
power/knowledge 
fact that the 
stems, 
same 
it 
type 
This apparent 
might be beyond 
can be argued, 
of symbiotic 
relationship that Foucault shows as existing between 
power and knowledge, in the individual and in society 
itself, is present in his own work in the form of a 
central paradox. The effect of this paradox is, as will 
be shown, to establish a sort of logical 'loop', which 
leads Foucault to the problem that the more valid his 
arguments are, the less tenable his project can be held 
to be. 
This is because the knowledge that Foucault works 
to uncover in his genealogies is - and must be if it is 
to act in accordance with his own criteria setting 
itself against the assumptions of the powers of 
resistance. It might even be argued that Foucault's 
work carries upon the back of its seeming radicality a 
huge force of reaction (20). According to Foucault's 
own schema, the project he undertook might have to be 
seen not as a resistance of power, whether positive or 
negative, but simply as an extension of it. 
It is clear, despite a somewhat infamous 
cultivated 'ambiguity', Foucault 's work was politically 
motivated in a fairly straightforward, non-relativised 
sense ( 21) . As we have already seen, he himself saw 
his task as being to separate out, 
from the contingency that has made us what 
we are, the possibility of no longer being, 
doing, or thinking what we are, do, think. 
It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics 
that has finally become a science; it is seeking 
to give new impetus, as far and wide as 
possible, to the undefined work of freedom, 
(in Rabinow, 1984, p46). 
It goes without saying that this 'work of freedom' 
cannot be entirely •undefined', since it is what caused 
Foucault to produce the particular texts that he did; 
and, in fact, part of the purpose of this focusing in on 
his project in this thesis is to show that his apparent 
silence in the spaces where Nietzsche can be heard 
preaching of the 'Ubermensch' is, whilst not empty as a 
gesture, certainly not to be taken simply at face value. 
The political goal of his work may be more 'obscure' 
than is usual, but it is certainly not simply absent. 
It is present, as is usual in politically motivated 
writing, as the underlying impetus that shapes, directs, 
engages with and judges the data. 
Foucault's apparent reluctance to acknowledge this 
aspect of his work perhaps has its root, as has been 
indicated, in a difficulty within the work itself. The 
logic of his theoretical structure is such that it 
eventually problematizes its own initiating impulses, 
which means that its radicality of purpose inevitably 
leads it to disrupt and destroy that which gave it 
intent and form in the beginning. So, in refusing to 
explicitly acknowledge a political goal for his own 
work, it can be said that Foucault is not thereby 
necessarily revealing a flaw in his theoretical 
position. This position was, as Foucault stated it, 
centred around one crucial question "What is at stake, 
then, is this : How can the growth of capabilities be 
disconnected from the intensification of power relations 
?" (in Rabinow, 1984, p48). 
This is perhaps the issue that is central to an 
understanding both of Foucault's work, and of the 
problems that seem, at times, to beset it. It is also, 
once again, an issue that is, and has been, of 
importance to those theatre practitioners attempting to 
challenge the ideological formulations of the societal 
'status quo•. How does one enter the economy of 
exchange without being at the same time entirely 
subsumed within it and thereby rendered, in effect, 
harmless ? The most extreme answers arrived at so far 
in the theatre, other than Artaud • s, were probably the 
'anti-art' activities of the Dadaists in the early 
decades of the century; but, as Kershaw (1992) shows, it 
is still aproblematic issue for contemporary 
practitioners. He states that the task of radical 
performances remains the successful negotiating of "the 
dialectic between successful opposition and debilitating 
incorporation" (p8). 
To enlarge upon what, for Foucaul t, the possible 
resolution to this problem was, it can be stated that he 
attempted to develop theoretical models of those areas 
where rationalism had confronted aspects of life which 
were unknown to, opposed to, sometimes a part of, or 
simply exterior to and in no relationship at all with, 
itself. He attempted, therefore, to describe the 
manner in which the will to knowledge had tried, by 
making discursive objects of these areas, to gain 
control of them for its own uses. The most effective 
strategy employed to gain this 
proved to be the establishing 
whereby the objects of 
end, as we have seen, has 
of situations and methods 
rationalism's attentions 
internalise and naturalise its prescriptions, becoming 
its points of expression and maintenance within the 
societal network. It is arguable within this that 
Foucault believed that it was in what he called the 
'deployment of sexuality• (22) that rationalism had 
achieved its most effective integration into the object 
of its attention, since it was able to construct there a 
complete synthesis of power and pleasure which ensured 
its access to areas of being that had hitherto been 
denied it. As has been shown earlier in this thesis; 
the major weapon in this development of rationalism's 
domination has been the normative regulation of life. 
Foucault found the physical expression of this 
paradigm of what he called the •power/knowledge• network 
in Bentham's concept of the 'Panopticon• (23), an 
architectural vision of the •ultimate' prison which 
could, 
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power. So to arrange things that 
the surveillance is permanent in its effects, 
even if it is discontinuous in its action; that 
the perfection of power should tend to render its 
actual exercise unnecessary; that this 
architectural apparatus should be a machine for 
creating and sustaining a power relation 
independent of the person who exercises it; in 
short, that the inmates should be caught up in a 
power situation of which they are themselves the 
bearers, 
(1974, p201) 0 
For Foucault, this envisaged prison encapsulated in 
concrete form the ultimate desire of knowledge/power's 
control of life, in that it showed to what extent that 
control could operate. Knowledge/power, in its 
perfection, would be exerted from the inside rather than 
imposed from the outside, through the individual's own 
constant imposition upon him/herself of behaviour that 
accorded to the postulated norm. 
Foucault's whole genealogical 
described as a descriptive 
articulate the methods visible 
As has been explained, 
enterprise can be 
project intended to 
in history by which a 
certain type of rat:ionalism has confronted and gained 
control of an object external to it, namely life. As 
such, his work contains characterisations of this 
rationalism, and examinations of its techniques and 
strategies of domination and expression over and within 
various of its object:s of attention. The nature of what 
he called this • regime of normalisation' was of 
paramount importance to Foucault because he saw that it 
was through the use of this 'regime' that. 
knowledge/power generally sought to gain access to, and 
subjugate, all areas of lived experience. 
Now, the radical intention of Foucault 's project 
meant that it focused on those areas of life - unreason, 
illegality, and desire - that not only presented power 
with its greatest objects of desire, its 'Other' ( 24) 1 
but also held a potential for, if not liberation, then 
at least reversal. (It is worth comparing here 
Nietzsche's list of the Good's three 'most-cursed' 
things : •sensual pleasure, lust for power, selfishness" 
[1961, p206]; since this surely at least partially 
encapsulates the qualities one might expect to be 
visible in their most extreme forms in Foucault's 
'insane', 'criminal', and 'perverted'). In this respect, 
Foucault is actually quite clear about where the site of 
a potential refusal of rationalism's domination might 
be, stating that it will occur in the form of •a 
practical critique that takes the form of a possible 
transgression" (in Rabinow, 1984, p45). It does not 
seem unreasonable to say that 
radical and Dositive agenda 
there is some sort of 
evidenced by these 
references and points of focus. In fact, despite his 
reputation as a 'pessimist', Foucault obliquely sketches 
for us in his works his ideal figure of resistance; and 
in a sense it is a more attainable one than its 
Nietzschean counterpart the 'free spirit', since it has 
existed in societies throughout history, including our 
own. These Foucauldian 'Uber.mensches are those 
figures that Enlightenment rationality has categorised 
for our own time as the 'criminally insane'. It seems, 
then, that Foucault is suggesting that it is within the 
bodies of these 'social outcasts' that his notion of the 
transgressive 
For it is 
act 
here 
finds 
that 
its 
the 
most certain 
norm, the 
expression. 
voice of 
knowledge/power, falls on ears no longer willing or able 
to hear it, since they are occupied instead in listening 
to the • unheard-of things • that Nietzsche spoke about 
( 2 5) . In approaching a clearer definition of what 
this obscure activity might consist of, he states that : 
[I]t has to be concieved as an attitude, an 
ethos, a philosophical life in which the 
critique of what we are is at one and the 
same time the historical analysis of the 
limits that are imposed on us and an 
experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them, 
(in Rabinow, 1984, p50). 
That it is precisely this type of 'experimenting• with 
limits that has been the conscious purpose of much 
Western avant-garde theatre practice and writing should, 
by now, be clear. As Raymond Williams (1989) noted, the 
avant-garde defines itself in opposition to bourgeois 
society - which in this context we have been defining as 
rationalism "on the grounds of its monopoly of 
consciousness a monopoly typically expressed in its 
forms of language and of representation" (p93). So, the 
avant -garde can be seen to be invo1 ved in the same 
examination of the methods by which individuals 
represent themselves to themselves that Foucault is. 
Perhaps, 1n light of these different methods of 
approaching the same issue, we can say that distinct 
from radical theatre's practical presentation of 
alternative forms, it is the intensity of focus of 
Foucault • s description of rationalism • s • techniques • of 
subjugation that should be seen as his most original 
contribution. Foucault's analyses add a definite weight 
of form to the bones of what was advanced by Nietzsche, 
and thereby help to advance a radical critique of the 
functioning of socialidentity in the contemporary 
Western world, ~s well as deepening and intensifying it. 
Now, if we refer to the criticisms that have been 
aimed at Foucault's apparent •a-politicality•, it will 
be seen that it was in keeping with the logic of his 
work for Foucault to establish for himself a position 
not only outside of the radical politics of the 'Left', 
but largely unapproachable by it. In an interview and 
debate with Noam Chomsky in 1971, Foucault consistently 
confounded and irritated the linguist by refusing to 
postulate any goal for progressive politics. Chomsky 
himself was happy to state the vision of liberatory 
politics as that which worked to establish a society 
that was the best available for meeting the needs and 
desires of all of its members; and happy also to accept 
that the blueprint for such a society would, and must 
necessarily, always consist of a notion of what human 
nature is, with a design traced out from this which, it 
was intended, would allow the best aspects of that 
nature the fullest expression. Foucault 's refusal to 
join in the speculation of what this society might look 
like was seen, during the interview, largely as 
posturing. In fact, it was the perfectly coherent 
expression of the thesis that we have seen Foucault to 
be following throughout his work. In his terms, the 
appeal to those aspects of humanity that were repressed, 
buried, abused, hidden, controlled, or otherwise 
contained by the present political situation in order to 
establish a new society - a new regime of norms - would 
always be fundamentally erroneous, since the values and 
concepts that were being appealed to, rather than being 
capable of outlasting or challenging power, were in fact 
creations of its own making. In these circumstances, 
Foucault believed, it would be simply illogical to 
believe that you spoke against power/knowledge when you 
could only ever speak as it. 
Foucault' s comments on the concept of the modern 
'soul' may help to throw more light on this, so it might 
be helpful to re-introduce them here in fuller form. He 
maintained that : 
This real, non-corporeal soul is not a substance; 
it is the element in which are articulated the 
effects of a certain type of power and the 
reference of a certain type of knowledge, the 
machinery by which the power relations give 
rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and 
knowledge extends and reinforces the effects 
of this power ..... On this reality reference, 
various concepts have been constructed and domains 
of analysis carved out : psyche, subjectivity, 
personality, consciousness etc.; on it have been 
built scientific techniques and discourses, and 
the moral claims of humanism, 
(1977. pp29-30). 
If this is accepted, if the constructed nature of 
most of the • facts • of human identity is established, 
then, says Foucault, it would clearly be a foolish act 
to turn to these notions - notions such as there being a 
'primal nature' in humans, or a •real self' in people, 
or such a thing as 'common humanity' - for the necessary 
support of some political, ethical, or moral project 
designed to achieve the liberation and fulfilment of 
things that don • t exist. For no such things exists of 
themselves; they are constructs; and their function, as 
Foucault described it, is to act precisely to preclude 
any other possiblities of what life might be from 
occuring. It was from this perspective that Foucault 
regarded the entire, supposedly progressive, 
'emancipation from ignorance' supposedly represented by 
the advance of Enlightenment rationality throughout 
history. For him, this progression was simply the 
ascension to dominance of a particular form of the will 
to power, a particular driving force, that has tied 
itself to the accumulation and consolidation of 
knowledges, 
particular 
thereby becoming a will 
form of rationalism. 
to knowledge, a 
It is this 
accumulative force that always acts as the motivating 
energy behind all the machinations of rationalism in its 
confrontation with the sheer physical fact of life. 
As the example of the Panopticon was designed to 
.. -
show, the concept of the will to knowledge presented by 
Foucault reaches its most effective and productive point 
when the object of its processes of subjugation becomes 
also its means of expression. This effectively means 
that a process needs to occur whereby the will to 
knowledge creates the circumstances that result in it 
becoming necessary to its object of attention and/or 
desire. It is in this way, then, that the will to 
knowledge is characterised as formative of 'subjects', 
since it forces individuals to speak themselves aa 
subjects in order to silence their 'other-ness', which 
it otherwise could not properly contain. 
Foucault shows this most clearly in the three 
volumes that comprise his Hi story of Sexuality. For 
Foucault, as we have seen, this is the will to 
knowledge's most effective area of integration into 
individuals, since it is here where it has succeeded in 
establishing a power/knowledge network that is central 
to almost all aspects of any individual's social 
identity·.· By putting the body into discourse via the 
'deployment of sexuality', the will to knowledge, says 
Foucault, has secreted itself into the very heart of 
life, creating naturalising myths to disguise its 
presence. This means that it has, in practice, made its 
own fictions the 'real' grounding that people turn to in 
constructing their identities. He notes that, • it is 
through sex - in fact, an imaginary point determined by 
the deployment of sexuality - that each individual has 
to pass in order to have 
intelligibility• (1978, pl55). 
access to his own 
This repeated idea, that all the values and notions ,,·_ 
that people turn to as a resource against the dominance 
of the will to knowledge are in fact simply illusions 
that it is responsible for creating in the first place, 
is fundamental to an understanding of what was mentioned 
earlier as a possible problematic in Foucault's theory. 
It is by keeping sight of this point that an 
appreciation can develop of the paradox that Foucault 
might have presented himself with. For there is little 
doubt as to the value of his excavation and analysis of 
the methods and techniques of the will to knowledge's 
manipulation of individuals; and also of the practical 
histories that he produced on the development of the 
modern methods of treating the insane and the offender; 
and yet it might be the case that there are unresolved 
tensions within his work which strain his own argument 
enough to raise doubts as to its overall import as a 
critique. 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and 
yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is 
never in a position of exteriority in relation 
to power ..... Resistances do not derive from a 
few heterogeneous principles ; but neither are 
they a lure or a promise that is of necessity 
betrayed. They are the odd term in relations of 
power ; they are inscribed in the latter as an 
irreducible opposite, 
(Foucault, 1978, pp95-96). 
The issues that engender these postulated tensions 
seem to be to do with the possibility of autonomous 
action by individuals, and are perhaps raised to the 
status of a problem by Foucault' s own characterisation 
of the extent of the will to knowledge's effects. 
It is possible to to present this problematic by 
describing Foucault's theory as in some sense 
'mirroring' the object of its attention. In other 
words,like the practices of discourse of rationalism it 
describes, it can, in itself, be seen as forming a 
network of strategies and methods that all pass through 
a central deployment - in this case the conception of 
the will to knowledge. It is this central 'axis' that, 
if this analysis is right, acts to enable all that 
passes through it at the same time as it strips it of 
any effectivity beyond its confines. In this sense, in 
a process similar to that undergone by the constructed 
'subjects' of the will to knowledge, Foucault's concept 
of the will to knowledge carries his own genealogies to 
the points of inquiry that marks them as radical and 
effective granting them the capacity to reveal and 
explain the machinations and naturalisations they come 
across - but, at the final stage, when they stand in a 
position to deliver a blow and strike out against the 
object of their critique, the same conception needs, if 
it is to be inclusive, to reveal their force of 
radicality 
contained 
and 
and 
incisiveness as 
therefore illusory, 
probably alree1dy 
since they are. 
themselves produced within the discourse of rationalism. 
In other words. the concept of the will to knowledge, 
which characterises it as that which produces both power 
and its possible resistance, seems to disable the 
possibility of genuine acts of opposition. such acts 
become simply products of the expansion of the will to 
knowledge's hold on life, instead of refusals of it. 
However, there are clear points in Foucault's work 
where he does seem to attempt to ind~cate possible 
pathways out of this problematic, and where he 
references what he believed to be examples of genuinely 
transgressive acts. For example, he was clearly excited 
by the anarchists' concentration on delinquency (26·), 
and saw it as an attempt to 
recognise in it the most militant rejection 
of the law ; when they tried not so much to 
heroize the revolt of the delinquents as to 
disentangle delinquency from the bourgeois 
legality and illegality that had colonized it; 
when they wished to re-establish or 
constitute the political unity of popular 
il1egalities, 
(1977' p292). 
There certainly does seem to be some sort of 
positive attitude towards a political agenda in evidence 
here, which in turn suggests that Foucaul t had not, as 
Chomsky and others believed, entirely abandoned the 
s~arch for political alternatives.. There is little 
doubt, though that he was extremely wary of the act of 
formulating such things on a societal scale, and was 
distrustful of their capacity to produce positive 
consequences. 
There are, in fact, clues to what Foucault's 
'positive political agenda' might have been, but these 
are gleaned more by noting the targets of his critiques 
than they are by registering eXplicit declarations. For 
example, there is present across Foucault's writings 
what is an intense antipathy towards the effects of 
normalisation, which suggests an attachment to some 
notion of genuine differentiation. There also seems to 
be a cynicism towards visions of the future that rely on 
myths for their basis, which might register as the 
voicing of a belief that these things are only valuable 
when founded on a different kind of truth. We have also 
seen expressed a contempt for the way instrumental 
rationality has confined and subjugated unreason, which 
might be read as a desire to see unreason's spontaneity 
unleashed; and have witnessed a critique of the •myths' 
of sexuality and sex, which could be viewed as an 
attempt to point to the body as a site of resistance by 
revealing how it has been turned into an object of 
discourse. 
It is perhaps possible to distinguish in all this 
the shape of the 'Other' that Foucaul t was seeking to 
extricate, or even defend, with his critical analyses of 
the dominating strategies of rationalism. This 'Other' 
appears in the shape of a more radical conceptualization 
of the truth of human identity. In other words, it 
represents an effort to indicate the prior, or initial, 
form of the object - the human organism - that the will 
to knowledge has moulded into 'subjects' in accordance 
with its own needs. It does not, as such, correspond to 
notions such as a 'true human nature' or a 'real self', 
since such notions tend to act as supports of the 
rationalistic structures of the existing social world in 
a way that this 'Other' clearly would not. It 
represents, rather, a picture of where the primary 
forces of the human organism - the will to power in its 
'pure' form -have conflicted with, and been subsumed by, 
the operations of rationalism. For Foucault, the 
'History' of humanity is the history of the 
manifestation, and subsequent domination, of this 
rationalism. He attempts in his genealogies to show how 
this rationalism, which he terms the will to knowledge, 
has invested life to the extent that it has become the 
source of all the possibilities of individual identity 
available within society. 
In doing so, he has also attempted to reveal how 
the limits of the will to knowledge's containment of 
individuals are the site of constant irruptions and 
inversions, as the force of individual agency, or 
desire, seeks for itself extended avenues of expression. 
The point was to search out those acts which are 
genuinely trangressive, as opposed to those that simply 
extend the containment of the individual and act to 
further the processes of the will to knowledge. For 
Foucault, every time genuinely progressive potential is 
blocked, or channelled, or made to express itself in 
conformity with an imposed structure, the process of 
perversion and interiorization that supports the 
construction of the individual as a mythical 'subject' 
is continued. 
In light of this, it might be possible to ·say that 
Foucault is, in effect, locating a force which might be 
characterised as similar to a will to power as, in some 
sense, primary in individuals. Following from this, it 
can be asserted that this will to power is placed by 
Foucault as a 'fact' of the human condition prior to the 
workings of rationalism which have, to contain and 
direct it, placed it within the processes of a will to 
knowledge that define the shapes it is possible for it 
to take. The question Foucault was concerned to ask of 
this situation was Why, from all possible 
alternatives, did the 'will to power' effect itself as 
the will to knowledge ? And what is the nature of this 
relationship between the 'will to pO\ver' and the will to 
knowledge ? He believed that it was possible to name 
this will to knowledge as just one form of rationality, 
or rationalism; and was concerned to point out that his 
critique of it could not be translated as an attack on 
Reason per se, since uno given form of rationality is 
actually Reasonn (in Raulet, 1983 p205). 
Now, what should be ·noted here is the grounding 
8! 
this 'defence' of Reason in Foucault's work offers for the 
conception of the capacity to learn advanced earlier .in 
this thesis, since the installation of such a capacity as 
innate in human beings is, as we saw, the positing of 
Reason as a natural human capability. In other words, as a 
concept it is a different way of arguing, just as Foucault 
does, for the arbitrary nature of certain forms of 
rationalism, but not against the containing structure of 
Reason itself. This is an important point to make, since 
it suggests that it is only by retaining the structures of 
Reason that individuals can have a sphere of operation for 
their desires. The realm of Reason therefore becomes the 
only site of play for individual creative agency, and 
subsequently the only arena for the extension of liberatory 
potential. That this is so becomes acceptable once it is 
realized, as Foucault explains, that Reason is a site of 
being that particular strains of rationalism are developed 
from, and do not completelty encapsulate. In other words, 
there is more to Reason as a means of existence than its 
manifestation as rationalism. 
In this sense, then, the anti-rationalistic, or 
irrational, drive of theatre forms such as Surrealism and 
Expressionism, which attempted to reach beyond the 
conscious mind into the more 'chaotic' unconscious, can be 
seen as attempts to develop the perception of a new order:,~ .. 
surpassing that of rational coherence, embodied in the more 
'sublime' Reason of the 'archetypal' mind. Artaud, for 
example, made clear that "true culure" was simply "a 
rarefied way of understanding and exercising life" (1970, 
p3), and that "this leads us to reject man's usual 
limitations and powers and infinitely extends the frontiers 
of what we call reality• (p6) . The end point of this would 
be what he termed "active metaphysics", by which he meant 
"thought adopting deep attitudes• (p31). Not the banishing 
of thought, then, but its enlargement and extension beyond 
rationalism. 
If we return to the conception of human identity 
offered earlier in this thesis at this point, we will 
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remember that it was a description of the structuration of 
human identity that stated that an infant • s experiential 
data is pulled together into a 'pool' via the capacity for 
individual memory, which sets up a dialectical 
input/feedback circuit that processes, informs, and directs 
the infant's interaction with the materiality of the world, 
which is •willed' at only the most primary level, the level 
of the needs and desires of the somatic drives. From the 
preceding analysis of Foucault's work, we can see that, the 
infant's initial existence as the undifferentiated 
materiality of the body can be presented as the stage of 
its presence as •pure• will to power, whilst its subsequent 
maturation is the process of its removal from this phase of 
its existence into existence as the will to knowledge. 
What the discussion of Reason above indicates is that 
there is already present as a natural feature of the 
originarywill to power an impulse towards the unifying of 
experience, since a capacity to learn includes an ability 
to remember, and an ability to remember presumes a 
continuous site of experience, a 'centre•. We begin to 
see, then, that the attempt to 'de-centre' this self may 
meet a resistance from the materiality of the body itself, 
in its dialectical relationship with the world around it. 
Nietzsche, for instance, made it clear that the sense 
of cohesion and unity experienced by the •subject' is . 
.r·. 
rooted in the materiality of the body and is, in fact, an 
essential pre-condition of life (27). 
However, it needs to be made clear that adopting a 
schema of human identity that includes a certain tendency 
in the organism towards cohesion of experience is in no way 
to embrace recognisably the same concept as that of an 
unproblematised Essentialist notion of a 'real self'. The 
latter concept has information to give about the 
'character, or 'personality' of the individual in question, 
whereas the notion of the 'centred' self advanced by this 
thesis is rooted in the materiality of the body and gives 
no clues as to any possible ethical, or emotional, 
trajectory. In other words, it regards the •self' as a 
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socio-economic political situations. 
'subjects' as 
of particular 
That there has been, and is, variation 1n the specific 
forms of these identity structures maintained and validated 
by different civilisations at different times clearly 
bespeaks the contingency of what particular cultures tend 
to represent as absolute, or natural, concerning what it is 
to be human (to qualify as a member of that microcosmic 
culture/world), and this can only act as a foil to notions 
of essential 'selves' that exist exterior to any particular 
cultural context. Indeed, a certain malleability of form 
is generally accepted as a defining characteristic of what 
is denoted by the term 'human', since it is this that acts 
as pre-requisite for the existence of cultural diversity. 
This, in itself, adds weight to the proposition that there 
is more potential for variation in the forms of human 
identity within the realm of Reason than is offered by 
Western instrumental rationality; and supports, surely, the 
efforts to give voice to those unexplored possibilities 
undertaken by avant-garde theatre practitioners. As Paul 
Kornfeld, the Expressionist dramatist said, the search is 
for "that seed of madness that is not the overthrow of 
Reason but its surpassing" (in Drain [ed], 1995, p259). 
So, in conclusion to this analysis of the 
problematisation of the notion of the 'self' offered in the 
writings of Michel Foucault, we might say that in setting 
out to illuminate how a certain relationship between power 
and knowledge had created the forms of the 'self' found in 
certain historic manifestations of Reason, Foucault was 
attempting to answer the question of how the primary will 
to power had engaged what he termed the will to knowledge 
as its means of expression, and with what results. 
The developing conception of human identity advanced 
by this thesis proposes, as we have seen, that the 
evolutionary trajectory of human beings is, in fact, pre-
determined towards certain forms rather than others. For 
example, a certain determining factor in this evolution is 
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the nature of human embodiment, an aspect of which is the 
ability provided by the innate capacity to learn - itself a 
characteristic of the primary will to power - to create a 
continuity of experience over time which is individual. 
This is another way, perhaps, of saying that the 
experiencing of life as a •centred' being is, at a basic 
physiological level, innate in humans. 
We can take this interrogation of what constitutes the 
structures and forms of human identity further now by 
moving to examine the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques 
Lacan. Lacan' s work is of interest here since it 
constitutes an attempt to remove the body as a determining 
influence on identity; which effectively means that its 
target is precisely the type of formulation of human 
identity just forwarded above. An analysis of his theory 
should lead, then, to a testing of that formulation's 
viability. His writings are 
decipher, but what follows should 
in the present discussion. In a 
notoriously difficult to 
make clear his importance 
sense, the analysis will 
allow us to effect a return to Goffman's original 
interrogation of the self-as-a-performative-event, only in 
a different context and amidst different terminology. It 
will therefore enable a new dimension to be added to our 
developing notion of how the concept of the self is best 
characterised. 
The great big gap between what a performance is 
to people inside from what it is to people outside 
conditions all the thinking about performance. 
These differences can be as great within a single 
culture as they are across cultural boundaries, 
(Schechner, ~n Schechner & Appell (eds), 1990, p27). 
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Lacan and the total Will to 
Knowledge : 
Such is the fright that seizes man when he 
unveils the face of his power that he turns 
away from it even in the very act of laying 
it bare, 
(Lacan, 1977, p34). 
The object is to pry the human soul loose 
from its joints, to s ink it deep in terror , 
frost, fire, and transports until it 
suddenly rids itself of all its dullness, 
anxiety, gloom, 
(Nietzsche, 1956, p276) (28). 
It is possible, as i t was with Foucault, to trace the 
Nietzschean notions of a 'table of values' and 'the Good' 
onto Lacan's notion of a ' symbolic order' (29), and see 
both sets of notions, at the same time, as parallel to the 
Foucauldian 'power/knowledge' network (30). Following 
this imposition, we can then describe the field in which 
the infant becomes a 'subject' what Lacan terms the 
' symbolic order' - as the realm created and maintained by 
the will to knowledge (instrumental rationality). Lacan's 
notion of the 'Real' then names what we have until now been 
calling the stage of the pure 'will to power' . 
This tracing on of forms can be continued by 
describing Lacan's concept of the 
of what he calls the 'mirror 
' imaginary' 
phase' as 
- the stage 
the first 
manifestations of the drive to a cohesive self that 
registers what we have been calling the will to knowledge: 
This allows u s to place Lacan' s main theoretical terms 
within the context of this thesis so far. 
As has already been noted, the central point of 
interest in this examination of Lacan's work is the attempt 
within it to remove the body as a determining influence on 
the lives of individuals, other than at an unattainable 
l evel. This attempt would, if successful, clearly 
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invalidate the positive vision of the body's liberatory 
potential which we have seen offered by Foucault and, more 
especially, by Nietzsche. 
[B]etween the infant's image as recognised 
in the mirror and her lived experience of a 
fragmentary and minimally controlled bodily 
self is a gap apparently fully present to the 
infant's consciousness. The fundamental 
alienation that results from her 
identification with her mirror image is, thus, 
something essentially 'felt' by the young child, 
and Lacan would seem at this point to be committed 
to the claim that some such alienating feeling 
must be a more or less permanent characteristic 
of human consciousness 
(Lee, 1990, p30} . 
Jonathan Lee, in his examination of Lacan's opus 
(31}, charts what he sees as Lacan's attempt to steer a 
path between linguistic idealism and a naive belief in 
pre-linguistic experience. In the former, language - and 
it will be helpful to the later discussion to note here 
that the term 'language' in the Lacanian schema refers to 
what this thesis has been describing as the world as 
constituted for individuals by the will to knowledge - is 
seen as a closed, all-encompassing circuit, having and ·. 
needing no access to areas of experience outside of itself"; 
the latter presentation, on the other hand, describes an 
experiential realm that is available to individuals outside 
of such a linguistic circuit. Lee attempts in his text to 
map the course that Lacan followed in manoeuvring between 
these ·two extremes, and indicates that it is not a tension 
easily resolved. For ex~ople, Lee points out how Lacan 
wants to defend the intelligiblity of a kind of 
cognitive experience of the real that avoids the 
extreme intellectual heights of 'savoir' - complete 
mediation by the symbolic structure of language -
but also avoids falling into the extreme intellectual 
depths of 'connaissance' - absolutely immediate 
contact without any mediation by language, 
( 1990, p194} . 
It is fundamental to Lac an's general theory of 
subjectivity - of what we have been calling existence as 
the will to knowledge - that alienation and lack are its 
defining characteristics. As such, Lacan' s theory relies 
upon a notion of the Real - what we have called the state 
of existence of the 'pure' will to power and the 
symbiotic relationship with the mother, as irretrievably 
lost to the subject due to the transfiguring and alienating 
e f fects of the mirror and oedipal stages. By formalising 
the subject-making process in this way, Lacan can be seen 
to be building into his theories the persistent nature of a 
'Real' which the enclosed 'signifying chains' of the 
Symbolic would have no need of. It can be suggested that 
this develops into a problem for Lacan's thesis precisely 
because of his refusal to remove the experiential potency 
of the body from the picture, which, as we have just seen , 
is often postulated as the site of this pure will to power, 
or the 'Real ' level of existence. 
In other words, in the attempt to remove any resort to 
the notion of biological determinism from his theory (32), 
it may be that Lacan did not quite manage to account for 
what must, after all, be a compromise between two givens -
the organism and language. For it would be strange, 
surely, for a theory that establishes itself on a claim for:, 
the longevity of certain bodily experiences (the loss of 
which are the root of the subject's alienation and sense of 
lack), to claim in the same, or even a later , breath that 
bodily lived experience, the temporally continuous presence 
of the body in the Real, has no determining effect on the 
'subject ', whose horizons of experience are those 
prescribed by the Symbolic. It would seem at times, 
though, that this is precisely what Lacan is, in effect, 
claiming : 
The child's identification with its specular 
image impels it nostalgically to seek out a 
past symbiotic completeness, eve n if such a 
state never existed and is retrospectively 
imposed on the pre-mirror phase; and to 
seek an anticipatory or desired (ideal or 
future) identity in the coherence of the 
totalized specular image .... It is the dual, 
ambivalent relation to its own image that is 
central to Lacan's account of subjectivity, 
(Grosz,l990, p39). 
What makes the issue more perplexing here is the 
contradictory characterisations within Lacan' s texts (and 
in Grosz' s) of what the Real is. as an experience for t he 
pre-mirror phase infant. Lacan characterises the Real as 
a place that 'lacks nothing', in opposition to the 
imaginary and symbolic which are, by definition, lacking of 
this lack of nothing (33); and yet, at the same time, his 
theories rely on a notion of the experience of the Real as 
the motivation for the alienating transfiguration of his 
hypothesis of the 'mirror stage' ( 34) . In this 
formulation, the 'mirror stage' represents that phase of 
existence when the infant is impelled to identify itself aa 
its image because of the unity promised there, a promise 
which i s , apparently, sufficient because it offers relief 
from the infant's uncomfortable experience of its 'body-in-
bits-and-pieces' (35), a discomfort having supposedly been 
created by t he prematurity of its birth. For the infant, 
says Lacan, the mirror-stage image 
represents an ideal unity, a salutary 'imago'; 
it is invested with all the original distress 
resulting from the child's intra-organic and 
relational dicordance during the first six 
months, when he bears the signs, neurological 
and humoral, of a physiological natal 
prematuration. 
(1977 1 p19 ) • 
However, it is difficult to know, and it certainly 
does not seem to be made absolutely clear, how, or why, 
such a supposedly uncomfortable experiential phase as the 
pre-mirror stage - which is existence as the 'pure' will to 
power, remember could become a universal point of 
nostalgia for human subjects marooned in the endless chains 
of language. If, as Grosz suggested above, the sense of 
1 symbiotic completeness' never did exist , and is imposed 
retro-actively, it is not then immediately apparent why 
this should be so; and again, the point i s never 
particul arly clarified. What would be the purpose of such a 
presentation of experience as t h is ? In order to serve an 
innate nostalgia ? Or is it just another of what Lacan 
terms desire's 1 0bjet petit a ' s' , towards which it reaches , 
but which it can never possess (36) ? 
For something must indeed motivate the infant to leave 
its ' lack of lack ' in the Real and e nter the 'primary 
alienation ' of the identification with its image in the 
mirror; and since what the image offers is spatial cohesion 
and unity, it might be presumed that the infant identifies 
with the image in order to gain these things which, despite 
its l ack of lack, it lacks. This suggests the possibility 
that the infant seeks the distance from its own experience 
that the mirror offers in order to effect escape from what 
i s an intensely uncomfortabl e posit i on. However I it is 
also possible that the infant uses this s t ructure of self-
as-image as a means to establish within its elf the distance 
- the reflexivity - necessary for the operation of power 
over its own body. This is an important point, and we 
shall return to it again later. 
Following from this, it can be seen that if it is >-
indeed an affective bodily experience that motivates the 
infant towards specular identification with its own image 
Vla a ' mirror stage', then the problem discussed above, of 
the presence of the body in the Real/Symbolic 
synchronistically clearly needs to be answered; and it also 
surely needs to be made clear what the character of this 
initial and continuing bodily presence was, and is. This 
would then allow the possible existence of a I nosta lgia ' 
for the Real in the human 'subject' to be better explained. 
For Lacan, identity does not derive from genet ic 
dispositions, nor from an unfolding of neuro-
physiological developmental sequences ; nor is it 
the product of a war between biological and 
cultural forces, nor the reflection of collective 
archetypes. Identity is built up as a composite of 
of images and effects - i.e . mental representations -
taken from the outside world from the start of life, 
which are developed in relation to the Desire for 
recognition and the later social requirements for 
submission to an arbitrary Law, 
(Ragland-Sullivan , 1982, p7) (37). 
To explore the possibility of an inconclusive 
resolution of the presence of the Real in Lacan's theory is 
far from an intended dismissal of his findings. It is, 
rather, an attempt to discover 
of this realm of experience 
the exact nature and status 
constituted in and by the 
for the 
Symbolic . 
'subject' supposedly 
For according to 
Lacan, the Real is, as we have seen, that source of the 
sense 
haunts 
Desire 
being 
of lack and alienation from his/her 
the subject throughout life. It is 
has the character in human beings 
always only partially satisfiable 
own self that 
the reason why 
that i t does, 
through the 
extension out to, and return from, the unpossessable 'objet 
petit a' ; and it is also the site of what he terms bodily 
'jouissance', the ultimate sensory experience (38). The 
' Real', then, might be said to be, for Lacanian theory, 
the absolute reason underlying existence. As he himself 
says, "what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is 
an encounter, an essential encounter - an appointment to 
which we are always called with a real that eludes usn 
( 1979 , p53) . Belsey (1993) makes clear the importance of >. 
this elusive 'Real' as the object of unconscious desire in 
adults when she notes that : 
Every object of adult desire is always only a 
substitute for an original object which is 
forever lost, and which it represents. Since 
each substitute, each representation, is always 
only that and no more, it ·can never fully be 
the object of unconscious desire. Loss returns 
as the impossibility of perfect satisfaction, 
(p391). 
It is arguable , in light of this characterisation of 
the I Real' I that the tension recognised by Lee in Lacan Is 
work, which apparently caused him to oscillate with some 
indecision between the two poles of naive reduction and 
linguistic idealism, is the logical outcome of this 
attitude towards the twin realms of the ' will to power' 
the Real - and the wi l l to knowledge - the Symbolic Order. 
For Lacanian psychoanalysis makes no sense , has no purpose 
even, if a more valid realignment of actions in the 
Symbolic to their true root in the Real is not seen as the 
desired end of the process of analysis. 
If this is the case, then an argument for the 
determining nature of the Real is surely being forwarded. 
However , this reading i s problematized by the fact that 
it is implicit in most presentations of Lacanian theory, 
and in the overall sens e of Lacan' s writings themselves, 
that it is, in fact, the Symbolic which is fully 
determining once it i s entered. There is, within this 
presentation, "no lost golden world outside 'civilization' 
or culture" (Belsey , 1993 , p39 2) , which might be l ooked to 
as an area free from the necessary loss and alienation 
inflicted on the subject by i ts ent ry into language. All 
activity in the Symbolic, says Lacan, is generated by the 
primal loss and alienation experienced by the infant in its 
passage from the Real to the Symbolic; so that the history 
o f subjects in analysis, or out, is presented in Lacanian 
theory as the unconscious inscription of their desire for · 
the totality represented by the Real onto the Symbolic. In 
the terms u sed by this thesis so far, this would read as 
the presence of the ' will to power ' as the contained 
energising force which propels the wi ll to knowledge and 
shapes i ts biographical 'destiny', forcing it to seek ever 
fu ller expression and ever greater ' overcomings'. This is 
similar, perhaps, to what Nietzsche meant when he noted 
that "in the final analysis one experiences only oneself" 
(1961, p173) . 
The · life of the human 'subject ', then, is 
characterised by Lacan as a narrative of the finding of 
desired objects in the Symbolic - the 'obj e t petit a' 
that never more than partial l y fulfil the subject's true 
Desire, which is for a return t o the symbiotic wholeness 
and 'lack of Lack' represented by the pre-mirror phase 
relationship with the mother, which is also the stage of 
its pre- existence as 'pure' will to power. 
It is important to recognise here the fact that the 
infant, at this first stage, is limited in its physical and 
psychical ability by being constrained within the form of 
its embodiment , and is therefore restricted in its ability 
to meet its own needs, suggesting an aspect of this early 
existence as will to power - an absolute vulnerability, a 
state of disempowerment - that it is important to note and 
which will be returned to in later discussion. 
So, in Lacan 's theoretical structure, the basic human 
experience is a longing for, and constant search to 
replace, the determining factor of human activity in the 
Symbolic the Real. This Lacanian 'base' is, of 
necessity, forever lost . It can neither be known nor 
grasped , and exists only as that which no longer exists. 
This means that, in effect, the Real is positioned as 
determining nothing, since it is non-existent; and yet it 
is this very non-existence, and the human urge for things 
to be otherwise, that does, apparently, act as a 
determinant on all activity that takes place 'beyond' it. 
It is, of course, difficult not to see the 
debilitating effects of an Idealism present 1n the.:-_ 
manufacture of this paradox, and it is towards a possible 
resolution of this that we will now turn. 
The subject is born in so far as the signifier 
emerges in the field of the Other. But, by this 
very fact, this subject, whic h was previously nothing 
if not a subject coming into be i ng - solidifies into 
a signifier .... The subject is this emergence which, 
just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, 
having scarcely appeared, solidifies into a signifier, 
(Lacan, 1979, p199}. 
Ellie Ragland-Sullivan (1982} is an example of a 
defender of Lacan ' s structuring of the formative process of 
individuation, on the grounds that his work seeks, 
correctly, to reject the traces of biological determinism 
still present in Freud's work. She quotes Lacan in not~ng 
that "in the psyche, there is nothi ng by which the subject 
may situate himsel f as a male or femal e b~~ng" (Lacan, 
1979, p204). After this, however, she goes on to make the 
slightly curious comment that "Lacan is interested in what 
structure and language make of our bodily natures" ( 1982, 
pl 7) . It seems at the least ambiguous , for an argument 
which claims to be rejecting the notion of the importance 
of biology in the differentiat i ng practices of social 
sexuality, to allow within the argument for such a thing as 
' bodi l y nature ' . And it is surely even more surprising to 
find it somehow 'bracketed off' from the individual's 
psychical experience. There would appear to be a risk 
here, perhaps generated by Lacan's own unresolved attitude 
towards the matter of the Real , of running dangerous l y 
close to a dualistic framework of understanding. For 
instance, individuals are neutral ly characterised as far 
as psychic topography is concerned, being essentially a 
blank sheet where any differentiation is cultural l y created 
rather than the result of innate form, and yet these same 
cultural forces - the structures of the Symbolic Order -
are then, apparently, forced into a more difficult and 
never fully resolved compromise with the already present 
bodily natures of human beings, since the same original . 
'neutrality ' of form is simply not advanced in this 
instance. This implicit tracing of an innate character 
onto the body but not the psyche of the infant is engaged 
in, not only by readers of Lacan such as Ragland-Sullivan, 
but by Lacan himself; and it allows him to advance a host 
of assumptions that act as grounding for further 
hypothetical propositions. 
For example, Lacan presents the material structure of 
Desire in the Symbolic Order as sJJ~~J anti no the original 
and primary drives of need gratification operative in the 
realm of the Real by building upon energy paths that flowed 
out from the body then , and which , in the Symbolic, move 
out to penetrate to some degree the rim of an 'objet petit 
.: ~ . 
a' before returning to the body. 
This same pattern of structuration of the body, which 
is reliant on a re-tracing and re-alignment of an already 
present form, can be seen in many aspects of Lacanian 
theory. For example, the human infant is presented as 
'premature' at birth, which, if it does nothing more 
specific, surely causes its bodily/psychical experience to 
be of a certain manner rather than another. Bodily 
'jouissance', also, is characterised as concentrated on 
orifices and rims - the eyes, ears, mouth, anus, genitals -
and all those areas that stand as border points between the 
body's surface and the external world. The infant 
experiences its body as a 'body-in-bits-and-pieces', rather 
than as a unified whole; and it is incapable initially of 
installing distance between its own 'self' (which does not 
yet exist) and the world outside it. Of all the active 
nodes of concentration of bodily 'jouissance', the infant 
can recognise the centrality of the genital site, 
presumably due to its prominence as a site of sensation. 
All of these characterisations cannot help but reveal an 
assumed form of the body that is implicitly accepted by 
Lacanian theory as prior to its own formulations. Indeed, 
without this 'prior' structure, the theory would have 
nothing to extrapolate out from. 
However, the psyche of the infant is, if we are to 
believe Lacan, esentially form- less at this stage. It is 
useful to remember here, then, that the level at which this 
'prior form' of the body is posited as existing is also 
that level at \vhich our notion of the capacity to learn was 
presented as existing also . It therefore stands as one of 
the innate, 'objective', and necessary pre- conditions for 
the human life-form, (39). So, perhaps against Lacan, we 
would argue that it is necessary to argue for the existence 
of a 'prior' form in the human psyche also. 
There lS a further, crucial point to make here, 
concerning what we have characterised as the 'will to 
power'. Inserting the notion of such a driving force into 
Lacan's schema, and suggesting that the drive towards the 
transfiguration of the mirror stage, if it happens at all, 
develops in the infant out of the need for this force to 
assume control over its environment and empower itself, 
might possibly help to explain what, at times, seems the 
quite remarkable astuteness, however unconscious, that 
Lacan ascribes to the human infant, in its ability to see 
what is required of it and to what end. This 'will to 
power', it can be argued, is what impels the infant to 
enter the psychic positions offered it by the mirror and 
oedipal stages, and to accept its eternally 'alienated' 
state as will to knowledge in return for social recognition 
as a cohesive, unified identity. Looked at in this \vay, 
the infant can be seen to be surrendering its 'lack of 
Lack' in the Real for the ability to possess a self which 
it can then reflect upon. This point was also crucial to 
Foucault, who saw his genealogies as "an analysis of the 
relation between forms of reflexivity - a relation .. of· self 
to self and, hence, of relations between forms of 
reflexivity and the discourse of truth, forms of 
rationalityand the effects of knowledge" (1983, p203). 
The issue to re-assert here is that it was not 
Foucault's intention to attack Reason itself by 
investigating certain manife stations of a type of 
rationalism, and neither was it his intention to suggest 
that reflexivity - the basic structure of Reason - was, of 
itself, a subject for critique. It was, rather, spec ific 
forms of reflexivity, not reflexivity per se, that were the 
proper objects of inquiry. 
It might be possible to state, then, that this 'self', 
capable o f reflection upon itself, is indeed one 
n ecessarily a l iena ted from itsel f, but that it is thi s very 
ability to reflect and a c t upon its object from a di s t anc e 
(even if this distance is internal to the object in 
question), t hat is the f irst pre -requisite for the 
operation of power in general, and of the 'will to power' 
in its human f o rm in particular. In this presentation of 
the matter, the infant would be entering the 'alienating' 
transfigurations of the oedipal and mirror stages in order 
to become empowered. Indeed, writers such as Pagland-
Sullivan and Grosz acknowledge this fact at some level by 
their focus on t:he particular qualities of empovJerment 
ascribed to the different gender positions covered by the 
oedipal rite of passage. It could be, then, that the 
relationship Lacan describes between the Real, the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic in the subject, the perpetual 
exchange of imagery and energy between the conscious and 
the unconscious, can be characterised as the insistent 
striving of this 'will to power' towards full expression, 
towards a total and complete empowerment of its form, which 
is hampered always by its own essential type, and by its 
distance from its object of attention - the lived body. 
Actually, to cast it thus really does no more than give 
form to a presence that Lacan clearly recognised : "It is 
in this erotic relation, in which the human individual 
fixed upon himself an 1mage that alienates him from 
himself, that are to be found the energy and form on which 
this organisation of the passions that he will call his ego 
is based" { 1977, pl9} . 
We can now move on to a different aspect of Lacan' s 
theory, which is a concentration on language. 
A major premise of most psychoanalytic theory is that 
what language finds unrepresentable it represses, thereby 
forming the unconscious. This repressed, 'unexpressible' _. 
force is constitut:ed of the drives and urges of the body. 
In Lacanian theory , the unconscious is formed not: only 
by language but as language, as a sort of inverse, or 
negative, of the 'developed' picture that is conscious 
discourse. This process does not happen in a vacuum, and 
language does not create matter out of a void so much as 
instill rupture into a continuity. Lacan argues that 
language creates the tot:ality of meanings and possible 
discourses, and that it is prior to , and formative of, the 
'subject'; but he also stresses that what language works 
on , the raw material out of which it fashions human 
subjects, continues to inform, colour, and disrupt language 
itself. Lacan' s \vorking of the concept of the unconscious 
therefore makes clear that it exists as a sort of 
'dialectic', where language - the conscious - is constantly 
forced to accommodate and bear witness to that which it has 
deemed unspeakable and therefore repressed. This repressed 
material is, as Sheridan describes it, uthat which lS 
lacking in the symbolic order, the ineliminabl e residue of 
all articulation, the foreclosed element, which may be 
approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord of the 
symbolic" (in Lacan, 1977 , px); and Lacan himself makes 
clear that •if repression there muse be, it is because 
there is something beyond tha t is pressing in" (1979, 
p162). 
This 'something' , which strains and pushes at the 
structures of the Symbol ic - of the will to knowledge - is, 
essentially , what Lacan presents as the Real, and this 
t hesis has called the will to power, and it is rooted in 
the body ' s drives and desires . 
In Lacan' s theory, the body is, as we have seen, the 
site of 'jouissance', that manner of experience that is, as 
he says, 'beyond the Phallus'. It is also the foundational 
support for the structure of Desire. So when he talks 
below of objects that are 'of use' , Lacan is referring to 
those things required by the body. It is the body and its 
needs and drives that first sketch what will become the 
eventual topography of the human psychical realm; and the :-_ 
body which hierarchizes and draws forth from the 'inaugural 
continuity' of existence in the Real those things that will 
be included within the Symbolic Order . It is, therefore, 
the body that originally decides the parameters of 
'meaning', and so the form and context of the operations of 
the will to knowledge in the Symbolic. The body, in fact, 
forms the world of subjects and objects as Lacan makes 
clear "[T)here would be no emergence of objects if there 
were no objects of use to me. This is the criterion of the 
emergence and distribution of objects" (1979, p191) . He 
also notes that "before strictly human relations are 
established, certain relations have already been 
determined. They are taken from whatever nature may offer 
as supports" (p20) . In other words the 
dialectical engagement with the material 
oredetermines the shape of things to come. 
body, in 
world, 
It can perhaps be seen from this brief analysis of 
Lacan' s thesis so far that it would be c l aiming a lot to 
state that the lived experience of the body has been 
successfully removed from a schema of the passage of 
infants into 'subjecthood'; and this suggests that a 
retention of a determining capacity for the body in the 
objective wor ld may be a valid theoretical option , if only 
because it avoids the paradox invo l ved in trying to remove 
it. This can then lead to a reinstatement of the body as a 
'factual' entity, and with this factual, material body 
comes, necessarily, a factual, material world. In terms of 
the ontological positions operating as supports of the type 
of theatrical practices we have touched upon so far 1n this 
thesis, this re-assertion of the body would seem to help to 
defend , in theory, those performances that look to the body 
as a power for liberation, or at least some deeper level of 
the 'truth' of identity . 
At this point , an initial summation can be made that 
states that we have seen, across the writ ings of both 
Foucault and Lacan, a formulation of a pre-linguistic 
experiential substratum - what this thesis names as the 
will to power and a subsequent description: of it~ ·,. _ 
evolution into the delineated and divided 'subject' of the 
will to knowledge. This fundamental, dual-level structure 
1s employed by both Lacan and Foucault as a framework 
within which they place their objects of attention, in 
order to focus , essentially, on the manner in which the 
Y.•ill to knowledge exists as a containing device for the 
ru~orphous \vill to power. To thi s extent, it is possible to 
say that the conception of identity offered by t his thesis 
still appears as a coherent one , and has not yet come into 
conflict with the radical pro~lematization of the self 
offered by post-structuralism. 
I want now to start drawing out a closer comparison 
between the Nietzschean and Lacanian projects. Lacan needs 
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to be seen as postulating for us, in exactly the same way 
as we have described Foucault as having done, the nature of 
the subjugation of the will to power in rationalist 
societies. In doing this, he also starts from a point akin 
to Nietzsche' s basic ontological position, and it may be 
informative to see if the comparison can be extended 
further. We can begin to do this by focusing on 
Nietzsche' s approach to 
individuals. 
the conscious 
The intention is only a sign and symptom 
that needs interpreting, 
discourse 
(Nietzsche, 1990, p63). 
The decisive value of an action resides in 
precisely that which is not intentional in 
it, and all that in it which is intentional, 
all of it that can be seen, known, 'conscious', 
still belongs to its surface and skin, 
(p63). 
of 
The basic picture of human life that both Lacan and 
Nietzsche advance is that of 'subjects' whose awareness of 
their own motivating desires and drives is at the best 
partial, but more usually simply completely lacking. The 
purpose of Lacanian analysis, therefore, and, within it, 
the role of the analyst's silence (40), is to act as a wall 
against which the 'self' of the analysand will be thrown as 
its discourse is not responded to in any way, until that 
self begins to break down and crumble, inducing in the 
'subject' a "controlled paranoia" (Lacan, 1977, p15). This 
is intended to act as an intense destabilising of all the 
points of reference that the analysands had up until then 
used to guide their presentations of themselves to 
themselves, which in turn is intended to reveal to them 
that the stories which they have been telling themselves 
about their lives are just that and no more simply 
stories and fictions. Through the ongoing process .of 
analysis, what will then become clear to these individuals 
i s the nature of the forces that lie behind all their 
actions and decisions, inscribing their narrative - which 
is the only true narrative into the fibres of their 
lives. Clearly, this can be compared to Nietzsche's 
prophet-figure Zarathustra calling for men to experience 
the "hour of the great contempt", where everything that 
they are, think, do, "even" their happiness becomes 
"loathsome" to them ( 1961, p79} . For Nietzsche, this was 
the first step towards an authentic existence as a 'free 
spirit'. 
For both writers, the point is that what the 'subject' 
takes him/herself to be is not actua lly what s/he is. As 
Lacan puts it, "it is not a question of knowing whether I 
speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but 
rather of knowing whether I am the same as that of which I 
speak" (1977, p165}. 
Clearly, then, both Nietzsche and Lacan would not take 
at face value the story that any 'subject' were to tell 
them of 'who' they were, but would instead search in the 
ruptures and cracks of the discourse they chose to utter 
themselves as for the ' real' being - the will to power - to 
reveal itself. This is the meaning behind Zarathustra' s 
warning that "it is not only he who speaks contrary to what 
he knows who lies, but even more he who speaks contrary to 
what he does not know" (1961, p87}. 
If we remember how Goffman simply described the nature 
of self-identity as a continuous 'performance' and did not 
really seek t o d i smantle thi s structure, it should be clear 
that what we have in Lacan and Nietzsche is a much more 
radically critical approach to the same issue. ~-!here 
Goffman seemed content with a description of the situation, 
Lacan and Nietzsche are, to some extent, more involved in a 
deconstruction of it. We might look at Lacan's description 
of the unconscious as structured by, and as, a 'language' 
for furtherance of this idea. 
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Within this formulation, the conscious/unconscious 
division of the human mind is redefined in the sense that 
they are presented as defining each other, the topography 
of the one being determined by the presence of the other. 
Lacan's own metaphor for the anchoring agent of the 
conscious mind, that which causes it to have the structure 
it does, is what he terms the 'points de capiton', which 
Lee translates as the "'buttons ' that keep upholstery 
attached to the framework of a piece of furniture" (Lee, 
1990, p61). These 'points de capiton ' are described by 
Lacan as situated wherever a particular signifier has been 
repressed; and to understand these references of Lacan's to 
the unconscious being structured 'as language' , one need 
only follow this particular metaphor through. The visible 
surface of the piece of upholstery , for example, with its 
navel - like 'points de capiton', is the conscious mind, 
whilst the reverse side - which will reproduce in exactly 
inverse form the topography of the 'out ' side is the 
unconscious. The material of the upholstery, which is what 
actually creates, contains, separates and constitutes the 
two sides, is language. This fabric is not opaque, and its 
function is to act as a filter of the unconscious, the non-
visible side, which is constantly straining to get through, 
especially around these ' points de capiton'. This it 
succeeds in doing in the manner of the irruptions into 
consciousness of dreams, and of over-invested language 
forms such as metaphor and metonymy. In La can' s schema, 
the ' subject' mistakenly takes the visible surface of the 
upholstery - the conscious mind - to be the entire 'shape' 
of his/her self; and so what Lacanian analysis seeks to do 
is illuminate the positioning of the repressed signifiers -
the 'points de capiton ' - of the subject's visible 'shape', 
since they are "the sionifieds for the signifying chains of 
the subject ' s discourse" (Lee , 1990, p61, emphasis added). 
In other words, these ' points de capiton' represent that 
which has caused the 'shape' of consciousness to appear the 
way it does, since they are always in place where there is 
a signifier that language has repressed because it cannot, 
102 
or will not, be made to speak it; and it is this act of 
repression, this drilling- in of 'buttons' to ho l d the 
fabric down, which creates the topographic structure of 
both the unconscious and the conscious simultaneously. So, 
as Lee explains, "to fix the ultimate meaning of any 
discourse is to determine the signifiers that have been 
repressed by t hac discourse" (p62). This act of fixing, for 
Lacan, is not something that 'subjects' themselves will be 
capable of , and hence his system of psycho- analysis (41) . 
In a sense, then , unlike Foucault' s ana l ysis of the 
macrocosmic workings of pm..;er /knowledge, it is possible to 
see Lacan as having been examining the mjcrocosmic effects 
of the will to knowledge's operation within the subject ' s 
consciousness, and asking of it the question How did the 
will to knowledge the symbolic order effect the 
containment of the will to power - the Real ? Hi s answer 
was, as we have seen : As language . Foucault, on the other 
hand, by focusing on the macrocosmic workings of the will 
to knowledge in its social regulation of 'subjects', was 
asking How can the will to knowledge ' s 'points de 
capiton' , those places where it has most stringently sought 
to subjugate the potentiality of the will to power, be 
recognised ? And his ans\ver was : By the intensity of the 
regimes of normalistion around those points. It can be 
seen from this that the field of inquiry for both writers 
was recognisably the same - the processes of containment of 
the human life- form within social structures of identity, 
most notably the concept of 'sel f' involved in subjecthood. 
Now, before finally drawing the theories of Lacan, 
Nietzsche and Foucault togecher more fully to look at what 
is suggested by the questions they were asking of the will 
to knowledge, it will be conscructive here to first cast an 
eye over how similair Nieczsche ' s and Lacan' s conceptions 
of ·desire are, since it is desire which is recognised by 
post - structural ism as \vhat might be termed the ' voice' of 
the will to power, and Lacan's work offers what is probably 
the most systematic exploracion of the concept from a post -
structuralist position. 
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Ultimately one loves one's desires and not 
that which is desired, 
·· (Nietzsche, 1973, p106) . 
It is the truth of what this desire has been 
in his history that the patient cries out in 
his symptom, 
(Lacan , 1977, p167) . 
It is really no more than a progression of logic for 
Lacan to develop a notion of desire as necessarily 
frustrated, since his situating of the Real as the 
'impossible' of Being, that which constantly presses in on 
the consciousness of the 'subject', would seem necessarily 
to demand such a conception. We have already seen the 
probable failure of Lacan' s theory to reduce the 
determining influence of the Real in the symbolic order -
his postulation of the workings of the circuitry of desire 
can be seen as one aspect of the attempt within that theory 
to describe, or even resolve, this problematic. 
For Lacan, there is a 'self', which is the necessary 
creation of the will to power as it seeks fulfilment; and~ 
this self is marooned at some distance from the state of 
being - Lacan's Real - that motivates its actions. This 
state of being, which is the flux of the libidinal drives, 
is the real force behind the directives that guide the 
self's decisions, in that the self strives endlessly to 
locate this state of existence since it mistakenly 
believes, at an unconscious level, that what it is looking 
for i s somewhere other than where it, itse lf, presently is. 
The self is driven to seek this state of being in order to 
experience again the sense of unity and concreteness of 
identity that it believes can only be provided there. This 
is why Lacan says that the self's desire is for "the desire 
of the Other" ( 1979, p235) . What he means by this is that 
for the self, aware as it is of its own divided existence 
104 
.:-~. 
since the mirror-stage, the recognition that being so 
desired by another would imply would grant it the solidity 
that it desperately craves. It would grant it a sense of 
being 'real', of being recognisably and concretely present. 
This recognition, because it would be afforded by the Other 
- the "one supposed to know" (42) - who i s imputed by the 
self as occupying a more 'real' state than its own, lends 
the authority of that state to what it recognises and 
desires. In other words, it confers onto the self the 
status of being 'real' that the self alone is incapable of 
doing. The fact that the sense of being real achieved 
through recognition by the Other is illusory is precisely 
what the non-recognition by the "one supposed to know" 
the analyst - of Lacanian analysis is designed to expose. 
The 'subject' 1s intended through this non- recognition to 
be shown how his/her objects of desire are not the truth of 
that desire. This, for Lacan, is a fact already sensed 1n 
the self's unconscious acknowledgement to itself of its 
failure to achieve its desire in any of its objet petit 
a's; an acknowledgement which, in all probability, is what 
has led the 'subject ' to enter into analysis in the first 
place. It is this same process of the continual forming of 
the subject's life around the convolutions of his / her own 
desire that Nietzsche is referring to when he comments that 
man ultima.tely, "reaps nothing but his own biography," 
(1984, p238). This ·recognition l eads to the need, 
perceived by both writers, to examine 
with which the self tells the story 
the specific forms 
of what it is t o 
itself; and this, in essence, returns u s to the question 
Foucault was also attempting to answer, namely how does the 
will to power create of itself the will to knowledge . 
It was a matter of analysing, not behaviours 
or ideas, nor societies and their 'ideologies', 
but the 'problematizations' through which 
being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought 
- and the 'practices' on the basis of which 
these problematizations are formed, 
(Foucaul t , 1984, pll). 
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Why the Will to Knowledge ? . 
We have said, then, that both Foucault and Lacan were 
intent on analysing the processes by which the will to 
power came to represent i tself in the world as the 
channelled network of drives and desires that constitute 
the lived somatic existence of the 'subjects' of the will 
to knowledge. The crucial question for Foucault in this 
analysis was how the human life-form made of itself the 
particular object for reflection that it did . As we have 
seen, he located the roots of the modern 'self' in the 
possibilities offered to a specific form of the will to 
power - the will to knowledge - by the distancing of the 
threat of death from the everyday life of individuals via 
technology. Human life then assumed a role as the object 
of/for this will to knowledge that was articulated through 
a conglomeration of normative prescriptions installed 
within 1n the political and socio-economic networks of 
society which worked together to define the set of 
possibilities of what forms human life could find itself 
granted access to . His series of ' genealogies' stand as 
investigations into the particularities of these changes iri, 
.r·-
the regimes of normalisation operating on 'subjects' in 
particular epochs. 
Lacan , on the other hand, had no particular desire to 
historically locate the practices he was defining, those 
practices of the processes of socialisation that determined 
that human life would become the particular type of object 
of attention for itself that it did, installing in itself a 
divide between its 'true' state of existence and the 
alienated site of its existence as a 'self' . He traced 
this process through with his hypotheses of the infant ' s 
imaginary relation to itself in the mirror-stage, and its 
later postioning within the symbolic order via the 
'resolution ' of the Oedipal complex . 
We have already discussed the probl ematic resident in 
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Lacan's projection of a state of distress in the infant -
the body experienced as a 'body-in-bits-and-pieces' - .as 
the motivating factor of this drive to 'misrecognise' the 
image as the 'self', and have seen how there is a failure 
within such a conception to fully explain how this initial 
existence in the Real, which apparently lacks nothing, can 
therefore foster a sense of the needfulness of a sense of 
unity in the infant. It would perhaps avoid this 
problematic if the Real were instead presented simply as a 
site of bodily distress from which the infant move s in 
order to seek the unity that its mirror-image seems to 
offer. Lacan seems genuinely unwilling, however, to drop 
the notion of the Real as also a positive experience, in 
that he wants to retain an i dea of it as that state which 
is devoid of the lack that marks later life. There is a 
certain logic to this stance, since there must necessarily 
have been a state of 'non-lack' at some time for the idea 
of a later state of lack characterized by a yearning for 
the former state to operate properly. 
It does seem that this ambiguous characterisation of 
the Real remains a problem in Lacan's theory. 
Nevertheless , his hypothetical 'mirror-stage' is ln some 
senses crucial to this thesis, in that it offers a 
description of a truly pivotal point in the development of 
individual identity. In the schema used by this essay, .' · 
Lacan' s mirror-stage describes the border over which the 
will to power passes to become the will to knowledge. In 
this sense, what Lacan seems unclear about is what has to 
be left behind for the crossing to be made; and what he in 
effect describes is a picture of a traveller leaving a 
detested place to reach a promised land who, having 
achieved this goal , then searches the new homeland for 
something approximating the one just left behind. It may 
be that Lacan was attempting through this to signal an 
innate perversity in human beings; but since this is never 
stated , it probably should not be assumed to be the case. 
Coward and Ellis (1977) note, in their treatment of 
Lacan Is theory I hovJ uthe mirror-phase is seen by Lacan to 
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be the moment at which the infant's first movement t owards 
a unified sense of self is put in motion" (p109) . .In 
Nietzschean terms, this would be describable as the first 
flexing of that 'will t o simplicity ', with its need to 
'bind together and tame ' , that signals the presence of the 
will to knowledge. Lacan, as we have seen, characterises 
the impulse to make this move as deriving from the psycho-
physical sensation of discomfort engendered by the infant's 
"physiolog ical natal prematuration" (1977, p 19 ) . Coward 
and Ell is go on to describe how it is the differentiation 
of the world i nto 'subjects' and 'obj ec t s ' that provides 
the necessary structure f or what will eventually be the 
site of language 's functioning, noting t hat "the 
pos i tionality which characterises languag~ in which 
meanings exist for a subj ect who functions a s the place of 
intention of those meanings - commences with the separation 
of subject and object" 
(1977, p111) . They then s how how this process of 
separation is enacted according to the pleasure principle 
as hypothesised by Freud, whereby the imaginary ego of the 
infant accepts or rejects things as a result of the 
fee lings of pleasure or pain that they produce in it. I t 
is i n this act of expelling from itself what it will not 
accept that the infant begins to form a divide between what 
is it and what is ' other ', and thereby creates a world 
structured as subj ects and objects . 
This does nothing , of course , to explain why , if t he 
infant i s the sole determining agent in this construction 
of the world as inside/outside , and therefore operates this 
ability of creating the world ext erior to it only in order 
to hold what it will not accept into itself at a distance 
from it, the exterior world as so constituted is not simply 
a repository f or al l that is negative for the infant, and 
how it is that it can a l so contain objects of desire for 
it. It does not, either , offer an explanation for the 
existence in itself of the pleasure principle , which surely 
seems to carry with i t the voice in this schema the 
dictatorial voice - of the body. What these criticisms are 
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intended to imply is that there is a need to consider 
the possibility, touched on already, that the 
'centering' of experience within human beings is a 
manifestation of the healthy functioning of the organism 
according to its biologically-determined optimum mode of 
functioning. This point will resurface later, since it 
is an important one. 
In furthering the explication of this formation of 
the world as subject/object, Coward and Ellis go on to 
explain how , for the infant, the proposed , 
dialectic of introjection/projection is 
the movement which can eliminate 
unbearable tension by the setting up of 
an outside that is radically other than the 
ego . . . and it is this which in creating an 
outside, builds the ego and places the 
subject in a position of possible predication, 
(1977, p139). 
They state that this leads to the need to master symbolic 
discourse since, 
by this movement of projection/expulsion, 
the object which has been projected is 
definitively separated from the body of the 
subject ; it is thus situated as ' out there', 
and as such only one relationsh ip is possible 
in order to master this exteriority and gain 
satisfaction of needs. This is the acceptance 
of the sign, that is symbolic r ealtions and 
learned language. Acceptance makes it possible 
to represent the object in its absence, and 
therefore enables mastery of that absence, 
(p141) . 
So, the infant's formation of a discrete 'self', 
its positioning of itself as a 'subject ' that is certain 
things whilst it is not others, is what gives to it the 
possibilities of predication, which is also the ability 
to be represented as a subject-position in language, as 
well as the means to master absence. This 1s, in fact , 
implicitly acknowledged as an act of empowerment for the 
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infant by Coward and Ell is, and can only be portrayed as 
negative if emphasis is placed on the fact that it -is 
gained at the cost of a non-divided existence in the Real. 
It is possible, though, against the pessimism implicit 
in such a reading, to advance a case for the infant's 
division of itself from the world and itself as deriving 
from natural capacities in human beings which in fact 
enhance, rather than diminish, its potential in life. As 
we shall see, this seems to be the path that Nietzsche 
took; and he did so by dint of a rejection of the notion of 
the real as simply an idealism. This, essentially, is also 
what this thesis has been attempting with the particular 
presentation of identity that it has been offering. 
Bryan Turner notes how "the fact of human embodiment 
(or more technically the fact that humanity is in 
evolutionary terms a warm-blooded mammal, a species being) 
gives rise to certain problems which must be satisfied in 
order for Man to survive" (in Featherstone, 1991, p1); and 
goes on to describe how the particular paths of development 
followed by different groups of the human species have 
engendered different regulatory structures, since "the 
growth of civilization requires simultaneously the 
restraint of the body and the cultivation of character in 
the interests of social stability" (p15). This, he says, 
can be sought in a variety of ways, depending on the nature 
of the society in question. Perhaps it will be remembered 
that this is the process which Goffman was happy to call 
'natural', seeing the development of civilisation as 
'probably a natural process', rather than, as Foucault saw 
it, a reflection of the workings of particular 
relationships between power and knowledge. In the West, 
Turner notes, rationalism was the chosen regulatory 
structure designed to overcome the crises and threats that 
confronted the efforts of this geographical coagulation of 
the human species to survive and extend itself. He goes on 
to explain that what is seen as the gathering degeneration 
of the effectivity of this structure as a containment 
device and provider of solutions has begun to mean that 
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it is no longer clear that dependence on 
human rationality will be sufficient in 
principle to respond to these global crises, 
precisely because there is the suspicion 
that the crises are actually produced by the 
same instrumental rationality, 
( 19 91, p2 4) . 
The point here is not whether rationality will be 
sufficient 'in principle', but that it is not proving to be 
so in practice. Rationalism has developed and extended as 
a framework for human existence as a result of human 
interaction, and therefore as a result of the dialectical 
relation between practice in the material world and the 
practice of the formation of concepts about that practice. 
So. if it is true that strains are beginning to show in the 
conceptual apparatus offered by instrumental rationality in 
the contemporary world, it is primarily because it is 
proving to be insufficient to meet the problems issuing 
from current human practice, and only secondarily - in fact 
only as a result of this - because of a problematic being 
discovered as regards its founding principles. This takes 
us back to Harman•s insistence, dealt with in Chapter Two, 
that concepts must be seen 
interaction with the physical 
as deriving from human 
world, rather than from_,_ 
.r .•• 
nowhere; which in turn leads us back to the ambivalence·· 
towards the Symbolic due to a certain nostalgia for the 
'lost• real which we witnessed in Lacan. 
It can be said that underlying Lacan • s acceptance of 
the impossibility in adulthood of ever being able to 
experience this Real directly, in an •unmediated' fashion, 
is the idealist assumption that something is lost in the 
human conceptualisation of the world, and that this 
something is something worthwhile. As Peter Dews explains 
it. 
subjectivity presupposes reflection, a 
representation of experience as that of an 
experiencing self. But through such 
representation, which depends upon the 
1 1 1 
synthesizing function of concepts, the 
original fluidity of intuition, the 
communication between the human and the 
specular world, is lost. Consciousness 
becomes a kind of self-cqntajoed theatre, 
divided between stage and auditorium : 
energy is transformed into the thought of 
energy, intensity into intentionality, 
(1986, p31, emphasis added). 
It is this 'lost realm' of experience, this 'original 
fluidity of intuition' that seems at times to haunt Lacan's 
work; and we have seen how, like Foucault, he intimates 
that it is the innate multiplicity of the body and its 
drives that speaks this 'lost' level of life most 
truthfully. However, as we have seen; a system of 
reflexivity - or consciousness - is a defining feature of 
being 'human'. This reflexivity is, as Lacan himself has 
shown, the division of the world into 'subjects' and 
'objects'; which is, in turn, 
'symbolisation' of the world - the 
the subject in symbolic form. 
the grounds for the 
re-presentation of it by 
This translation of the 
world into symbols can then be seen to be the method by 
which the 'will to power' seeks to gain control over its 
environment in a context - that of embodiment as a social 
animal where totality of control and influence is 
necessarily beyond it. Symbolisation, then, needs to be·; .. 
seen as the means by which the will to power seeks to 
become the whole of something of which it is only, in fact, 
a part. If we can note Lacan's point about man needing to 
'impress his image in reality', we can now see that he/she 
does this so as to effectively 'own' the whole, to become 
it, and to extend the form of themselves beyond the 
boundaries of embodiment into the atoms and the stars 
(43). In this sense, it can be claimed that symbolisation 
is the will to power at play. 
As a counterpoint to Lacan's pessimism, then, the 
position of this thesis asserts the possibility of viewing 
instrumental rationality as successfully serving the will 
to power. On top of this it suggests, with Foucault, that 
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rationality is an outgrowth of vlill to power which enables 
it to extend itself into the world and overcome the 
limitations of its form to a greater extent than would have 
been possible without it. It is clear that when that form 
of rationality which has been chosen as the path to 
empowerment becomes a disabling, rather than enabling, 
factor in its overall development, a situation that will be 
revealed in the effectivity of the practice it engenders, 
it will then undergo alteration. 
So, even if Lacan's formulation of human life as the 
experience of the alienation of the 'self' from a valid 
level of its own existence is accepted, then a striving for 
positivity suggests that this state of affairs needs to be 
seen as the result of biological imperatives, as a natural, 
unalterable 'fact' of existence as a social human animal, 
rather than necessarily as a cause for distress. 
As this thesis has argued, the individual's experience 
of being a source of events in a world that exists beyond 
it needs to be read as an early feature of its nature as a 
corporeal presence in that world; and this basic structure 
of an experienced, discrete continuity is what the 
'secondary' networks, the particular societal formulations 
of identity, actually build upon, hence the clear 
commonalities of form amongst what are, effectively, alien 
cultures. A schema of identity such as this is valuable 
because it is capable of revealing the arbitrary nature of 
particular societal discourses to do with identity 
formation in a radical way, at the same time as being 
capable of installing the necessary grounds for the 
formulation of alternative configurations. What these 
possible 'configurations' might be will depend on taking as 
read the structures indicated above which are imposed on 
human development by the human form itself. As we have been 
discovering, one of the most important of these structures 
is the self's necessary representation of the world to 
itself and others in symbolic form. Now Foucault was aware 
that 
the fact that man lives in a milieu which has 
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a conceptual architecture does not prove that 
he has turned away from life through the process 
of forgetting, or that a historical drama has 
separated him from it; but only that he sees things 
in a certain way ... Forming concepts is a way of 
living, not of killing life, 
(in Armstrong, 1992, p188). 
Foucault makes clear here that the fact that humanity 
creates for itself a 'conceptual architecture' is not the 
cause for an argument for, or a mourning of, the 
'petrification' of life into an 'alien structure'. The 
point about this conceptual structure is that it does 
exist, but that it forms a dialectic with human practice 
and is essentially plastic. It therefore can be, and is, 
continuously altered; which suggests a level of 
indeterminacy and potential for re-definition. This point 
is crucial, since it returns us to an idea of the 
importance of human agency. It is this force which is 
capable of re-formulating and testing the limits imposed 
upon the human organism in any particular societal 
situation. 
The ramifications of this 'creative agency' were 
studied by both Lacan and Foucault and, as we have seen, it 
is possible to read the former as the more pessimistic with 
the regard to its potentiality as a force for liberation. 
Nietzsche, as we are about to go on and see, moves beyond·.;,_ 
the caution of both, by advocating the 'self' as the ~ro~er 
sphere of practice for the will to power, as a result of 
its being the only one available. One of the major 
reasons, however, for this turn to these affirmatory 
writings is the fact that it is particularly in the sphere 
of artistic practice that Nietzsche located the paradigm 
case of this type of practice of the 'will to power'. 
A final recap, then. 
This chapter has shown how a picture of human identity 
that states that there are objective facts about the world 
and the human form is not, necessarily, in conflict with a 
radical post-structuralist scepticism. It has also 
constructed a theory that follows the post-structuralist 
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problematising of 'self'; and yet accepts at the same time 
that there are basic facts of existence which determine 
that the 'centred' self is, in some senses, nevertheless an 
innate phenomenon of being human. The next chapter will 
show how the addition of a developed concept of a will to 
power into this theory of subjecthood is the pathway to a 
positive description of the performative nature of the 
self, one which avoids the tendency towards nostalgia for a 
non-present 'Real', noticeable ~n theories like Lacan' s, 
which seem not to have acclimatised fully to the 
pervasiveness of appearance over this 'Real' . As more 
contemporary performance theory is introduced, it will 
become clear that the theory of self offered by this thesis 
does little more than place in a different conceptual 
context the underlying ontological approach to human 
identity of experimental western theatre practitioners in 
this century. 
Human beings must invent themselves in the 
midst of an infinity of possibilities, instead 
of passively accepting their roles because 
they think they could not be other than they 
are, 
(Boal, 1992, p209). 
., 
,: ~ .. 
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The Problematized Self as a 
Performance Event. 
Fundamental thought : the new values must first 
be created - we shall not be spared this task ! 
- p 512 . 
... the great conception of man, that man becomes 
the transfigurer of existence when he learns to 
transfigure himself, 
- p 434. 
[Art] is the great means of making life possible, 
the great seduction to life, the great stimulant 
of life, 
- p 452. 
(Nietzsche, 1968). 
This chapter operates from the premise, present 
throughout this thesis, that many of the specificities of 
the attack on the notion of the cohesive self that we found 
in the work of Foucault and Lacan derive in no small part 
from the approach towards the problem of individuals and 
their social identities found in the writings of Friederich 
Nietzsche. As referred to in the Introduction, the 
adoption of Nietzschean philosophy for its affirrnatory 
approach to the issues covered is not unique to this · 
thesis. 
As we have also seen, the distinct projects of 
Nietzsche, Foucault and lacan can be presented as parallel 
to each other in many respects. It is the task of this 
chapter to show how the project that Nietzsche attempted to 
encourage his readers to undertake, the 'freedom' he 
offered them - having defined freedom as ua facility in 
self-direction" (1968, p375) - might be found in no place 
more than in the dynamics and possibilities of the 
theatrical event. 
This is something that Nietzsche, with his concept of 
the • theatre-eye • as "the great third eye that looks out 
into the world through the other two" (1982, p206), seems 
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to have recognised. In fact, his attitude towards art and 
artistic practice, the plastic arts especially, might. be 
characterised as celebratory of their potential to approach 
a level of the 'divine'. For Nietzsche, "we possess art 
less we perish of the truth" ( 1968, p43 5) ; and 'art', for 
him, is "essentially affirmation, blessing, [and] 
deification of existence " (p434). 
It is important not to ignore the positive and 
affj rmatory drive of this attitude to art, since it is to 
art that Nietzsche turned for a "laboratory of the social 
imagination" (Birringer, 1991, p178); and many 
practitioners and theorists of radical performance can be 
seen to have approached the whole idea of the purpose and 
function of theatre from very similar standpoints; which 
suggests that the 'undefined work of freedom', first 
indicated by Nietzsche and then worked upon by Foucault, 
has been, and is, underway today in some form in our 
theatres and performance spaces. 
If this is true, if "it's art when man produces 
himself" (Brecht, 1965, p95), then it might be possible to 
assert that theatrical activity is a prime site and tool in 
the effort towards what Nietzsche saw as the pre-condition 
of a new freedom- a 'transvaluation of values'. If this 
is accepted, it then becomes necessary to ask how and why 
this might be so. Why 1s it that a critical attitude··. 
towards the notion of self is such a feature of theatre ? 
And what makes practitioners and theorists (and Nietzsche) 
trust action in the theatre as an effective tool for self-
development ? Is it because, as Peter Brook states, "a new 
truth emerges only when certain stereotypes are broken" 
(1987, p239) ? As we shall see at the close of this 
chapter, the solution may well rest in theatre's basic 
form, which demands that the Self take on board Others as 
though they were Self, at the same time requiring that the 
Self represent itself as Other. Theatre, or performance, 
in this respect, becomes one of "the highest and most 
illustrious human joys, in which existence celebrates its 
own transfiguration" (Nietzsche, 1968, p540); and, as we 
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have already seen above, mankind becomes the 'transfigurer 
of the world' by partaking in such activity. In other 
words, theatre offers individuals the opportunity to 
attempt a 'transvaluation of values' - a phrase which, if 
it indicates anything, suggests that it is the act of 
valuing that will be examined, and this entirely by and 
through the careful taking of different value into the 
entire field and structure of value. (Value in this sense 
being the web of discourses that support and produce 
'defined' individuals in a 'known' world - what Nietzsche, 
as we have seen, called the 'table of values'). 
Before approaching an eventual clarification of this 
potential •force• of theatrical activity, I intend 
initially to take what is a necessary detour through 
Nietzsche's concept of the will to power - the second, it 
will be remembered, of what this thesis has called the two 
primary 'building blocks' of identity. This will also 
allow the will to power's relation to theatre and 
perfomance activity to be made clearer and more relevant 
to later discussions of the work of theatre theorists and 
practitioners. The basic approach will be to flesh out 
what the will to power was held to be by Nietzsche, and why 
it was that a site of its optimum functioning was posited 
by him as the world of art. As Nietzsche said, u What is 
essential in art remains its perfection of existencen 
(1968, p434). 
Initially, though, it may be worth explicating, in the 
same way as was done with Foucault and Lacan, the reasoning 
behind what, later in this Chapter will, effectively, be 
the placing of the writings of diverse theatre 
practitioners \oJithin a Nietzschean • frame'. 
What should become clear, as the analysis of aspects 
of their texts unfolds, is that it is a conception of human 
identity that they hold in common with Nietzsche, even if, 
as is arguably the case with Brecht and Boal, it might be 
expected that they would stand in opposition to his 
celebration of those 'free spirits • that pull themselves 
away from existence in 'the herd' (as he was wont to refer 
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to the masses as). Clearly, it would be a mis-
representation of the thinking of both Brecht and Boal to 
argue that they held a 'Nietzschean' outlook on life. It 
is not the aim of this thesis to offer such a 
representation. What is offered is an examination of the 
type of conceptualization of human identity that can be 
seen to lie at the centre of their thinking on other 
issues, together with an assertion that this 
conceptualization can be said to be commensurate in many 
respects with that which rests at the heart of Nietzsche's 
philosophy. The point being that, as practitioners, their 
approach to their work would not be as it is without such a 
conceptualization. What they share in common with 
Nietzsche is a view of the human form as more variable than 
society at large presents it as being, and a desire 
corresponding to this to do something to alter this state 
of affairs. On a more general level they, together with 
Grotowski, share a belief in art as a forum for the 
examination of, and experimentation with, the possibilities 
of the human form which, as we shall see shortly, is a 
central tenet in Nietzschean philosophy. 
The W1• 11 t p . t . ___ ____ oower 1n prac 1ce. 
We are experiments let us also want to be them 
{Nietzsche, 1982, p191). 
Theatre is a way of experimenting with life - a 
kind of research-and-development department for 
the culture at large, 
{Charles Ludlam, in Drain [ed], 1995, p149). 
Against what he saw as the prevailing idea of the 
individual as a cohesive and continuous entity, the truth 
of whom could be discovered in the nature of his/her 
'immortal soul', Nietzsche proposed as the umost useful 
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achievement" of "the promotion of knowledge" the 
"abandonment" of just this idea (1982, p204). In its place 
he offered "M¥ hy:potbPsj s : The subject as multiplicity" 
( 19 6 8 ' p2 7 0 ) . This was intended to indicate the unfixed 
and essentially undecidable quality of human life, the 
potential variety of which Nietzsche saw as severely 
curtailed by the operations of morality upon individuals. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that what 
Nietzsche was advocating was a rejection of the act of 
valuing (that activity which installs moral order in the 
world) since, for him, the "only possible" critique of 
morality was "a brave and rigorous attempt to .l.iJLe. in this 
or that morality" (1982, pl96). If we combine this 
statement with his earlier definition of freedom as •a 
facility in self-direction', it becomes clear that 'living 
in this or that morality' is essentially an act of self-
governance, self-discipline, self-creation and, in reality, 
a profound type of self-ishness - "Let ~ self be in the 
action, as the mother is in the child : let that be ¥QUL 
maxim of virtue ! " ( 1961, p120) . In other words, it is 
the "independence of self" from the constraints of public 
and traditional morality - or 'regimes of normalisation' as 
Foucault would have called them that is the •first 
condition" of the freedom that Nietzsche seeks for people, 
(Barker, 1989, p75). 
This ·theme of the restoration of responsibility, 
specifically moral responsibility, to individuals - in the 
case of theatre, the individual audience members - is one 
that we have, and will, find evidenced in almost all the 
writings of experimental theatre practitioners. Its common 
presence in apparently widely divergent approaches to the 
theatrical medium will be seen to stem from the basic 
structures and dynamics of representational form itself, as 
an unavoidable aspect of the commitment involved in acts of 
communication between individuals in a public medium, where 
the field of the discourse runs on the dynamic produced by 
the constant confrontation between the Self and what is 
Other to it. This is a point which reasserts the 
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importance of defining what qualifies as a performance as 
opposed to a performative event. The existence in a 
performance of at least two perspectival points the 
performer and the spectator - introduces an ethical terrain 
that need not be insisted on to the same degree with events 
that are simply performative. Freedom, in this situation, 
becomes then the responsible governance of oneself in 
relation to oneself and to Others; whilst the acceptance of 
responsibilty for one's impact on Others becomes an act of 
some truth only when one can justifiably claim to have 
guided and produced one's own actions in their entirety. 
If the latter is not the case, if one's actions in the 
world are the product of unacknowledged and undisciplined 
drives, there is really little sense in the claim that one 
is responsible - "We unlearn responsibility for ourselves, 
since we as conscious, purposive creatures, are only the 
smallest part of us" (Nietzsche, 1968, p357). 
This means in practice that the nature of the act of 
valuing, of judging the 'rightness' or otherwise of 
actions, can be seen to become increasingly anachronistic 
the more the scope of an individual's self-knowledge is 
refused. If an individual does not know what it is that 
he/she is, how can it then be possible for her/him to 
assume to know the cause of what they do ? And surely it 
is only by reading back from an effect to an undeniable 
cause that a structure of 'responsibility' can be erected ? 
In Nietzsche's proposition, personal responsibility does 
not easily extend beyond the Self, since installing it in 
the inter-subjective realm demands immediately, for the 
structure to operate effectively, that the two parties be 
commensurate to some large degree. In the extreme 
individualism of Nietzsche's philosophy, such a levelling 
out of the Self to common dimensions is nothing but 
anathema. 
This question of the ethical terrain surrounding acts 
of confrontation between the self and others is, it can be 
seen, an important one. 
But what, then, is to guide the individual as he 
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transvaluates his· inherited values and transfigures himself 
and the world ? Is she/he to allow her /his drives and 
desires free reign, ignoring others' judgements concerning 
her/his actions, since the table of values they operate in 
judging her/him is no longer applicable ? Nietzsche 
answered potential questions along these lines by 
developing his concept of the 'Will to Power', which, for 
him, was nothing more or less than Life itself : 
[T]his, my Dionysian world of the eternally 
self-creating, the eternally self-destroying 
... my "beyong good and evil" ... This world is 
the will to power - and nothing besides ! 
.. And you yourselves are also this will to power -
and nothing besides ! 
(1968, pSSO). 
It becomes important, then, to establish how Nietzsche 
characterised this 'will to power', since it was through 
mastery of this essential driving force that mankind was to 
'. 
enter upon the journey towards the 'Ubermensch' and 
overcome her/himself. 
It is interesting, from our point of view, to note 
that it was to the arts that Nietzsche most often went when 
in need of a paradigm for the individual embarked on a 
project of 'self-overcoming'. For him, art offered a means 
to deify life, as against other practices of deification, ·· 
which belittled the idea of the individual by installing 
the idea of something far greater and more 
the individual's world than the individual 
"One must shatter the all; unlearn respect 
powerful into 
him/herself 
for the all; 
take what we have given to the unknown and the whole and 
give it back to what is nearest, what is ours" (1968, 
pl8l) . But what then was to happen, if individuals 
accepted their right to absolute 
integrity 
entities, 
of expression ? How would 
which indi victuals relieved of 
individuality and 
entirely distinct 
the need to use 
public forms for their self-expression would stand to 
become, be able to relate to each other ? What are the 
results of accepting that "all seeing is essentially 
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perspective, and so is all knowing" 
p255) ? It does not immediately 
(Nietzsche, 1956, 
bode well for the 
intricate structures of inter-subjective communication to 
allow every individual the right to bespeak the world in a 
unique way; for what path back to satisfying communication 
- with its affinity to notions of communion and community -
between individuals might there be left available ? 
"(W] ords make the uncommon common," Nietzsche complained, 
(1968, p428); and it is difficult to know how, when 
language is the basic communicational tool, such a reducing 
effect might be avoided. In other words, granting the 
individual clear autonomy with expressive means might allow 
them to 'exteriorise', to make visible to others, what they 
are; but there has to be some doubt as to how satisfying 
the 'expression' will be when the object of it, the Other, 
does not comprehend the nature of the highly specific signs 
being used, which would be the case in this hypothetical 
instance. 
This was a dilemma that Nietzsche was aware of, and 
one that he needed to overcome, since it might be possible, 
reading out from some of his comments, to conclude that 
inter-subjective communication always does a disservice to 
the subjects involved. Clearly, this is the view of 
schools of thought such as psycho-analysis, which maintain 
that the individual speaks her/his desires and drives into 
., 
the world unbeknown to her/himself, and without hope of··· 
full 'remedy'. Nietzsche, however, was generally 
concerned to offer the individual more hope (and with it 
more scope) than a psycho-analytic reading seems to allow; 
and his approach to the problematic of inter-personal 
communication is simple, strong, and effective. 
Alexander Nehamas, in his Ni et zscbe r.j fe as 
Li teratllre (1985), offers a delicate reading of the 
Nietzschean concept of perspectivism (1), which makes clear 
that perspectivism is not the same thing as relativism, and 
therefore does not lead to the problems of 
incommensurability that can effect projects growing out of 
the latter position (p49). Perspectivism, according to 
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Nehamas, does not assert that every individual exists in an 
entirely unique way - although that is an aspect of its 
thematics - what it suggests is that there is no other, or, 
more importantly, no better way of knowing the world than 
interpretation (p67) - "As if a world would still remain 
over after one deducted the perspective ! " (Nietzsche, 
19 6 8 ' 'p3 0 5 ) . 
This insight leads Nehamas to a discussion of 
interpretation and its outcomes, and it is interesting here 
because it re-introduces, under a different name, the 
'capacity to learn' that we saw developed earlier in this 
thesis. Nietzsche said of this drive - "[T]he instinct for 
the utility of inferring as we do infer is a part of us, we 
almost .ar:..e. this instinct", and didn't hesitate to refer to 
it as a "biological compulsion" (1968, p278). 
Unlike the sombreness of the approach to this issue 
that we saw in Lacan's work, where a lost "Real" haunts the 
spectral interplays of the Symbolic Order, making life 
always an instance of 'lack' , Nietzsche exhibits a 
pragmatism in his account that calls for no sense of loss, 
just knowledge of how to work the situation to advantage 
One should not understand this compulsion 
to construct concepts, species, forms, 
purposes, laws ... as if they enabled us to 
fix the real world; but as a compulsion to 
arrange a world for ourselves in which our .; 
existence is possible, 
(Nietzsche, 1968, p282). 
Within this pragmatism, Nietzsche develops his notion of 
individual agency and autonomy, and the nature of his 
concept of perspectivism allows him to postulate 
interpretation, or evaluation, as that capacity which gives 
individuals the powers to be creators "Evaluation is 
creation : hear it, you creative men ! Valuating is itself 
the value and jewel of all valued things," (1961, p85). 
This is, in some senses, crucial to the whole 
hypothesis of this thesis, since it inserts the 
individual's capacity to interpret, to evaluate, as the 
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source of creative power for that individual. 
This, then, is the practical drive of the call for a 
'transvaluation of value' it is not an attempt to 
jettison the act of evaluating, of establishing 'tables of 
values' entirely, but rather the attempt to reveal to 
individuals that they themselves are of a certain form, and 
that this form can be used to their advantage through a 
process of mastery. So, far from advocating the smashing 
of every table of values, Niet zsche (parallelled today by 
Postmodernism's call for attention to be paid to the voices 
of marginalised minorities) is calling for the 
proliferation of such tables, but at an individual, rather 
than societal, level. For Niet zsche, the creation of a 
table of values is the right of every individual; and 
reflection upon the particular character of any table by 
others can lead to a recognition of the shape of the 
particular will to power that founded it "A table of 
values hangs over every people. Behold, it is the table of 
its overcomings; behold, it is the voice of its will to 
power," (Nietzsche, 1961, p84). 
That Nietzsche can posit the creation of a table of 
values as a positive act is a consequence of his acceptance 
that any •standpoint of value" is necessarily "the 
standpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement" 
for "complex forms" of "relative life-duration" (1968, ·.· 
p3 80) . In other words, a table of values is always a 
reflection of the needs of a particular form of life, and 
has no recourse to entities outside of that (such as 'God', 
'Nature• and so on) as justification, or proof. This being 
the case, it can be seen that the creation of an individual 
table of values is an effect of the successful carrying out 
of one's moral 'responsibility' to oneself. 
For Nietzsche, the strongest guide in this effort to 
re-interpret the world is the "richer, clearer, more 
tangible phenomenon" (1968, p270) of the body; which is 
why, for him, the body and its physiology are "the 
starting-point" (p271). In Nietzsche's pragmatic 
materialism ('would it not be more materialist to start 
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with the question of the body ?' - asked Foucault), "value-
words are always banners raised where a new bliss has been 
found - a new feeling" (p380). 
A picture is beginning to emerge here, perhaps, of the 
basic structuration and possibilities of the individual in 
Nietzsche's philosophy. It is the conception of human life 
in the living that, out of the theorists analysed so far in 
this thesis, comes closest to what is desired here, in that 
it clearly proposes several readings of the relevant issues 
that allow individuals room for positive manoeuvring once 
the theorising is done. In Nietzschean philosophy, what 
Foucault referred to as the necessarily •undefined work of 
freedom', is laid out quite cleanly and clearly, and is, in 
fact, nothing short of the overcoming of the Self and the 
recreation of the world in one's own image. This is why 
"religious awe" before oneself is "the condition of 
prophets and poets" (1968, p405), and it is also why 
"nothing is rarer than a personal action" (p472). 
This latter statement reflects Nietzsche' s summation 
of the state of his fellow men, whom he saw as largely 
labouring through life with moral perspectives that were 
imposed from above rather than manufactured from within; 
and this, to him, vias nothing but a surrendering of one's 
moral responsibility to oneself, for one can only 
interpret, and interpret morally, and therefore to have no'.·. 
say in one's morality is to see the world not as oneself. 
This is similar, it would seem, to Grotowski' s vision of 
his 'Poor' theatre as that which proposed "the substitution 
of material wealth by moral wealth as the principal aim in 
life" (GrotoHski, 1969, p44). So, in Nietzsche's view, an 
individual's \vill to power could be held to be strong only 
when it sought to overcome itself as it had been formed in 
its life so far, and continued to do so until its death, 
for it was only through the constant overcoming, the 
constant mastery, of self that a 'Mensch' might become an 
'Ubermensch'. Without the claiming of this right to re-
interpret the world according to one• s own desires a 
focus that was present in Lacan, too there was, for 
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Nietzsche, nothing left of life worth living - "To live as 
I desire to live or not to live at all," (1961, p285). It 
is this which leads him to acknowledge the fact that "only 
the doer learns" (p279) . And it is also this that pulls us 
back to how it is that the will to power appears in 
practice. 
We have already seen that Nietzsche contends that 
inference, the •capacity to learn', is a "biological 
compulsion" that is "almost" all of what we are. He is, 
then, operating a schematic of 'being human' that includes 
what was earlier in this thesis referred to as one of the 
two 'building blocks' of identity. Obviously, he also works 
with a hypothesis ~hat utilises the other 'block', since it 
is this thesis that has borrowed it from his writings -
namely the concept of 'will to power'. Nehamas points out 
that Nietzsche also proposes what can be seen as the same 
basic structuration of experience as has been forwarded 
here, in that he defines the human world as a joint product 
of external forces and human interpretation (p232) ; which 
is a parallel account in some ways to the recurrent stress 
placed earlier in these pages on the dynamic relationship 
between the external world and the human organism, one that 
offers back to the world some determining capacity in terms 
of the subject. What is important here is that this 
determining capacity is DOL one-way. 
Nietzsche, within the powers of human 
the world they live in, too. How is 
It is, according to 
·;,., 
beings to determine 
this done ? His 
answer, as we have been seeing, is via interpretation. Or 
perhaps we might, as we did earlier, call it creative 
agency. 
We have again taken back the predicates of things, or 
at least remembered that it was we who ~ them to 
them :- let us take care that this insight does not 
deprive us of the caoacity to lend ... 
(Nietzsche, 1982, p133). 
The idea that individual human agency is an effective 
force for the transfiguration of self and the world is, it 
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should by now be clear, a necessary one in terms of the 
theoretical proposals of this thesis. More importantly, 
perhaps, it is, as has been shown, absolutely crucial to 
the retention of a useful concept of performance. 
Nietzsche, unlike Lacan and beyond the more wary 
Foucault, maintains the positivity to be able to advance 
such a view of the power of agency from within a 
characterising of the world, and the lives of individuals 
within it, that is very similar to that held by the other 
two writers. He does so basically by dispensing with the 
idealism (what he terms, in reference to it somewhere else, 
"a moral-optical illusion" (1990, p49]) that provided Lacan 
with his notion of the lost • Real'. For Nietzsche, uthe 
apparent world is the only one : the 'real' world has only 
been JyinoJy added" (1990, p46); and as Neharnas points out, 
Nietzsche's ability to dismiss realism/idealism so entirely 
sterns from his staunch refusal to acknowledge the 
possibility that there can ever be one • real' view of 
things (pp83-4), an attitude provided by his concept of 
perspectivisrn. In short, Nietzsche works to describe a 
range .of powers available to the individual in the 
situation from which Lacan especially, but also Foucault, 
could find little to celebrate. But then, this is to be 
expected from a man whose self-confessed "instinct" was, in 
opposition to Schopenhauer' s, "towards a justification of 
life" (1968, p521), and whose list of 'affirmative affects' 
included : 
... will to power, gratitude toward earth and 
life - everything that is rich and desires 
to bestow and that replenishes and gilds 
and immortalizes and deifies life - the 
whole force of transfiguring virtues, 
everything that declares good and affirms 
it in word and deed ... 
(p533). 
So, again, what is the form of this will to power in 
praxis ? How does it occur ? It is, of course, since what 
we are is will to power, simply what we are; which may not 
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seem to be saying much but is entirely logical, since 
Nietzsche would have felt it a disservice to us to send us 
off into the unknown to look for something 
already possess and which did not actually 
we did not 
exist. The 
point for him was simply that we had not sought to master 
ourselves at an individual level - "[E]very achievement of 
knowledge is a consequence of courage, of severity toward 
oneself, of cleanliness toward oneself. .. " (p536). No doubt 
the reasons why Nietzsche viewed art (and within that the 
plastic arts such as theatre) as a paradigm example of 
human creative activity are beginning to indicate 
themselves. 
Nietzsche's whole philosophy tended toward an 
investigation of the paucity of the forms of existence, of 
the "possibilities of being", that were on offer to 
individuals in society. It is indeed difficult to think of 
another human activity that concerns itself with form and 
perception, interpretation and evaluation, on quite such a 
profound scale as art does; and within the arts, it is 
difficult not to advance theatre, performance, or drama as 
the generic forms that deal in the fullest sense with the 
subject of human form and identity. If what is required 
were a 'laboratory for the social imagining of the self and 
its possibilities', then the theatre would definitely have 
a staunch case to make for itself. As we shall see, this·.i, .. 
is something that its practitioners already know. 
why they are there. 
It is 
But before we move on to that, it might be helpful to 
take a final look at what the individual as will to power 
is like, and what his/her course of action is likely to be. 
This will also take us into a more detailed examination of 
the Nietzschean concept of art. 
That lies are necessary in order to live 
is itself part of the terrifying and 
questionable character of existence ... 
(1968, p451). 
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The Individual as Will to Power 
The world revolves, not around the 
inventors of new noises, but around the' 
inventors of new values; it revolves 
inaudibly ... 
(Nietzsche, 1961, p154). 
In Thlls spoke Z.arathnstra (1961), Nietzsche reveals 
how life (the will to power) had come and revealed to him 
its secret, that secret being that it, life-,· was "that 
which must overcome itself again and again" (p138). This 
continual 'overcoming' , wfth its connotations of victory, 
of mastery, was the unforeseen pathway to the highest ideal 
of man, that of the 'ubermensch'; and because of the 
centrality given in his writings to the concept of 
perspectivism, the individual seeking to 'overcome' was 
invariably what Howard Barker has called the "struggler 
with selfn (Barker, 1989, pp36-7). This is because, for 
Nietzsche, the distinctions between subject/object, 
self/other, and so on were "conditions of life" but 
nonetheless "false" (1968, p268); and it was therefore a 
mistake to regard things in isolation from one another 
because, in reality, (or rather, ~n the reality of 
Becoming), all was a part of the whole and therefore 
separable only as a means to an end, not as an act that 
might claim 'truth' for itself. In other words, working to 
overcome the Self was working to overcome the world, since 
the two were aspects of the same thing. Thus 'whoever 
transfigures themselves, transfigures the world'. As a 
logical consequence of this, Nehamas points out, re-
interpretation and re-evaluation the two themes of 
transfiguring values become the individual's umost 
powerful weapon" (pp97-8). If the individual is able to 
forge new truths for him/herself, if they are able to re-
interpret and re-value the world from a self-created 
perspective, then they do more than simply offer a new way 
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of looking at the • old • world - they actually create new 
aspects of the world through their overcoming of it and 
themselves, (Nehamas. 1985, pp58-60). This is why, for 
Nietzsche, •valuing is creating•. 
It is important here to understand how central the 
notion of perspectivism is to the whole logical edifice of 
Nietzsche's writing. Without it, the central cohesive 
force of his argumentation would be severely retarded, 
since it is the absolute fact of the inescapable and 
necessary existence of perspective in all seeing that 
underwrites his attacks on morality and universalism 
(what he terms "one of the hereditary madnesses of human 
pride" [1968, p305)) - and moves him to advocate the re-
possession of this faculty by all individuals, since it is 
in developing their own perspective on things, one that ~s 
'beyond good and evil,' that they will be able to act with 
the greatest power. Again, this is mirrored in Grotowski's 
assertion that underlying his theatrical practice was the 
understanding that •we must gradually learn to be 
personally responsible for all we do" ( 1969, p160) . For 
Nietzsche, there was a fundamental first step in ascending 
to one's capacity as a creator, and it was not only a 
birth-right that had been stolen by the invention of God, 
but also remarkably simple - "I wish men would begin by 
respecting themselves : everything else follows from that, n .· 
(1968, p486) 0 
So, supposing 
self-respect. \vhat 
the individual achieves this act of 
happens then ? What does a self-
respecting will to power do to begin overcoming itself ? 
As already indicated above, Nietzsche • s advice is clear -
"Essential to start from the body and employ it as a 
guide. " ( 1968. p289) . This is because consciousness • is 
not the directing agent, but an organ of the directing 
agent" (p284), and also because "the criterion of truth" 
resides in the body, in "the enhancement of the feeling of 
power" (p290) . This might seem at first to suggest that 
Nietzsche is advocating a type of hedonistic indulgence of 
every physical and sensual whim, but there are points to 
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be remembered here. Firstly, there is, for Nietzsche, no 
distinction between mind and body, both are aspects of the 
pulse of energy in the physical human form, energy that we, 
with our notion of 'willed' actions, think we dispose of 
but which, in reality, "disposes of us" (p518). The name 
of this energy is will to power. In this respect, then, 
Nietzsche is not calling for the indulgence of the body, 
but is asking rather that the real state of affairs of 
human life be looked at squarely and recognised. We are 
already will to power and nothing else besides, Nietzsche 
says, it is what directs and guides our lives, but we have 
believed the story that says we are something else, 
something more mastered, something that exists, like God, 
somehow removed from the material world. Nietzsche's 
materialism means he refuses that as a possibility, and 
refuses also any trace of essentialism, and this allows him 
to state that the senses, the drives and desires, of the 
organism are the deepest level of truth available "Our 
most sacred convictions, the unchanging elements in our 
supreme values, are judgements of our muscles, n (1968, 
p173). For him, as we have seen, unothing is 'given' as 
real except our world of desires and passions .... We can 
rise or sink to no other •reality' than the reality of the 
drives" (1990, p36). This effectively means that to live 
in any sense true to oneself, one must live with constant-. 
and clear knowledge of what one's drives and desires are, 
which is where the need for the overcoming of self comes 
in. Essentially, the task required of the individual who 
seeks to live as will to power is to become that which will 
to power desires to be, which ~s. simply, powerful. It is 
an overcoming of self because •conscience', 'cohesiveness', 
the drive towards 'unity' and so on, all act to contain and 
repress the desires of the individual seeking empowerment, 
through what Foucault described as the processes of 
normalisation. But once these obstacles are mastered, what 
direction does a liberated will to power take ? If 
healthy, says Nietzsche, it will always be towards an 
extension of the effects of its own form in terms of impact 
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on the world and the sensation of pleasure felt by the 
organism at its own extent. 
A condition once achieved would seem to be 
obliged to preserve itself if there were 
not in it a capacity for desiring not to 
preserve itself ... It can be shown most 
clearly that every living thing does 
everything it can not to preserve itself 
but to become more, 
(1968, p367). 
Essentially, Nietzsche's conception of the will to 
power states that life is nothing but the clash of driving 
forces of different organisms in various states of 
empowerment, and that "all driving force is will to power 
... there is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force 
except this" (p366). However, an operative will to power 
does not work in a void, careering through life 
unchallenged and unobserved. It must, in order to know its 
own extent and power, meet and overwhelm resistance, both 
within itself and without, for it is only through conflict 
that a will to power can experience one of the "two kinds 
of pleasure, that of "victory" (the other being "falling 
asleep"), (p374). This is why Nietzsche can state that 
"the mature man has, above all, weapons he attacks" 
(p385). 
'greatest 
begin 
If we remember that 're-interpretation' is the_ 
weapon' available to the individual, we might 
to understand Nietzsche's insistence on 
individualism. With the power to transvaluate values, 
individuals become what Nietzsche warned they were capable 
of being - "the danger of dangers" (1982, p185), willing to 
disregard a larger morality in favour of their own, forged 
from the enjoyment of existence as a will to power, and 
indifferent to others' moral contempt, which, says 
Nietzsche, "causes greater indignity and harm than any 
crime" (1968, p393). 
Perhaps it might seem at this point as though 
Nietzsche has not dealt adequately with the problematics of 
the intersubjective world to any extent because of the 
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extremity of his advocacy of individualistic practice. It 
quite possibly is the case, as it was with his prophet-
creation Zarathustra, that Nietzsche vacillated between not 
being able to reconcile individual autonomy with collective 
habitation at all, and then advocating a society where the 
'herd' were ruled despotically by an elite of •free 
spirits'. However, it is clear, despite the strength of 
his rhetoric on occasions, that he did not particularly 
require the destruction of the communal world in order to 
see his vision fulfilled. He is unambiguous on several 
occasions, (and was so long before post-structuralism 
arrived to study the issue in depth), that there is little 
point to the complete dismantling of the artifices of 
rationality that constantly signal a world of 'reality' 
behind that of appearances, even if they are plainly seen 
to be fabrications that serve the purposes of powers 
antagonistic to 'free spirits'. 
The existing world, upon which all earthly 
living things have worked so that it appears 
as it does (durable and changing slowly), 
we want to go on building - and not to 
criticize it avmy as false ! 
(p538). 
This is the meaning behind the first of the three 
quotations with which this chapter started, where Nietzsche 
warns that we will not be spared 'the task' of creating 
'new' values. Without this effort, he suggests, there will 
be an inevitable spiral into nihilism. It was Nietzsche's 
argument, against the possibility of this approach, just as 
it was Foucault's, that it was the particular categories of 
reason, not the world itself, that needed to be dispensed 
with "[T] he demonstration that they [categories of 
reason] - cannot be applied to the universe is no longer 
any reason for devaluating the universe" (p13). For him, 
the knowledge that all facts and judgements were 
conditional did not lead inexorably to a loss of faith in 
individual judgement, since there was, in fact, no level of 
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truth beyond the individual one. Again, it is the concept 
of perspecti vism that enables Nietzsche to operate 
positively within the world that others have despaired of. 
One can refute a judgement by proving its 
conditionality : the need to retain it is 
not thereby removed ... One must grasp the 
need for their existence : they are a 
consequence of causes which have nothing 
to do with reasons, 
(pl51) . 
It is, in fact, the extent of Nietzsche's materialism, 
combined with his notion of perspectivism, that moves him 
to an acceptance of appearance over 'reality•. Without the 
ambitions of idealism towards a deeper level of • truth • 
about the world, the Nietzschean individual is freed to 
operate with the surfaces of things, knowing that there is 
no other aspect of existence available to them, simply 
because what they are is a thing that does not truly 
function at any other level. It is, of course, the 
'subject' which has been the focus of post-structuralist 
scrutiny that is in fact being presented and defended here, 
and Nietzsche' s attitude towards it is again interesting 
for this thesis, because of the positivity of his approach. 
He says of the 'I' that 'thinks' : 
However habitual and indispensable this 
fiction may have become by now - that in 
itself proves nothing against its 
imaginary origin : a belief can be a 
condition of life and nonetheless be 
false, 
(1968, p268). 
It is largely this same recognition of the falseness 
of the concept of the 'centred' subject that has led to the 
drive to problematise it within 
However, a longing for a life without 
post-structuralism. 
'lack' , with real 
'presence•, has sometimes meant that it has failed to match 
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the materialism of the Nietzschean thesis, and consequently 
lost the capacity to suggest more positive paths of action. 
On a secondary plane, the drive inherent in idealism to 
claim the world with its view is undone precisely because 
it takes the world, and not the individual, as its object 
of desire. Nietzsche, on the other hand, attempts to offer 
his followers a truth that is not 'beyond', but in their 
bodies, in the warp and twist of their desires "All 
respect to your opinions 1 " he says, "But little deviant 
acts are worth more !" (1982, pl05). 
If it is a concentration on the individual that helps 
Nietzsche avoid possible pitfalls in his philosophy, it is 
that same concentrated focus that leads him, and therefore 
us, to his particular attitude to art - the site of the 
creation of human forms. 
It is a measure of the degree of strength 
of will to what extent one can do without 
meanings in things,to what extent one can 
endure to live in a meaningless world 
because one organizes a small portion of 
it oneself, 
(1968, p318). 
The Artistry of the Will to Power: 
.. 
No-one tells me anything new; so I tell 
myself to myself, 
(Nietzsche, 1961, p214). 
Communication is necessary, 
(1968, p306). 
The other 'entities' act upon us; our 
adapted apparent world is an adaption 
and overpowering of their actions; a 
kind of defensive measure. The subject 
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alone is demonstrable; hypothesis that 
only subjects exist ... 
(emphasis added, p307). 
'The subject alone is demonstrable'. What might be 
the meaning of this statement ? If it is combined with the 
statement that •communication is necessary', the nature of 
its intent may become clearer. Communication has to 
happen, it is a required part of a healthy life, says 
Nietzsche, without which individuals would lack an 
important part of their power, since impact and effect on 
others is a root source of much of the pleasure involved in 
power. The will to power, he asserts, always registers as 
"an insatiable desire to manifest power" (1968, p333). 
Basically, the extent of one's power is gauged through the 
power of one's extent - "My idea is that every specific 
body strives to become master over all space and to extend 
its force [- its will to power] and to thrust back all that 
resists its extension" (p340). 
Adding to this basic form the idea that the one thing 
that is available in terms of communication, the one thing 
that one can use to extend one's reach in the sphere of 
intersubjective discourse, is the subject, ('the subject 
alone is de~onstrable'), leads to the realisation that it 
is very unlikely that Nietzsche would have wanted to, 
advance the notion that abandoning the self as 'subject' · 
was a worthwhile move. It is more likely that he was 
offering possibilities of what the self might be outside 
of the constraints of the morality of Being, specifically 
inside, or at least closer to, the reality of the flux of 
Becoming - "Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, 
the luxuriance of a prodigal play and change of forms ... " 
(1990, p56) - and this clearly begins to point towards an 
activity of experimentation with the possibilities of self 
that we have seen is well-known to any actor or theatre 
performer, whose skill is that of the adoption of 'multiple 
selves'. For if there is a prime example of subjects who 
exist "as multiplicity" then surely actors, those who adopt 
personae for a living, must rank as in the running to claim 
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the title. Obviously, another clear contender would be 
those individuals classified today- with the term 
•schizophrenic', who are viewed as suffering from a 
particular form of 'neurosis'. Interestingly, Nietzsche 
seems to have seen the similarity himself between these two 
types of states of mind, since he argued that artists 
"understand a quite different sign language - and create 
one", which is a condition, according to him, "that seems 
to be a part of many nervous disorders" (1968, p429J. 
So, communication must take place, and it must take a 
form that is that of the self as subject, since it is that 
alone which is demonstrable, which can be communicated. 
What then does the artist, who creates something with the 
intention of communication, work with, and how ? In 
Nietzsche' s view, an artist "accords no value to anything 
that cannot become form (- that cannot surrender itself, 
make itself public-) n {p433). In other words, the artist 
pulls from him/herself, or from the world around him/her, 
that which s/he can fashion in his/her own image, which 
s/he can turn from hidden or abstract sensation or thought 
and make real for others, thereby 
through the careful manipulation of 
medium. This is the will to power 
(or perhaps we might say 'style'). 
impacting 
form in 
upon them 
the public 
as demonstrated form, 
Where is innocence ? Where there is 
will to begetting. And for me, he who 
wants to create beyond himself has the 
purest will. 
Where is beauty ? Where I have to will 
with all my will; where I want to love and 
perish, that an image may not remain 
merely an image, 
(1961, p145). 
And if there is a goal, or most desired state, to be 
obtained from the creation of form - and for form, we might 
want to read 'self-as-sign,' or 'sign-as-self', a sign 
being always that which registers the existence of public 
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meaning, and therefore signals the intersubjective world 
it is "to create the world before which you can kneel"·, a 
desire which Nietzsche sees as the "ultimate hope and 
intoxication• of all individuals, (p136). 
Essentially, of course, this is nothing short of a 
desire to deify oneself; which, coming as it does from 
within a philosophy that views the concept of a 'God' 
beyond human beings themselves as a manufactured "reproach 
against existence" (1968, p377), is entirely to be 
expected. Having removed the idea of God from the world as 
nothing but a malicious nonsense - "What thinking person 
still needs the hypothesis of a god ?" ( 1984, p33) 
Nietzsche needs to, and does, feel no compunction at all 
about indicating self-deification as an appropriate use of 
what is clearly a human capacity - the capacity for belief, 
or idealization. This is why he can state that the 
function of art is "To bring to light 'basic idealizing 
powers' (sensuality, intoxication, superabundant 
animality)" (1968, p447); which seems closely parallel to 
Artaud' s call 
specialists 
p55) . It is 
for word-bound playwrights to give way "to 
in objective, animated enchantment" (1970, 
important for a proper understanding of 
Nietzsche' s position here to remember that, to his mind, 
there was absolutely no separation between the functions of 
the body and those of the 'mind', in that all aspects of an· 
individual's personna were the effects of feelings 
experienced by that individual - an attitude which is in 
fact, as we have seen, the founding premise of modern 
psycho-analysis. ( ".:l,.ll belief is based on the feeling of 
pleasure or pain in relation to the feeling subject" [1984, 
p25]). Belief becomes, then, not a matter of a rational 
analysis of data in che search for proof but a reaction to 
feeling, and in this it is no different from knowledge, 
opinions, or 'consciously-felt feelings,' since all are the 
result of processes that are beyond the realm of Reason 
entirely - "Out of passions grow opinions; mental sloth 
lets these rigidify into convictions," (p266) . So, having 
returned the human capacity for belief to 'what is ours', 
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to the task of deifying the self, Nietzsche then sets out 
how to best achieve this, and what the function, . or 
purpose, of such a retrieval might be : the will to power 
as god-like form, with a reach and extent of effect on the 
world that is enough to place one, and others, in awe of 
oneself. The skill, or artistry, of the will to power then 
appears as that oldest of intoxicating actions, the art of 
seduction : "It is not enough to prove something, one has 
also to seduce or elevate people to it," (1982, p162). As 
Sergei Eisenstein commented in 1926 whilst discussing the 
"moulding of an audience in a desired direction", the 
instrument for achieving this end consists "of all the 
parts that constitute the apparatus of theatre ... because, 
despite their differences, they all lead to one thing 
which their presence legitimates - to their common quality 
of attraction" (in Drain [ed), 1995, p88). 
It begins to become clear, then, that the artistry of 
the will to power consists in making of oneself an image 
which has been mastered so well as to appear real, and 
which seduces both oneself and others into believing in its 
reality, thereby extending the self further into the world 
and conquering the senses of others so as to hold them in 
respectful thrall to one's strength as a creator : "Life is 
not the adaption of inner circumstances to outer ones, but 
will to power, which, working from within, incorporates and 
subdues more and more of that which is •outside'" 
(Nietzsche, 1968, p361). 
Again, the similarity to the craft of acting and its 
intended effects is clear. It also seems clear that 
Nietzsche viewed art, in which acting was implicated, as 
that state of mind, or activity, which offered individuals 
the greatest opportunities for operating their natures as 
'experiments' . This is the meaning behind what at first 
seems, for a philosopher who advocated 'becoming' over 
'being•, a somewhat odd statement to make, namely that uta 
impose upon becoming the character of being - that is the 
supreme will to power" (p330) . If we recall Foucault and 
Lacan's attitude to the necessary entrapment of the 
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energies of individuals within the structures of 
socialisation, we will remember that they found themselves 
unable to offer much in the way of positive or efficacious 
actions which the individual might undertake to retain for 
themselves any level of genuine 'freedom' in such a 
situation. For Nietzsche, this existence as being - as a 
'self' - is also an unavoidable fact, but his reaction is 
to celebrate it as the finest achievement will to power (or 
becoming) has been capable of so far. To use the forms of 
life to one's advantage, to experiment with them, is the 
possibility he offers, and he does so because he believes 
that in practising this, in making and re-making one's 
form, one approaches the fundamentals of human life : 
Ultimately, the individual derives the values 
of his acts from himself; because he has 
to interpret in a quite individual way even 
the words he has inherited. His interpretation 
of a formula at least is personal, even if he 
does not create a formula : as an interpreter 
he is still creative, 
(p403) . 
Nietzsche's affirmatory attitude here can be further 
contextualized if we remember that it was to appearance, 
rather than to some deeper level of 'truth' , that he turned_: .. 
when seeking to indicate the worth of something, and since 
being is all appearance and no 'truth' whatsoever, it is 
the perfect platform for self-responsible action. For him, 
it is clear that "if there is anything that is to be 
worshipped it is appearance that must be worshipped, that 
the lie- and not the truth- is divine 1 " (p523t. 
:: ~ 
That this leads him to view art as a paradigmatic 
activity is really no suprise, then; but in fact his 
conception of art is such that it is actually life, not 
art, which he is referring to when he speaks of the latter. 
As far as he is concerned, when people speak of life they 
are referring to uthe artistic basic phenomenon that is 
called 'life'" (p538). In effect, this means that the 
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activities which we term • art • are forays into life as it 
really is, beyond the constraints of morality, beyond good 
and evil, where individuals exhibit and practice a "refusal 
to be deprived of the stimulus of the enigmatic" (p262). 
Art, for Nietzsche, pulls individuals away from mundanity 
and enters them into a world rich in the potential to 
create the unkown, to offer out to others 'unheard-of 
things' 
The aesthetic state possesses a superabundance 
of means of communication, together with an 
extreme receptivity for stimuli and signs. It 
constitutes the high point of communication 
and transmission between living creatures -
it is the source of languages, 
(pp427-8). 
Unsurprisingly, it follows from this conception of 
'art' as life itself, and 'life' as nothing but art, that 
Nietzsche should then go on to suggest a particular role 
for individuals who, as a part of life, as the interpreters 
and therefore creators of it, have little choice (if 
existing in a self-directed way) but to acknowledge their 
status as artists. Again, it is Nietzsche's acceptance of 
the impossibility of •getting behind' appearances that 
leads him to this conclusion, for a cultured appearance· 
wrought from mascery of life (art) will always be nothing 
but artifice, a fact that Nietzsche wants to place as a 
cause of affirmation rather than despair : u•Life ought to 
inspire confidence' the task thus imposed is tremendous. 
To solve it, man must be a liar by nature, he must be above 
all an artisc " (p45l). 
What we now have, following through Nietzsche's 
conception of art and the individual will to power, is the 
notion that individuals, existing as they do at the level 
of appearances, can do little better for themselves than to 
practice their self as though it were the text and they the 
writers, or it the picture and they the artist, or they the 
actors and their lives the roles and so on. Nehamas (1985) 
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actually treats Nietzsche's own writings in this way in his 
text, analysing them as carefully sculptured forms ·of 
expression which are diverse in their range and variety of 
style, and were deliberately created to represent a 
different version of the self that was Friederich Nietzsche 
to the world. 
In offering this type of 'liberty to experiment· to 
individuals, however, Nietzsche also moves to retain the 
forms and structures of individuation that are available at 
any given time in specific settings, since he is clear chat 
without them, there is no basis for the creation of form at 
all. (This fact, together with Nietzsche's stress on che 
potential empowerment offered by the adoption of 'self' by 
individuals, seems reminiscent of the claim made earlier in 
this thesis, in the discussion of Lacan, that encry into 
subjecthood might be an empowering, rather than 
debilitating, move for individuals to make). In light of 
this, it might be wise to assert, remembering the earlier 
separation of performance and performativity, that 
Nietzsche is arguing for the need to view the self, and 
subjecthood, metaphorically, as forms of art like any 
other; a proposal which makes more sense once it is 
remembered that life and art, for Nietzsche, are one and 
the same thing, \·ihich itself makes practising the self a 
form of artiscic practice. With this in mind, we can look 
upon Nietzsche's attitude to artistic conventions as being 
concerned also wich the conventions and conditions of the 
forging of personal identity. As he notes, "every macure 
art has a hose of conventions as its basis - in so far as 
it is a language. Convention is the condition of great 
art, not an obstacle," (p428). 
Of course, Nietzsche does not need to reject che 
conventions of form outright since, in his philosophy, it 
is precisely these conventions that make communication 
between absolutely distinct individuals possible; and the 
act of communication with others is, as we have seen, 
fundamental to the health of the human organism, since the 
dynamic relation between self and other is the site of the 
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operation of desire, which, as we have also seen, is the 
proper guide for a well-lived life. It would therefore 
make no sense for Nietzsche to reject these conventions of 
form outright. Again, it must be remembered that the 
concept of perspectivism, with its access for individuals 
to the power of re-interpretation, means that the edifice 
of conventionality that contains the forms of expression is 
never static, and therefore always in the process of 
change. This is why - ('new interpretations create new 
worlds' l Nietzsche can state that "history always 
enunciates new truths", since he holds that "a fact, a work 
is eloquent in a new way for every age and every new type 
of man" (p5lll. This then offers tradition, convention, 
the nonn, as a potential resource, rather than a 
constriction, much as Foucault always maintained it was, a 
resource which is reliant for its effectivity on the 
individual's capacity to re-evaluate, rather than on the 
content of the conventions as they already stand. In 
Foucauldian terms, we might say that the operation and hold 
of the norm is altered and adapted through the active 
genealogical investigation of its historical 
transfigurations conducted from the viewpoint of the willed 
self-direction of the individual. Nietzsche believed that 
this attitude allowed him to claim that his work was "even 
anti-pE7ssimistic ... in the sense that it teaches something 
that is stronger than pessimism, 'more divine' than truth : 
art" (p453) . 
This reference to art as 'divine' is not to be taken 
lightly, since by dismissing belief in God as a mistake, 
Nietzsche is not r.hen intending to remove from the world 
the human capacity for deification, but simply to re-direct 
it, as we saw earlier. So, for him, art is the "real task 
of life", as well as being its "metaphysical activity" 
(p435), and this is because there is an absolute need to 
find "a conception of this world as the actually-achieved 
highest possible ideal" (p527) . The logic to this is 
painstakingly clear : Life is art; Individuals are a part 
of life, and therefore art; The practice of the self is 
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therefore the practice of an art form; As an art form, life 
offers the individual the opportunity to craft and perfect 
him/herself; This practice of perfecting ought to lead to 
deification of the form achieved; Life then becomes the 
highest possible ideal, since perfection is achievable from 
within it. 
So, in this sense, by naming art as 'life's 
metaphysical activity', Nietzsche is simply saying that 
whereas before the striving for perfection was directed 
towards some idea beyond the human world - (such as God) -
now it can be practised in its more proper sphere, that of 
the inter-subjective world. In this way the "curse on 
life" of "the god on the cross" can finally be removed 
(p543) 0 
One might reasonably ask, though, where the site of a 
'materialist metaphysics' might be ? Possibly it is already 
clear that it will focus on, or centre in, the body 
"[P)erhaps the entire evolution of the spirit is a question 
of the body; it is the history of the development of a 
higher body that emerges into our sensibility" (p358). 
Of course, it is not immediately clear what form this 
'higher body' might take, but it seems that Nietzsche 
intends to indicate it as present in the 'aesthetic' state 
of mind, as a sort of "intelligent sensuality"; a concept 
he fleshes out by referring to "the demand for art and· 
beauty" as "an indirect demand for the ecstasies of 
sexuality communicated to the brain" (p424). In respect of 
this Nietzsche desires ufor myself and all who live" what 
would be, in effect, uan ever-greater spiritualization and 
multiplication of the senses" (p434). This is achieved 
when, in the most perfect men, "the most sensual functions 
are finally transfigured by a symbol-intoxication of the 
highest spirituality" which leads these individuals to 
"experience a kind of deification of the body in 
themselves" (p540). In other words, - and surely the name 
of Artaud keeps coming back to one here - Nietzsche is 
offering art as a transfiguring experience that elevates 
the individual beyond the constraints of dualistic self-
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hood, beyond good and evil, to a state of existence where 
the complexity, power, and sensation of one's form· is 
revealed to one in an awe-inspiring way. And this is not a 
state of sensual indulgence, remember, since it is one of 
• symbol-intoxication •. where the • intelligent sensuality• 
of the individual is the experiential state, as opposed to 
the more usual configuration of either body or mind. Art, 
for Nietzsche, should reveal to individuals that the site 
of the divine is themselves, in all their multiplicity, and 
to this extent it is revelatory in the sense of the term 
used by religious creeds revelation leads to belief, 
belief to deification, deification to power - "One should 
not play with artistic formulas : One should remodel life 
so that afterward it has to formulate itself" (p447). 
It seems difficult, in light of this, not to propose 
Artaud as a practitioner who strove to realize this 
Nietzschean vision of art in the theatre and, following 
from this, to then advance the existence of a common 
ontological attitude amongst those other practitioners, 
such as Grotowski, Barba, Schechner and Brook, whose work 
appears to have been influenced by Artaud • s own vision. 
Artaud was clear, for instance, that what he termed 'true 
culture' acted "through power and exaltation" (1970, p4). 
and that this could only happen "the moment the 
inconceivable really begins, where poetry taking place on> 
stage nourishes and superheats created symbols" (p17). 
Just as Nietzsche claimed deification as the object of art, 
Artaud believed that theatre should exist "to bring to all 
of us a natural, occult equivalent of the dogma we no 
longer believe" (p21), and that its function was therefore 
to "allow us to reach the sublime once more" (p36); only 
this time the sublimation of Tife would be achieved by the 
disintegration of the coherent self of the state of Being 
because "the highest possible concept of theatre is one 
which philosophically reconciles us with Becoming" (p83) . 
This 'attack' on the self in some senses encapsulates the 
type of cruelty Artaud was envisaging, since it is clear 
that he viewed his ideal theatrical event as a site where 
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•life is continually lacerated, where everything in 
creation rises up and attacks our condition as created 
beings" (p7l), and such a transfigurative experience was 
bound to be to a certain extent uncomfortable. Artaud was 
not the first practitioner, however, to search out such 
efficacious power for the theatre. As early as 1907, 
Meyerhold was complaining about the ineffectiveness of what 
he saw happening in the theatres around him : •The stage is 
no longer infectious", he said, •it no longer has the power 
of transfiguration" (in Drain [ed], 1995, p243); and this 
notion of an 'infectious' stage ls clearly echoed in 
Artaud's vision of theatre as a 'plague'. There is a clear 
commonality in terms of the approach and the targets of 
such radical theatre writings, then, and it seems to be 
grounded in a similar ontological viewpoint to that we have 
discovered in our analysis of Nietzsche. Indeed, as Innes 
( 1993) makes clear in his overview of avant-garde theatre 
in the last hundred years, there is little doubt that, 
despite the divergent approaches exhibited in the movement, 
the avant-garde is essentially a philosophical 
grouping. Its members are linked by a 
specific attitude to western society, a 
particular aesthetic approach, and the aim of 
transforming the nature of theatrical 
performance; all of which add up to a 
distinctive ideology, 
(p4) . 
The particular aim of this thesis in respect of this, as 
should be clear by now, has been to indicate and explore 
the notion of self-identity as a particular concern within 
such avant-garde practice, and to provide a coherent 
theoretical model of the type of notion of identity that 
such practice appears to have been seeking out. 
(The subject alone is demonstrable. Communication is 
necessary). Birringer (1991) at one point describes 
postmodernism as "a cultural struggle over the perception 
and evaluation of the historical moment in which we live" 
(p169). It is difficult to know whether he meant to signal 
the 'postmodern condition' as somehow different from other 
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epochs because of this, (which being the case, he might 
well be viewed as holding a somewhat naive 
being clear that every epoch is always such a 
whether, (which would be more useful), he was 
the state of consciousness that attends this 
approach, 
struggle); 
referring 
struggle 
·it 
or 
to 
in 
the contemporary moment. He also refers to what he calls 
the "political economy of signification" (p186), and this 
is very much the field of battle in a range of discourses 
at the present time, including performance theory. It is 
generally the case that writers whose work is informed by 
critical theory, such as Birringer, are concerned in their 
texts to open up the notion of •economies' of 
representation and to show how these operate to repress, or 
dominate, the desires and powers of individuals in modern 
Western society. If we remember from our discussion of 
Nietzsche that representation is always also demonstration 
of self, then we might begin to understand why the notion 
of an 'economy of 
is true that 'the 
unit of exchange 
'currency • that 
representation' is important. For if it 
subject alone is demonstrable', then the 
in an economy of representation, the 
circulates within it, can consist of 
nothing else but the self. Further to this, it can be 
added that, since the exchange of these representations 
forms an economy which takes its place within the various 
economies of late twentieth century capitalism in the West, 
Marx's analysis of the basic exploitative structure of all 
capitalist markets tells us that this exchange of 
representations will turn a profit for someone, somewhere, 
at the expense of someone else. It therefore becomes 
possible to see the drive to re-define what constitutes 
human identir.y, to offer the possibility of self-
determination back to people by dismantling accepted 
versions of the nature of identity, as a radical political 
action; an action which is designed to hand the means of 
production of selfhood back to individuals by attacking the 
hegemonic control of perceptual and interpretive choice. 
Keeping the political nature of these interventions in 
mind, we can now go on to look at the work of several 
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practitioners and theorists of performance to show how 
there is, within what is a diverse range of approaches, 
what might be called a 'thematics' to the notions of self 
advanced by them, as well as a consistency of attitude 
towards the role and function of performance events. 
There are several major assumptions which will direct 
this analysis, these being : that the political intentions 
of the practitioners analysed can be traced back to an 
image of the self not too dissimilar to that advanced by 
Nietzsche; that Nietzsche recognised the performing arts 
as a paradigm activity in terms of self-experimentation, 
and that there are practitioners who recognise Nietzschean 
philosophy as a paradigm approach to the self; and that it 
is as a site for the deliberate entering into confrontation 
with self and others that the theatre and performance have 
always operated as the stock exchange of the political 
economy of signification, in this respect pre-empting 
postmodernism by at least a matter of centuries. 
Whereas populism seeks to impose restrictive 
definitions of the self, the polar opposite 
force might be desire, which challenges even 
the self-defined limits of the self in a surge 
of derationalising intuitive legitimacy, a 
liberation available to all yet defying 
generalisation, 
(Barker, 1989, p76). 
In terms of the possibilities for the individual as 
will to power that \.;ere discussed above, the theatre (and 
it might be more inclusive in the present state of things 
to use the term 'performance' instead) has alw~ys offered 
itself, in some senses, as a powerful weapon, taking place, 
as it does, em::irely \·lithin a dynamic established between 
presentation, perception and evaluation. Performance, as 
an event, always functions as an offering of something to 
the perceptive capacities of the audience; and since the 
subject alone is demonstrable, what it always offers up for 
evaluation is the subject, or to be more accurate, those 
marks and signs which cannot be other than the traces of 
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subjecthood. Jerzy Grotowski seems to touch on just this 
point when he states that "when I do not perceive, it means 
there are no signs• (1969, p193), at least in so far as he 
suggests that it is signs which are the only perceivable 
things. We have already seen how a sign can only function 
as part of a sign-system, and that sign-systems only exist 
at the inter-subjective level, and this all goes to 
indicate that an act of performance is always a 
demonstration of self offered up to the evaluative gaze of 
the audience for their interptretive drive to feed on. As 
Eugenic Barba puts it, • showing something engenders 
interpretation• (1995, p25). Performance, then, b~comes a 
major site in society where individuals can find themselves 
being handed back their •greatest weapon' and asked to use 
it to reflect on, and possibly reformulate. their 
conceptions of the world. This is not a minor point 
Nietzsche was clear that re-interpretation was the greatest 
weapon available to the individual will to power, and 
Western theatre, in its very structure as an event, has no 
other manner of operating than on the dynamic energy of the 
audience's 
"Rearranging 
experience", 
constantly evolving interpretive processes. 
information is the main way of changing 
writes Schechner, (1982, p99); and if we 
acknowledge that the making of theatre is never not a 
process of re-arranging information, and that changing>_ 
experience is, for Nietzsche, changing the world, then we 
might see that what a performance always does, indeed has 
to do, is create new worlds and new truths. In this sense, 
the act of making performances is 
from the transvaluation of value; 
absolutely inseparable 
a fact which Turner 
(1990). with his concept of 'liminality•. and of 
performances as happening in the 'liminal phase' the 
•subjunctive mood of culture" (ppll-12) seems to have 
been aware of. Turner describes a 'liminal phase• as that 
which provides a stage for unique structures 
of experience ... in milieus detached from 
mundane life and characterised by the 
presence of ambiguous ideas, monstrous images, 
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sacred symbols, ordeals, humiliations, esoteric 
and paradoxical instructions, the emergence of 
'symbolic types• represented by maskers and 
clowns, gender reversals, and many other 
phenomena and processes ... 
(pll) . 
Little deviant acts are •worth more" than opinions was 
Nietzsche • s reckoning, having already made clear that it 
was only 'the doer that learns', and it is difficult not to 
see the types of activity that Turner is describing as 
'liminal', as happening in the space where performance 
always happens, as a set of doings whose effect is to take 
a different notion of value into the whole field of 
established valuations and hierarchies - in other words, to 
transvaluate. 
This seems to be one of the reasons for the clear 
demarcation in terms of intention between Naturalistic 
performances and non-Naturalistic ones. As Barker puts it, 
the theatre that he believes to be close to the true 
function of theatre •is not about life as it is lived at 
all, but about life as it might be lived, about the thought 
which is not licensed, and about the abolished unconscious" 
(1989, p52). In opposition to this, Naturalistic theatre 
presents, (or at least intends to present), an accurate 
reflection of life as it is lived outside of the"-
performance event; a practice which Barker, and the rest of 
the theorists dealt with here, tend to reject, seeing that 
it is •futile to rest a theatre on given things" (p16). 
Interestingly enough, although thematically linked by their 
rejection of a Naturalistic methodology in the crafting of 
theatre, it is the basic conception of self used that is 
the largest site of similarity between the various non-
Naturalistic practitioners, rather than the ultimate 
intended effects of what they present to audiences. 
We might initially illuminate this by focusing on some 
of the writings of two practitioners who are generally 
accepted as working, or having worked, within the same 
tradition - namely Bertolt Brecht and Augusto Boal. It 
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will be important here, and throughout the discussion as it 
develops further, to recall the characterisation of self 
offered by Nietzsche. This characterization highlights 
the self as multiple; the need to experiment; the 
antagonism towards general moralities; 
of the function of communication 
the acknowledgement 
with others; the 
importance of the creation of new values; freedom defined 
as •capacity for self-direction' and •will to self-
responsibility'; the highest ideals as being to create that 
which puts oneself and others in awe of oneself; the 
strongest desire as being to make a desired image real for 
oneself and others; and the need for mastery over one's 
drives and desires in order to achieve this. All of this 
will be seen to return again and again within the writings 
of the practitioners under discussion, even those who 
might have been expected to be antagonistic in the extreme 
to the radical individuality of the Nietzschean model of 
the self, such as Brecht and Boal. 
The model of self as the root 
of theatrical forms. 
[Human beings are] shifting raw material, unformed 
and undefined ... , 
(Brechc, 1965, p54). 
At first sight, it might seem an extraordinary move to 
introduce Brecht and Boal into a discussion that revolves 
largely around Nietzschean philosophy; and it certainly 
would be true to say that the latter • s radical 
individualism is in direct opposition to the declared 
social aims of the two practitioners. Why, then, are they 
under analysis here ? The answer is, quite simply, so that 
they can be used to show how their ontological bases have 
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within them aspects of what should, by now, be recognisable 
approaches to the problem of what it is that const itut;:es 
the 'self' of individuals in society. 
Philip Auslander, in his essay, " 'Just Be Your Self' 
Logocentrism and difference in performance theory" (in 
Zarrilli [ed) 1995), makes what is a somewhat crude 
attempt to cover the same ground by analysing the various 
ontological idiosyncrasies of three major practitioners -
Stanislavski, Brecht and Grotowski through a 
deconstructive lens provided by the French contemporary 
philosopher, Jacques Derrida. Towards the end of the 
essay, in which he has appeared to reject the work of the 
three theorists as inadequately radical in terms of 
approaches to the notion of self, Auslander reassures us 
that "it has not been my purpose to discredit the theories 
under discussion here. I want to indicate their dependence 
on logocentrism and certain concepts of self and presence" 
(p65). He goes on from this to criticise the current state 
of most performance theory as well, making it clear that, 
to him, its debilitated condition is due to its failure to 
meet the challenge set down by Derridean criticism 
Having lost what we still suspect was the 
only valid theatre, the theatre of communal 
ritual, we either rhapsodize about theatres 
of other times and places or attempt to 
ground theatrical activity in versions of 
presence which bear the stamp of secularism, 
psychology or political analysis in the 
place of religion, 
(p66). 
.£ 
In opposition to this, he states that truly radical, 
'deconstructive' theatre would know that "an affirmation of 
the play which makes meaning at once possible and 
impossible is the alternative to the yearning for presence" 
(p66) . 
It seems ironic, however, that Auslander should 
lambast his subjects of inquiry so thoroughly with 
Derridean philosophy to such an end, if only because it is 
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so unnecessary, considering how Derrida himself finished 
off the idea of genuinely 'radical' theatre in an essay on 
Artaud some twenty years before. In it, he stated that 
Artaud kept himself as close as possible to 
the limit : the possibility and impossibility 
of pure theatre. Presence, in order to be 
presence and self-presence, has always already 
begun to represent itself, has always already 
been penetrated. Affirmation itself must be 
penetrated in repeating itself, 
(Derrida, 1978, p249). 
This, following as it does an argument designed to 
represent repetition and non-repetition as the marks of 
presence (logocentrism) and non-presence (difference) 
respectively, effectively states that there is no 
possibility, in Derrida's view, of avoiding the "gratuitous 
and baseless necessity• (p250) of repetition (or 
representation). In other words, Derrida wrote, years 
before Auslander, that it was a fact that precisely what 
Auslander was arguing in favour of - (what he terms "post-
Derridean" acting [1995, p67] ) - is, because of the nature 
of theatre, always already an impossibilty. One might 
begin to wonder, given this discrepancy, how far Auslander 
himself had underst:ood the arguments he was advancing as 
misunderstood by others. 
For example, at one point, Auslander argues that it 
would be Derridean to "use the vocabularies of convencional 
acting methods and styles and undermine them", and he then 
goes on to state that 
Brecht obviously moved in this direction, 
but although his theory allows for the 
creation of many, even contadictory meanings 
in a performance, the implication is that a 
resolution of these conflicts is possible and 
desirable since that would imply the resolution 
of social conflicts, 
(p67) . 
Now, to start with, what is 'the implication' that 
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Auslander refers to ? Is it an expressed, or an assumed, 
one ? Certainly Brecht intended his theatre to be "of such 
a kind that as many as possible of the interventions which 
society had made at one time or another became visible" 
(Brecht, 1965, p43), but this is a long way from requiring 
everything on stage to eventually lead to the resolution of 
social conflicts in order to gain its place on the stage. 
Essentially, this is where the crudeness of Auslander • s 
approach becomes most visible, since it is clear that he 
can dismiss the theories of the three practitioners he 
deals with as succinctly as he does only by treating their 
conceptual armoury as cruder than it is. For instance, he 
sums up his dismissal of Brecht • s working practices by 
saying : 
Brecht would have the actor partly withold 
her presence from the character she plays 
in order to comment on it. To do so, however, 
the actor must endow another fictional persona 
with the authority of full presence, a 
theoretical movement that makes Brecht's 
performance theory subject to the same 
deconstructive critique of presence as 
Stanislavsky's, 
(p66) . 
This, of course, does not allow for Brecht's expressed view 
of human beings as consisting of 'shifting raw material,, 
_.~.-. 
unformed and undefined •, and instead presumes that Brecht 
was not aware of the constructed, or fictional, nature of 
the actor's •self' that watched the presentation of the 
role. To take Auslander • s word for it, we would have to 
assume that Brecht did not mean what he said about the 
nature of human beings. It would also be to dismiss his 
comment that "man is the sum of all the social conditions 
of all times" (Brecht, 1965, p63), as an only apparent 
acceptance of the formed nature of the human animal, which 
hid beneath it a covert belief in such •prior• things as 
self, human nature and so on. On top of this, it would be 
to assume that the careful and skillful manipulation of 
information that went on before a play was performed for an 
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audience was, essentially, constricted by wrong thinking. 
Listen to this paragraph: 
[I)f the audience is to be shown how to 
handle the character, or if people who 
resemble it or are in similar situations 
are to be shown the secret of their problems, 
then he [the actor) must adopt a standpoint 
which is not only outside the character's 
radius but also at a more advanced stage 
of evolution, 
(p76). 
Now, we have already seen Auslander criticise this use 
of a 'fictional' self as a falling back into 'logocentric' 
ways of thinking; but there are two points to be made here. 
Firstly, the 'fiction' is clearly a crafted one the 
'standpoint' 
is 'adopted' 
(a place, perhaps temporary, where one stands) 
(i.e. it does not belong to one, it is not 
one's own, but one claims it and treats it as such) - and 
this indicates acute reflexivity over the particular 
'fiction' chosen; and secondly, the fictional point of view 
should be 'at a more advanced stage of evolution', which is 
not a property of self that most human beings can choose to 
endow themselves with as and when they please. That Brecht 
and his actors could do it is entirely to do with the fact, 
somehow ridden over by Auslander, that Epic theatre was "a·· 
social measure" (1965, p104), and that it was Brecht's view 
that "if lives are worth anything, it is for and by means 
of society" (p78). Add to this his statement that "the 
unknown can only develop from the known" (p79), and 
possibly there might begin to surface the idea that in 
serving that end, Brecht felt free to operate 
comprehensible forms of representation purely on the 
strength of their range of availability to the members of 
his audiences. 
As a final point, and as a foil to Auslander's 
perception that Brecht always implied that 'a resolution of 
conflicts' was 'possible and desirable', let us finish with 
another quote from Brecht himself: 
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[O)ur new task demands that we put forward 
whatever takes place between people, fully 
and completely, complete with all contradictions, 
in a state that can or cannot be resolved. · 
Nothing is irrelevant to society and its affairs. 
The elements that are clearly defined and can 
be mastered must be presented in relation to 
those that are unclear and cannot, 
(p46, emphasis added). 
This seems to make clear that Brecht was not concerned 
to simply exclude the irresolvable from his theatre, and 
suggests that the apparent implication that Auslander 
recognised in his work was provided not by Brecht, but by 
Auslander himself. 
It is clear, as we have seen, that Nietzsche also 
intended to produce a radical critique of the self, and 
equally clear that he had no intention of thereby denying 
individuals access and rights to what they had come to 
regard as their 'selves', since it was as a result of such 
access that he hoped that individuals would be enabled to 
enter a process of the continual 'overcoming' of the 
constraints and limits imposed by their 'subjecthood'. In 
effect, he was at pains not to advocate the abandonment of 
the structures of self, at least not until some point in 
the very distant future, and even then it would be a 
methodology of living available only to the select few, the 
'free spirits'. For Nietzsche, the 'synthetic concept 'I'' 
was a 'condition of life' and therefore not sensibly 
abandoned, it being assumed that a condition of life is a 
necessary pre-requisite for that life to exist at all. 
This is what he meant when he stated of the intellect that 
"[W)e would not have it if we did not need to have it, and 
we Hould not have it as it is if we did not need to have it 
as it is, if we could live otherwise" (1968, p273). And 
interestingly, Nietzsche's advocacy of the 'synthetic 
concept 'I'' goes beyond the purely abstract too, in that 
he seems to affirm that the 'centring' of experience is a 
necessary, and even evolutionary, process, as in the 
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passage below 
Consciousness - beginning quite externally, 
as co-ordination and becoming consc1ous of 
'impression' - at first at the furthest 
distance from the biological center of the 
individual; but a process that deepens and 
intensifies itself, and continually draws 
nearer to that centre, 
(p274) . 
This ties in to statements such as that which relates that 
"every centre of force adopts a perspective towards the 
entire remainder" (p305), all of which adds force to the 
view that individuals should not abandon their structures 
of subjectivity. For, as is clear, it is only a 'centre of 
force' that can possess a point distinct 
from which to perceive (and therefore 
evaluate), and it is only this capacity 
from all others 
interpret and 
for individual 
perception that guarantees a will to power its •greatest 
weapon'. In other words, without the notion of a centering 
of experience so distasteful to theorists like Auslander, 
Nietzsche' s a·rgument is that the individual would have 
less, rather than more, power to operate in the world. As 
we are going to move on and see, every practitioner 
encountered on these pages seems to operate from a largely 
similar standpoint on the issue, no matter what their 
particular formal or methodolog1cal approach; and this 
coincidence of attitUde, as will become clear, gains in 
importance directly in relation to its roots in what might 
be termed political thinking. 
Human beings must invent themselves in the 
midst of an infinity of possibilities, 
instead of passively accepting their roles 
because they think they cou·ld not be other 
than they are, 
(Boal, 1992, p209). 
Nietzsche once asked what wo1;rld happen if it were 
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discovered to be true uthat all our so-called consciousness 
is a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, 
perhaps unknowable, but felt text ?" (1982, p76). It was a 
question along the same lines as his statement that 'all 
belief is based on the feeling of pleasure or pain in 
relation to the feeling subject', and it was intended to 
push home his point that all the effects of Reason 
intelligence, understanding, knowledge, conviction and so 
on - are simply the indirect results of the repression or 
expression of the drives and desires of the individual in 
question. Brecht, it might be argued, is generally assumed 
to have approached the problem of individuality from a much 
more rationalist perspective, caught up in the 
Enlightenment project of which Karl Marx' s writings were 
simply an instance. However, such a viewing of Brecht' s 
attitudes in this area can quickly be shown to be not 
strictly correct. 
"People do a lot that is reasonable, but has never 
been subjected to their reason", says Brecht at one point, 
(1965, p50), before going on to discuss why he constructed 
his characters as he did, taking it as said that the basis 
of his characterising was a view of human beings as 
'shifting raw material, unformed and undefined'. 
It's only when confronted by such characters 
that they will practice true thinking; that 
is to say thinking that is conditioned by 
self-interest, and introduced and accompanied 
by feelings, a kind of thinking that displays 
every stage of a\vareness, clarity and 
effectiveness, 
(p54). 
Clearly, if this is a rationalist conception of the 
process of 'true thinking', then it is an unusual one, for 
it states that true thinking only occurs when 'feeling' 
introduces it, makes the initial impulse in the body from 
which 'thought' develops, and that it then develops 
properly only when it is 'conditioned by self-interest'. 
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('Selfishness', we might remember, is what Nietzsche 
ironically called one of the "three most cursed things• -
along with •sensual pleasure" and "lust for power" [1961, 
p206]). So, if it is possible to take this conception of 
thinking as indicative in any way in terms of this thesis, 
we might want to say that Brecht, different as he was to 
Nietzsche in his declared aims for society - (and Nietzsche 
eschewed 'socialism' for what he saw as its shrewd 
manipulation of the "christian instinct • ( 1965, p401) ) 
seems to have operated the same basic schematic as regards 
the nature and structure of individuals as Nietzsche did, 
at least in terms of what it means to 'think'. If we are 
happy to accept that what it means to think, in other words 
what consciousness is like as an experiential state for 
individuals, is an important question in the field of 
inquiry into the human life form (in the human-ities), then 
we might also be happy to accept that when Brecht and 
Nietzsche can be seen to share similair views about it, 
then what is being witnessed is a coincidence of form of 
some proportion in their outlooks. 
It is a long time since I experienced the reasons 
for my opinions. 
Should I not have to be a barrel of memory, if I 
wanted to carry my reasons, too, about with me ? 
(Nietzsche, 1961, p149). 
This may seem to be saying entirely nothing of any 
import, other than in terms of abstract forms, about the 
works and writings of either Brecht or Nietzsche; but it is 
surely quickly apparent that the conception Brecht used of 
what his audience consisted of as human beings would define 
and delimit his approach to the creation of objects for 
them to perceive. It goes further than that, though. The 
entire mise-en-sc~ne of Epic theatre, looking at Brecht' s 
creations in Nietzschean terms, (where all the effects of 
the individual reflect to, and for, the individual), was, 
and is, structured around this conceptualisation of human 
beings. 
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Epic theatre, (like all skilled theatre taking place 
within a similar physical structuring .o-f audience-space-
performer). is a confrontation between self and other that 
has been stringently pre-ordained by one party and to which 
the other has agreed to submit upon entering. This is why 
Brecht made it clear that uthe kind of experience the 
theatre communicates isn't doing things yourself" (1965, 
p33). In effect, this means that Brecht, as playwright and 
director, attempts in making a performance to occupy the 
position of the audience as perceiver of what is on stage, 
and through this eo guide their perceptive processes to his 
desired ends come the time of the performance. There is a 
very real sense in which the craft of theatre for the 
director or pla~vright consists in large part in this 
deliberate attempted manipulation of the perceptive 
capacities of the audience by their own. It is the same 
sense in which theatre is always the confrontation between 
self and other where self is surrendered to the other in 
the belief that belief will return the other to one as 
self. It is also the same sense where 'understanding', 
standing under, supporting, is accomplished through belief 
- the •suspension of disbelief' - for the eventual reward 
of containing the whole, of becoming equal to it. In other 
words, instead of leaving their weapons on the threshold, 
the audience in the Epic theatre are asked to bring them in·· 
and use them with the utmost skill. In terms of basic 
structure, this mighc be seen as the occupation of the 
space of the other (the use of their perceptual position by 
an alien form thac of the director, performer or 
playwright) for the purpose of their eventual empowerment 
in the dynamic meaning-producing confrontation of the 
performance. In chis way, it becomes possible to state 
that Brecht 's thea-cre \oJas based entirely on empathy at one 
level, just as eve~ other form of theatre is. 
(~s we will see later, and as we touched on before, 
the problem of co~"ensurability and its reductive effect on 
autonomous individuality is always a central one for 
performance, which relies on it for any semblance of 
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effectivity. Communication is necessary; but it is, of 
course, before that possible. There is little doubt that 
every practitioner of performance discussed in these pages 
also views it as desirable) . 
[F]eelings are necessary if representations, 
imitations of events from people's social life are 
to be possible; also that such imitations must 
stimulate feelings, 
(Brecht, 1965, p15). 
We ought. to note here that it would be a misreading to 
think that Brecht is saying in the above passage that 
representations are always, necessarily, •imitations of 
events from people's social life', since that would be 
forgetting that he is talking about his Epic theatre, which 
was a •social measure'. As such, it was concerned with the 
social, and therefore dealt in the sphere of the social, 
using social means to achieve social ends. The more 
abstract comment, 1n which the reference to the social is 
sandwiched, is that 'feelings are necessary if 
representations ... are to be possible'. Now, considering 
that representation is a method of communication between 
human beings, and that human beings are, despite the 
guiding hand of language, indivisble feeling/thinking·. 
entities ("One thinks feelings and one feels 
thoughtfully", says Brecht [p92]) - it might seem nothing 
more than obvious to state that feelings are necessary for 
representation to occur. But we have already seen that 
Brecht based his theatrical form on his conception of the 
individual in the world, and seen how that conception 
shares many aspects of itself with those advanced by 
Nietzsche the subject as multiplicity; feelings 
(drives/desires) introduce thought; communication is 
necessary; interpretation (and the ability to guide it) the 
most powerful weapon - (Brecht worked in the theatre, after 
all, a field, like all the arts, for the active engagement 
of interpretation); self-interest (selfishness, self-
directedness, self-responsibility) should 'condition' 
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thinking; -·'all of these can be said to be present in both. 
On top of this, it can be shown - (disregarding even the 
wealth of examples where Brecht, seeming to reverse exactly 
the situation Nietzsche bemoaned, attempted to make the 
common 'uncommon' again, to alienate it from the normative 
context that 'defined' it, and remembering that Brecht • s 
choice of theatrical form was designed for a specific 
function and reflected that function) that Brecht's 
conception of reality bears affinities with Nietzsche's 
radical perspectivism. At one point, for instance, he 
defines the 'really' of ubeing really interested in 
something" as "i.e. deeply and many-sidedly" (pp38-39), and 
he then goes on to suggest that .. · when constructing a 
character, he "had to portray him as a basically alterable 
personality" (p43), in order to ensure that it would be an 
effective characterisation : ur had to make him take every 
step as if there was an explanation for it; and at the same 
time to have an inkling of some different step for which 
there would have been an explanation too," (pp43-44). 
This, then, can be connected to a passage where Brecht 
states that uabove all knowledge manifests itself in 
knowing better, i.e. in contradiction" (p89) - which might 
remind us of Nietzsche • s definition of 'free spirits' as 
those that were capable of 'changing their opinions'. 
Taken together, these references to the multiplicity of:-
forms and viewpoints available to each individual in 
society might then be taken to indicate that Brecht's basic 
view of the world and individuals was, like Nietzsche' s, 
that they were capable of transformation, initially by a 
process of transvaluation. The aim of this transvaluation 
was, for both Nietzsche and Brecht, freedom. Fr~edom, for 
Nietzsche, was self-responsibility and self-directedness, 
and this is perhaps similar to what Brecht was referring to 
when he said that the Epic theatre was "meant only for our 
own day, precisely for our own day" (p99) , and that, 1n 
that context, it was u simply a theatre of the man who has 
begun to help himself" (p103) . These parallels do not, of 
course, imply either that Brecht and Nietzsche believed the 
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same things, or that they intended the same effects, were 
doing the same things, or desired the same ends. What it 
does do is suggest the role of theatre, whenever it takes 
place, as a crucible for the interpretive processes, and 
highlight that it 1s for that reason that Brecht was 
involved in it. It also begins to suggest ways in which 
the conception of self advanced within Nietzschean 
philosophy has its echoes in theatre practice of the last 
century, and that the different methodologies of the 
various practitioners will inevitably reflect an overall 
perspective on stage, which can be seen as the mark of a 
particular form of the self, since the subject alone is 
demonstrable. A final bonus, also, is that it allows us to 
argue that Auslander's criticisms of Brecht were unfounded, 
since they gave no credence to his own viewpoints as 
expressed in his writings. 
The rationalisation of emotion does not take place 
solely after the emotion has disappeared, it is 
immanent in the emotion, it also takes place in the 
course of an emotion. There is a simultaneity of 
feeling and thinking, 
(Boal, 1992, p47). 
Interestingly, Augusto Boal, a contemporary theatre 
practitioner following in the methodological footsteps of 
Brecht - at least in terms of the intended effects of his 
chosen theatrical forms also displays a similar 
conceptualisation of human beings and the world they live 
in. That - (in the case of Brecht and now also with Boal) 
- this should seem at all odd is largely to do with their 
declared intentions as concerns their use of the theatrical 
medium, which they desired to use to initiate in their 
audiences a sense of their capacity for social action. It 
is because of the scale of this desired end, the fact that 
it was change on a social, rather than individual, level 
that they aimed for, that the notion that they are 
therefore antagonistic to all breeds of individualism seems 
to make sense. But, as we have already seen, Brecht was 
very clear that 'self-interest' was of paramount importance 
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if the individual were to practice true thinking. He was 
also of the opinion that it was feelings, rather than a 
somehow abstract 'intelligence', that engendered and 
'introduced' thoughts in the first place; and it is 
difficult to know how he can have intended to diminish the 
role of the individual by inserting the individual's drives 
and desires 1n a central position in the formation and 
continuation of consciousness. The point to be grasped 
here, perhaps, is that Brecht (and Boal) both operated a 
schematic of the self that is explicable in Nietzschean 
terms, but located it within a context that stressed the 
individual's relation to the social world, possibly causing 
their conceptions of individual identity to fall into the 
background slightly. Certainly, Nietzsche's call for 
'creators' in Thns Sooke Zaratbnstra seems to be answered 
by Boal' s comment that "this is how artists should be - we 
should be creators and also teach the public how to be 
creators" (1992, p29). 
Boal, in fact, seems to structure his theatrical forms 
around a conception 
remarkably close to 
of reality and the self that is 
that which Nietzsche might have 
described; and this makes the assertion that it is not 
necessarily the conception of self that is different, but 
the end to which it is put, very much stronger as an 
opinion. So, Boal can state that "we are what we choose to 
be" (p209), and explain that "the personality is only one 
possible manifestation of the person" (p205); at the same 
time as he can know that "theatre is an ideological 
representation of images of social life" (p210, emphasis 
added). These views allow him, like Brecht, to manipulate 
and represent for specific ends what 1s essentially, 
according to his own attitudes, unrepresentable due to its 
multiple and transitory nature. The human form is a 
multitude of possibilities, says Boal, but we can use 
types, representative forms, because of the project of our 
preferred ideology, around which we can base dramas that 
are comprehensible within society, in order to encourage 
the capacity for active evaluation of the audience members 
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and help them "make breaches" and "open up paths of 
liberation" for themselves (p225}. And so, like Brecht, 
Boal approaches his 'Forum theatre' as a 'social measure'. 
A point of interest here is Boal's assertion that the 
personality is only 'one possible' manifestation of the 
person, since he goes on to add that "(t]he character, the 
dramatis 
(p205} . 
persona, is another possible 
This illuminates again the 
manifestation" 
narrowness of 
Auslander's approach to the matter of Brecht's use of 
'outdated' notions of the self by highlighting the 
provisional nature of all selves; and begs the question of 
whether the 'self' as a concept serves a useful function at 
all, even when, as in post-structuralist thought, it is 
held to be entirely a fiction. As this thesis has argued, 
the individual goes through a biological process of 
centering, the nature of which shapes the conceptualisation 
of the world and self, and so there is little point in 
seeking to abandon the habit of centrism entirely. On top 
of this, it seems entirely likely that the structure of 
identity known as the self serves its function in many 
different contexts of belief, and that the evacuation of 
faith in the metaphysical substance of the self need 
necessarily do no real damage to the ability of the concept 
to serve as a tool for empowerment, it being a fact that it 
is the self that grants the individual access to a 
perspective one's only birth-right in the Nietzschean 
world-view. It seems to be to exactly this area of 
experience that Grocowski was referring when he pointed out 
that "a secular consciousness in place of the religious one 
seems to be a psycho-social necessity for society. Such a 
transition ought to take place but that does not 
necessarily mean tnat it will" (1969, p49). It is arguable 
that it is the secular, rather than the religious, 
consciousness that tends to meet the view of the self as 
multiple with the more affirmatory energy. In light of 
this, we can see that Brecht's (and Boal's) materialism 
means that they can accept a view of the self as multiple, 
and within that vie\v the separate 'selves' themselves as 
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transitory or dispensable, which allows them to utilise 
versions of the 'logocentric' self without importing (as 
Auslander supposes) , all the failings of the theological 
viewpoint with it. 
Apart 
The fundamental concept for the actor is not 
the 'being' of the character, but the 'will'. 
One should not ask 'Who is this ?', but 
rather 'What does he want?'. The first 
question can lead to the formation of lakes 
of emotion, while the second is essentially 
dynamic, dialectical, conflictual, and 
consequently theatrical, 
(Boal, 1992, p51). 
from same basic 
structuration of 
his 
self 
acceptance 
as Brecht 
of the 
subject as multiple, 
Boal' s most feelings and reason inseparable and so on 
convincingly 'Nietzschean' attitude is visible in his 
characterisation of 'conflict' as the "source of 
theatricality" (p51). This characterisation rests on the 
assumption that "(t]he will is the essence of the 
motivation" of the character; which in turn takes its 
substance from the assertion that "idea = concrete will" 
(p52). That such a view can be described as Nietzschean 
should by no\oJ be clear, since Nietzsche was at pains to 
point out that all life was 'will to power and nothing--
besides'. 
Now, it is not clear that it ~s the will to power as 
explicated by Nietzsche that Boal is referring to when he 
uses the term 'will' , but it seems safe to assume that, 
because of the correspondence between their conceptions of 
the self in other respects, che function and nature of the 
will iri-Boal's.version of the self is close to, if not the 
same, as that which we find in Nietzsche. So, where 
Nietzsche could scate that it is 'only the doer that 
learns' , Boal is able to say that the ideal of Forum 
theatre is that "[a]t best, it liberates the spect-actors. 
At best, it stimulates them. At best, it transforms them 
into actors. Actor - he or she who acts" (p39) . If we are 
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happy to accept that to 'act' is the same as to 'do', then 
we can see that the view of the individual in both cases is 
more than roughly parallel. 
that 
Indeed, ·· Boal goes on to say 
[O]ur aim is not to exhibit static emotions, 
but to create rivers in flux, to create a 
dynamic. Theatre is conflict, struggle, 
movement, transformation ... It is a verb, not 
an adjective. To act is to produce an action, 
and every action produces a reaction - conflict, 
(pp50-5l). 
This, of course, is what Nietzsche was referring to 
when he said that it was a sign of a •mature' man that 'he 
attacks'; and it was what he was referring to when he noted 
that force must meet resistance to expend, or overcome, 
itself. In basic form, these points do nothing but follow 
a logic that Nietzsche himself has installed, since, as 
will to power, there is nothing in life that is not 
continually striving to attain its optimum functioning by 
overcoming the resistance (the will to power) of all other 
aspects of life; and this effectively means that .all the 
dynamism of life consists entirely of various levels and 
styles of conflict - a view that Boal, as we shall see, 
shares absolutely. 
Man does ~ seek pleasure and does not avoid 
displeasure ... Displeasure, as an obstacle to its 
will to power, is therefore a normal fact, the 
normal ingredient of every organic event; man 
does not avoid it, he is rather in continual need 
of it; every victory, every feeling of pleasure, 
every event, presupposes a resistance overcome, 
(Nietzsche, 1965, p373). 
"The will is the essence of motivation", says Boal 
(1992, p52), before going on to state that "idea = will = 
emotion= theatrical form" (p54); and this eventually leads 
him to the general 'rule' that uthe essence of 
theatricality is the conflict of wills" (p55). Care should 
be taken here to ensure that the 'will' which Boal is 
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referring to is not taken to be the sort of 'free will' 
that, together with a dialogue with 'conscience', provides 
'autonomous' individuals with direction and ethical 
guidance. In the Nietzschean schema, will is always the 
will to power - "All driving force is will to power ... there 
is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force except 
this", says Nietzsche (1968, p366) - which, unlike 'free 
will', has little or no relation to abstracted and removed 
ruminations on life and its possibilities. Will to power 
is the primary driving force which, as we have seen, makes 
accommodation for nothing and seeks to overcome everything, 
and to which we are answerable, rather than vice-versa. In 
this respect, it is a material, a biological, force, as 
opposed to an abstract, 'spiritual' one. There is little 
doubt that Boal is working with a conception similar to 
this when he uses the term 'will' also. 
For instance, he states that "[t]he internal conflict 
of will and counter-will creates the dynamic, creates the 
theatricality of performance" (1992, p56). Now, clearly, 
since he has already stated that the dynamic created by 
'willing' is the 'essence' of theatricality, and included 
willing in a necessary and sufficient process of theatrical 
creation - (idea - will - form) - to state that it is the 
dynamic produced by the confrontation of opposing 'wills' 
that creates the theatricality of theatre is placing the--
notion of will very centrally indeed. For it becomes 
impossible, following Boal' s conception of theatre as so 
far expressed, to point to an act of dynamic performance 
without being able to point at the same time, in the same 
object, to a visible manifestation of the dynamism of 
willing. If we were to use other words here, we might say 
that theatre as described by Boal runs close to life as 
described by Nietzsche, the latter being happy to say that 
life is present when will to power is. So, if we were to 
follow a Nietzschean characterisation of will, we might 
like to say that the theatricality of theatre, the dynamism 
of any performance, the effectivity of it, depends on its 
capacity to manifest an active will to power at some level. 
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Of course, in a sense, any performance that has an audience 
can rely on an active will to power in the guise of that 
audience, and must meet it and attempt to overcome it with 
the strength of its stylised presentation of itself. in 
order to seduce it into a state of awe before the reality 
of the image that one is presenting, to 'create the world 
before which one can kneel'. 
"Nothing of what is human is barred to anyone", states 
Boa! at one point (p209), - echoing Brecht' s comment that 
"[n] othing human can possibly lie outside the powers of 
humanity" (1965, p32) before going on to argue, in 
relation to his approach to the making of characters and 
plays, that "the premise is the notion that each of us is 
capable of feeling, thinking and being, in ways infinitely 
more various than we do these things in our daily lives" 
(1992, p208) 0 
In taking stock so far, then, we can see that Boa! has 
what might be seen as a conception of the self similar to 
Brecht's (and Nietzsche's) and that, worked around a notion 
of will as central, this 'self' is offered possiblities for 
itself through a process of confrontation of prepared 
images of itself - ('representations from social life') 
that have been deliberately crafted and stylised for that 
specific purpose. In this sense, Forum theatre works at, 
and with, the intersection points of various 'wills', or 
perspectives, in order to initiate confrontation and re-
evaluation at precisely those points. It is, because of 
this, another instance of performance as paradigm as far 
as the liberatory potential of perspectivism is concerned, 
where both actors and 'spect-actors' are asked to "sound 
out" their "poss:.blities" (1992, p209); and where the 
objective "is to encourage autonomous activity, to set a 
process in motion, to stimulate transformative creativity" 
(p245). The desired end result being, established as it is 
by Forum theatre's two •fundamental principles', that 
"spect-actors must. be the protagonists of the dramatic 
action and these spect-actors must prepare themselves to be 
the protagonists of their own lives" (p242). 
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Once again, then, we can see that the emphasis is on a 
notion of freedom as self-responsibility and a 'capacity 
for self-directedness', where respect for their own 
potentiality ('I wish men would -begin by respecting 
themselves; all else follows from that') -is offered as an 
initial impulse into social action. It is worth noting 
that this process of self-respect is initiated, in Forum 
theatre, by enabling the individual audience members to 
wield their 'most powerful weapon' in public and have their 
skills with it acknowledged and paid heed to. In a sense, 
Forum theatre makes indi victuals exert their force on the 
world, and coerces them into displaying their will in 
concrete form, as an image made real for others; a practice 
the end effect of which we have seen Nietzsche praise as 
being every individual's 'greatest desire'. 
We want to experience phenomena, but above all we 
want to know the laws which govern these phenomena. 
And that is the role of art - not only to show how 
the world is, but also why it is thus and how it 
can be transformed, 
(Boal, 1992, p47). 
Now, if we return for a while to Nietzsche's view that 
'man learns how to transfigure existence when he learns to 
transfigure himself', we will remember that it is through a 
transvaluation of the notion of self that Nietzsche 
believed the world would be transfigured. It is in this 
context that it is importanc to collate the image of self 
that practitioners in the theatre are working with, at 
least in so far as doing so will emphasise their points of 
departure from more 'traditional' notions such as the 
'soul', or the mind/body 'dualism' which we noted still 
seemed to be present in Goffman's text. 
Brecht, for instance, made clear his distance from 
such notions when he commented that he now saw thinking 
"just as a way of behaving, and behaving socially at that. 
It's something that the whole body takes part in, with all 
its senses" (1965, p90); thereby signalling, in effect, his 
rejection of the rationalist view of the individual. He 
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also asked, "[w] hy should I want to knock out the whole 
realm of guessing, dreaming and feeling ?", since he .was 
confirmed in the belief that "people do tackle social 
issues in these ways" (p92). Apart from this, he also held 
a more complex view of the individual in society than might 
be allowed for if his affiliation to Marxism is allowed 
prominence in the picture of him presented; and indeed 
seems to have acknowledged the strength of the burgeoning 
individuality that Nietzsche - like Foucault - felt to be 
the favoured strategy of the discourse of rationalistic 
capitalism (or 'knowledge/power'). This is evidenced by 
his references, this time genuinely of an implied nature, 
to the difficulty of aiming for the public arena in order 
to communicate on a social level in the midst of a well 
established society based on individualism. He noted that 
it was "difficult to grasp very much without seeing beyond 
the individual to major group conflicts" (1965, p32), and 
rallied himself with the fact that "there's a lot that we 
share, even now" (p78, emphasis added); but he then seems 
to reach a somewhat weak conclusion, saying simply that 
"art can create a certain unity in its audience" (p94, 
emphasis added); which inevitably seems a little removed 
from the image of Epic theatre as a preparation, or 
catalyst, for massive, co-ordinated social change. So, 
perhaps these are tensions in Brecht 's ontological outlook;.~ .. 
and if this is so, it might be that they are caused by the 
strain of trying to contain a strong individualism within a 
social project to which individuality must, to some extent, 
succumb. If so, it makes more interesting the question of 
the degree of influence exerted by the utilised concept of 
self on the theatrical forms of different practitioners. 
Boal, for instance, goes so far with his notion of the 
confrontation of 'will' and 'counter-will' as the essence 
of theatrical dynamism, as to characterise the dynamics of 
the body, of visible movement, in the same way. For him, 
"the most important element of theatre" was "the human 
body" (1992, pxxx), because "all ideas, all mental images, 
all emotions reveal themselves physically" (p61) . This is a 
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comment that should not surprise us, considering Boal' s 
closeness to Brecht in terms of approach, and if · we 
recollect Brecht' s conclusion that thinking involved 'the 
whole body'. For Boal, theatre necessarily treated the 
body as its 'most important element' since - and here, 
which would no doubt seem odd to Auslander, he claims to 
have been following knowledge handed down by Stanislavski -
"a bodily movement 'is' a thought and a thought expresses 
itself in a corporeal form" (p6l). All of which points 
towards a schematic of the self as the sort of indivisible 
whole that Nietzsche always maintained it was. (He did, at 
one point, remark that u[o]ne never communicates thoughts : 
one communicates movements, mimic signs, which we then 
trace back to thoughts" [1968, p428] ) . 
In fact, it was upon the certainty of this absolute 
indivisiblity, 
Nietzsche based 
or undifferentiatedness, of 
his rejection of morality, 
form 
since 
that 
he 
believed that differentiation was tied to evaluation, and 
evaluation was an aspect of being, as opposed to becoming. 
Indivisibility, in this particular sense, is the acceptance 
(in Derridean terms) of indeterminate di fferance; as well 
as being the rejection of that differentiation, called 
morality, that seeks to find equivalent values for non-
equivalent things. In other words, treating the individual 
as an indivisible whole, as Brecht and Boal certainly do, 
can be seen to be a logically effective strategy, and might 
be held to have gained credence as an approach due to the 
influence of the Nietzschean view of the individual. 
Becoming is of equivalent value every moment; 
the sum of its values always remains the same; 
in other words, it has no value at all, for 
anything against which to measure it, and in 
relation to which the word 'value' would have 
meaning, is lacking. The total value of the 
world cannot be evaluated; consequently 
philosophical pessimism belongs among comical 
things, 
(Nietzsche, 1968, p378). 
In order to add to this trajectory of etching out the 
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configurations of self operative in the approach to form of 
various practitioners, it will be helpful here to move. on 
and focus on the work of two practitioners writing from a 
different perspectival position than either Brecht or Boal. 
To this end, we will look at some of the theory of Jerzy 
Grotowski and an early pupil of his, now established as a 
'name' in his own right, Eugenic Barba. Hopefully, this 
will allow the strategy of this thesis - (which at this 
point is the illumination of the workings of models of the 
self in the manufacture of theatrical form) - to continue 
its process of justification and clarification. 
The theatre can be a kind of anthropological 
expedition which leaves the obvious territory 
behind, abandons recognized values ... 
(Barba, 1995, p82). 
A confrontation is a 'trying out', a testing 
of whatever is a traditional value ... 
(Grotowski, 1969, p90). 
[A] performance concieved as a combat against 
traditional values (whence 'transgression') -
( p~ 0) 0 
In fact, it is with Barba that a stress on the 
importance of the performer as form becomes paramount. 
This is clear in his attitude to what constitutes the 'raw 
material' of theatre - which we saw described by Boal as 
the dynamism of conflict generated by will and counter-will 
- which Barba describes as unot the actor, no; the space, 
nor the text, but the attention, the seeing, the hearing, 
the mind of the spectator", leading him to state that 
"theatre is the art of the spectator" (1995, p39) 0 In 
accordance with this characterisation, Barba is led to 
focus on the visible representations offered to the senses 
of audiences by performances, in order to stress the fact 
that it is the nature of the visible representation, the 
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form, that is important, not the 'meaning' that is supposed 
to be perceivable 'behind' it. In other words, it is, for 
Barba, not some abstract level of • sense' that makes a 
performer's actions 'real', but "the quality of the 
action's energy" (p87). This 'energy', and its controlled 
presentation, is what makes a performance effective or not. 
So, Barba says, •on the perceptible level, it seems they 
[the performers] are working on the body and the voice. In 
fact, they are working on something invisible energy", 
an energy he defines as "a personal temperature-intensity 
which the performer can determine, awaken, model" (p62) 
which, in its basic material form, "is muscular and nervous 
force" (p70) . What is inter-esting for Theatre Anthropolgy, 
says Barba, "is the way in which this biological process 
becomes thought, is re-modelled, made visible to the 
spectator" (p71, emphasis added), for it is this crafting 
of form that gives the performance its reality, that allows 
the energy to 'dance'. 
(Sats, by the way is Barba's term, used below, for "the 
moment in which the action is thought/acted by the entire 
organism, which reacts with tensions, even in immobilityn 
[p55] ) . 
The exactness with which the action is designed 
in space, the precision of each of its 
characteristics, a series of exactly fixed 
points of departure and arrival, of impulses 
and counterimpulses, of changes of direction, 
of sats : these are the preliminary conditions 
for the dance of energy, 
(p71) . 
Now, if we recall Nietzsche's comment that "[a]ll art 
exercises the power of suggestion over the muscles and 
senses" (1968, p427), and recollect his praise of those 
"who accord the senses a more fundamental value than to 
that fine sieve, that thinking and reducing machine, or 
whatever we may call what in the language of the people is 
named 'spirit •" (p538), we may begin to see that Barba is 
also a practitioner who appears to be approaching the 
176 
making of theatre with a perspective on the role of art 
that shares aspects of itself with a Nietzschean view. 
This can perhaps most plainly be seen in Barba' s noting 
that it is the performer's task to create an image so real 
that it seduces the spectator into believing in it : 
A performer 'in-life' becomes sensual. S/he seduces 
the spectators, leads them to the meeting between 
experience and reflection. This sensuality attracts, 
captures, 'enamours' the spectators, makes them 
react emotionally, transforms their reactions into 
reflection, 
(Barba, 1995, p172). 
Another important aspect of Barba' s concept of 
performance is his stress on the manufactured nature of 
meaning, which he continually stresses is not something 
'in-itself' which the performer 'expresses' and the 
audience 'recieves', but is rather the result of the 
interactive process of the performance situation, which is 
the constant interplay between presentation, perception, 
and evaluation. 
It is not the action itself which has its own 
meaning. Meaning is always the fruit of a conyentinn, 
a relationship. The very fact that the performer-
-spectator relationship exists implies that meanings· ·. 
will be produced. The point is whether or not one ~'­
wishes to programme which specific meanings must 
germinate in the spectator's mind, 
(pp104-105, heavy emphasis added). 
Add to this Barba's view that u[t]he performer's body 
reveals its life to the spectator by means of a myriad of 
tensions between opposing tensions" - what he names the 
"principle of opposition" which uall performers use, 
consciously or unconsciously" (p24) - and there begins to 
build up, as it was suggested there might, a recognisble 
picture of the self underlying Barba's methodology. It is, 
in effect, a self given over to the transvaluation and 
transformation of itself purely for the purposes of 
convincing others of the reality of the image of itself 
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that it has created, of seaucing them irito belief in •a 
naturalness that is the fruit of artificiality" (p104). In 
such a way, says Barba, the performer can transfigure 
him/herself beyond the constraints of the socially 
prescribed. 
So, extrapolating out from these brief parallels, is 
it possible to suggest that Barba uses a conception of the 
self, and of the practice of theatre/performance that makes 
sense within a Nietzschean perspective ? It does seem more 
than likely ·- the individual viewed as a non-dualistic 
'whole' ('body-mind' is Barba's term for the non-dualised 
self J ; theatre as the opportunity for the individual to 
transfigure him/herself;. the effectivity of this dependent 
on an ability to· seduce one's audience; meaning residing 
~n the confrontation between performer and audience 
(between one perspectival position and another); the 
manipulation of form, of appearance, as paramount; art as 
that which works on the muscles and the senses - all of 
these would be at home in a Nietzschean characterisation of 
the theatre event, and all are present in the ontological 
viewpoint from which Barba constructs his performances. In 
this sense, then, it seems acceptable to begin to 
characterise Barba' s approach to theatre as reliant on a 
concept of self, and of the theatre event itself, that has 
some affinities with Nietzsche's attitudes to these things,·;,_ 
just as we were able to do with Brecht and Boal. 
This allows the argument for an implicit 
problematization of the notion of what constitutes human 
identity being present in the thinking of these 
practitioners to be further advanced, perhaps so much so 
that it can be seen as to some extent dictating their 
approach to the theatrical medium itself. There seems to 
be a common acceptance within the writings analyzed here of 
a view of the performance event as an optimum site for the 
active working of the interpretive capacity, and this seems 
to be tied to a general viewing of human identity as more 
various than it is proposed as being outside of the 
theatrical space. The distinct projects of these 
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practitioners can, because of this·, be seen as meeting at 
the level of broad purpose despite what may be very 
particular intended ends; and this broad purpose might be 
characterized as the manipulation of perception via the 
creative re-arrangement of form. As Barba states it, "to 
direct or choreograph means steering the spectator's 
perception by using the performer's actions" (1995, p168), 
and, as he makes clear, an action is "that which changes me 
and the perception the spectator has of me" (p156). This 
is a clear endorsement of the proposition that it is the 
signs of agency that install meaning in the world, and that 
it is through the effects of agency that humanity can 
change that world. This appears to be accepted at the 
level of a fact by not only Brecht, Boal and Barba, but by 
every practitioner that we have encountered in this thesis. 
It can act as justification, then, of the central placement 
of agency in the theoretical model of performance offered 
in Chapter One. It should also be clear by now that this 
installation of agency as a central feature of a model of 
human identity does not, of necessity, act as a boundary to 
definitions of what this identity can be held to be. Such 
a conception, as we have seen, is composed of a will to 
power and a capacity to learn, and both of these attributes 
are essentially neutral factors in the cultural 
construction of identity. Barba signals his awareness of·.~--
the basic neutrality of the primary human form, and of the 
liberatory possibilities granted by this, when he discusses 
what he terms the 'fictive body', the body which the 
liminal position of the performance space can, uniquely, 
allow for 
The performer's extra-daily body technique 
dilates the body's dynamics. The body is 
re-formed, re-built for the theatrical 
fiction. This •art-body' - and thus 'non-
-natural body' - is neither male nor 
female in and of itself. On the stage, it 
has the sex it has decided to represent, 
( p62) . 
There is little doubt that this conceptualization moves 
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close to Lacan' s view that the human form is psychically 
non-distinguishable in terms of female/male typology in .its 
prim.:ory ot;ot:o. ruL Barb.:~., cne truth of any particular 
performance action springs from its connection to the 'pre-
expressive' level of the performer's being, and masculine 
or feminine characterization udoes not belong on the pre-
expressive level" (p65). The focus on this primary level 
of being in Barba's work then reflects an attempt to move 
beyond the forms of identity in operation in later stages 
of socialization, in an effort to reveal the essentially 
transient, dynamic quality of the human form. In this 
respect, Barba's work shows the same critical attitude to 
social forms of identity as we found in Brecht and Boal, 
and maintains a similar effort to avoid the hegemonic 
influence that such forms are capable of exerting. If we 
move on now to look at the writings of Jerzy Grotowski, we 
can attempt to see if this thematic appears to continue 
there too, or not. 
The theatre must attack what might be 
called the collective complexes of society, 
the core of the collective subconscious or 
perhaps superconscious (it does not matter 
what we call it), the myths which are not 
an invention of the mind but are, so to speak, 
inherited through one's blood, religion, 
culture and climate, 
(Grotowski, 1969, p42). 
·~.·--
In fact, moving on eo discuss the philosophical 
premises underlying the theatre practice of Jerzy Grotowski 
moves us into the core theoretical area of this analysis of 
performance theory, since it introduces into the argument 
that aspect of the performance dynamic signalled by the 
initial title of this chapter, the relationship of Self to 
Other. As we have seen, the dialectical processes in 
occurrence during the creation and then endless maintenance 
of the topography of this intersubj ecti ve realm is the 
field of operation for the desire of the will to power, and 
therefore the site of ·ultimate fulfilment for individual 
creative agency, or force. As Nietzsche said, it is not 
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enough just to offer "the humble expression" that 
"everything is merely subjective", since it is necessary 
now to say "it is also our work! - Let us be proud of it 
! " (1968, p545). 
Grotowski becomes important to this thesis here 
because of his emphasis on the idea of the actor as making 
"a total gift of himself" to the audience member (1969, 
pl6); and his influence on Barba can be seen in what was 
just shown as Barba's stress on the craft of the performer 
(i.e. one who makes forms, a per-form-er). On the same 
matter, Grotowski makes it clear that he considers "the 
personal and scenic technique of the actor as the core of 
theatre art" (pl5), and it will be helpful here to recall 
Nietzsche' s stress on the artist as one who 'accords no 
value to anything that cannot become form.' Adding to this 
the characterisation of any sign as a reflection of the 
self - 'The subject alone is demonstrable' - should lead us 
to see early on that Grotowski did not move away from this 
schematic in developing his theatre forms, but in fact 
moved to encompass and occupy it to a radical extent. 
If there is an overall sense, or theme, to Grotowski's 
approach to making theatre, it could be held to lie in his 
attitudes towards what he felt comprised the actuality of 
the performance event, and towards what he saw as its 
function, or purpose. For example, he was clear that the':. 
actor's task was, essentially, "the expression of signs", 
and that this 'expression of signs' always "equals 
'artifice'" (pl7). This highlighting of artifice as the 
purveyor of what I·Jas meaningful in the performance seems 
similar to Nietzsche's approach to truth, where appearance 
is valued above scme invented notion of a 'reality' beyond 
the surface. In fact, the correlation between their 
attitudes towards created form is far stronger than that, 
as Grotowski indicates when he states that "[w)e find that 
artificial composition not only does not limit the 
spiritual but actually leads to it" (pl7). Now, if it is 
remembered here that Nietzsche 
'metaphysical activity', and 
181 
termed 
that he 
art life's 
sought a 
'spiritualisation' of the senses and saw artistic activity 
as •more divine• than life, then it might be possible· to 
see the link between Grotowski' s use of the term 
'spiritual' and Nietzsche' s. Both used the term without 
intending to refer to any type of theological institution 
or practice, but rather to indicate a state of being (for 
Nietzsche one of 'symbol-intoxication', and for Grotowski 
one of •trance') that, once experienced by the individual, 
would be recognised as a most 'divine• state of being. If 
we are unconvinced of this in respect of Grotowski at this 
point, it would be well to recall his insistence that a 
'secular consciousness in place of a religious one' was •a 
psycho-social necessity for society' as far as he was 
concerned; and this, in effect, leads to the re-directing 
(or self-directing) of the human capacities for belief and 
deification or what Nietzsche called the 'basic 
idealizing powers'. For Grotowski, the "theatre only has a 
mean1ng if it allows us to transcend our stereotyped 
vision, our conventional feelings and customs, our 
standards of judgement ... ," (1969, p213, emphasis added). 
To contextualize Grotowski's attitude here further, we 
can note that Artaud, too, was in no doubt about the 
transcendent nature of art. He noted, for instance, that 
"art is not the imitation of life, but life is the 
imitation of a transcendent principle which art puts us·.~--
into communication with again" (in Derrida, 1977, p234); 
and in the same way that Grotowski describes a state of 
'trance• in the actor that is powerful enough to force the 
spectator into a profound response, so does Artaud describe 
stage acting as "a delirium like the plague [which] is 
communicable" (1970, p16). There is also a strong emphasis 
in Artaud's writing as well on the fact that this profound 
theatrical experience could only be achieved within the 
discipline of crafted form, where expressions "resembled 
distilled gold" (p37) and where the sign was "raised to the 
nth power and absolutely stylised" (p43) . For Artaud, the 
power of such a disciplined crafting of form demonstrated 
"the effectiveness and greater active value of a certain 
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number of well-learnt and above all masterfully applied 
conventions" (p39); and these in themselves led to a new 
vision of theatrical practice Artaud was clear, like 
Grotowski, that the theatre's purpose ought to be the 
actualization of new levels of being via the deliberate 
mastery of form - "what matters is that our sensibility is 
put into into a deeper, subtler state of perception by 
assured means, the very object of magic and ritual, of 
which theatre is only a reflection," (p70). It seems 
clear, then, that both Artaud and Grotowski can be seen to 
have accepted the Nietzschean premise that it was at the 
level of appearance - of artifice - that the most profound 
truths would be available, making it pointless to seek to 
do away with the mediated as a result of a quest for the 
absolutely •real'. If artifice, or appearance, is all 
there is, then the manipulation of those elements that 
constitute it is, as we have noted before, the 
transfiguration of all there is. 
So, working from a basic schematic that holds 
expressivity to be always the presentation of signs, and of 
theatre as a confrontation between self and other, how does 
Grotowski operate the mise-en-sc~ne, and to what end ? It 
seems that the core of the answer to the latter question 
consists of an emphasis on the discipline of the actor's 
craft, which indicates that in the discussion to follow> 
Nietzsche's presentation of freedom as a •capacity for 
self-direction' and a •will to self-responsibility' would 
be best kept in mind. 
We believe that a personal process which is 
not supported and expressed by a formal 
articulation and disciplined structuring of 
the role is not a release and will collapse 
in shapelessness, 
(Grotowski, 1969, pl7, emphasis added). 
For Grotowski. this basic conception of the theatre 
event is combined with a belief in theatre's function as 
"an act of transgression" (p19), and supported by the view 
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that the theatre, with its "full-fleshed perceptivity" is 
always "a place of provocation" (p21). This provocatory 
status is attained because the theatre is "capable of 
challenging [overcoming] itself" and "violating accepted 
stereotypes of vision, feeling, and judgement" (p22) . In 
other words, the theatre offers new ways of being, new 
aspects of existence, to its performers and audience 
members. It seems clear that there is again present here a 
conceptualisation of human beings as more multiple than 
they are generally perceived as being. That this is 
presented as an 'offering' within the theatre situation is 
reliant upon taking the nature of performance to be that of 
an act of communication (and communion), a dialectical 
exchange normally predicated, at least in the theatre, on 
'active' and 'passive' polarities where one 'gives' and 
another 'receives' ; and this does seem to be an at tribute 
that all the practitioners discussed, including Boal, take 
as a given for the performance event. Grotowski, 
supporting a notion of performance as an event during which 
the actor makes a "total gift' of himself to the audience, 
clearly holds this view to a radical degree. 
So, if we read 'revelation' in the passage below as 
'transformation', (remembering that a new perception 
creates a new truth, and a new truth a new world, thereby 
introducing transformation into the individual), we can see· 
.~~. 
this attitude expressed by Grotowski as a principle of 
form. 
If the actor, by setting himself a challenge 
publicly challenges others, and through excess, 
profanation and outrageous sacrilege reveals 
himself by casting off his everyday mask, he 
makes it possible for the spectator to undertake 
a similar process of self-revelation, 
(p34) . 
The actor, then, in Grotowskian theatre, enters a process 
of the overcoming of self and then presents this to an 
audience with the desire that it initiate a similar process 
in them. In this sense it, and all other theatre, becomes 
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a concrete version of the transvaluation of value that 
Nietzsche was calling for a hundred years ago. For 
Grotowski at the time of his work with his notion of 'Poor 
Theatre', the "decisive principle• of theatre remained the 
same as it had always been, namely -
The more we become absorbed in what is 
hidden inside us, in the excess, in the 
exposure, in the self-penetration, the more 
rigid must be the external discipline; that 
is to say the form, the artificiality, the 
ideogram, the sign. Here lies the whole 
principle of expressiveness, 
(p3 9) 0 
Now, clearly we are not talking here about 
'expressiveness• as it can be attached to infants or to 
children, for example, since they are undeniably 
'expressive' 1n some way, but cannot be held to have 
mastered an 'external discipline' to any great extent. The 
expressiveness Grotowski is referring to is the mastered 
exteriority of the actor, those whose profession it is to 
overwhelm their impulses and drives in order to craft of 
themselves something credibly presentable. It is their 
task, as Nietzsche wished it were everyone's task, to 
accept the truth of appearance, mould it according to one's. 
truth, and present it to the world as. the truth. And for-:'.-. 
Grotowski, this mastery of self (or 'care of the self' as 
Foucault might have called it), involved a striving to 
reach 'beyond good and evil' 
We are concerned with the spectator who does not 
stop at an elementary stage of psychic integration, 
content with his own petty, geometrical, spiritual 
stability, knowing exactly what is good and what is 
evil, and never in doubt, 
(p40, emphasis added). 
This, then, was Grotowski's 'Poor Theatre' - which was 
'poor' because it "proposes the substitution of material 
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wealth by moral wealth as the principal aim in life" (p44) 
a place where those who have sought to •overcome' 
themselves and craft themselves into living 'truths' offer 
their overcoming to the perceptual senses of others, in 
order that they might be helped to do likewise. It is, in 
other words, 'active' transvaluation (or, as Artaud called 
it, "active metaphysics" [1970, p31]) that activity 
which involves those present ~n what Nietzsche saw as the 
fundamental aspects of life, and asks them to recognise as 
much. For Grotowski, this is because "we must gradually 
learn to be responsible for all we do" (1969, pl60); and is 
there any doubt, following his comments on the need for a 
'secular consciousness'' that his emphasis on self-
responsibility is closely parallel to Nietzsche' s ? 
Through self-responsibility comes freedom is the message 
from both it seems, and in one it is reflected in writings, 
in the other in theatrical practice. Other than that 
difference of the specific field of activity, the basic 
philosophical premises seem to be very much of the same 
design in both cases. 
We can chase this theme of similarity a little further 
by noting that Grotowski, like the other practitioners, 
shares with Nietzsche a view of the human organism that 
attempts to return to the body its function as the site and 
source of expression. For instance, Grotowski was clear; .. 
that uthe essential thing is that everything must come from 
and through the body. First and foremost, there must be a 
physical reaction to everything that affects us" (p172); 
and this is surely similar to Nietzsche' s insistence that 
our 'most profound judgements' are judgements 'of our 
muscles', and to his call for people to 'start from the 
body' and 'employ it as a guide'. These are again parities 
of approach that are clearly identifiable between the two, 
and as such they act to establish the theme of linkage at 
the level of ontology that we have been looking at with all 
the practitioners discussed. What is particularly 
interesting in Grotowski, the more so perhaps because it is 
absent from the writings of the others, is his specific 
186 
focus on the dynamics of theatre seen as a 'confrontation', 
a characterisation that, with its echoes of conflict and 
peril, hints at a realm within which the will to power, 
with its drive for victory and extension, might readily 
feel at home. 
This act of the total unveiling of one's 
being becomes a gift of the self which 
borders on the transgression of barriers and 
love. I call this a total act. If the actor 
performs in such a way, he becomes a kind 
of provocation for the spectator, 
(Grotowski, 1969, p99). 
Philosophy consists of the gradually increasing 
dominance of an ontology of the same, in which 
a knowing self struggles to subordinate the alien 
objects of its thought to its dominion, 
(Connor, 1992, p195). 
Grotowski viewed 'self-research' as usimply the right 
of our profession, our first duty" (1969, p200), and stated 
that ucreativity, especially where acting is concerned, is 
boundless sincerity, yet disciplined i.e. articulated 
through signs" (p217) . Now this characterisation of 
disciplined sincerity as meaning sincerity that is 
'articulated through signs' is crucial to an understanding 
·• 
of the discussion to follow, which, ~n itself, is ~·.'-
outgrowth of the Nietzschean hypothesis that 'only subjects 
exist'. This hypothesis of Nietzsche's can be seen to make 
sense if it is remembered that Nietzsche was not intending 
by making it to mean that the 'objective• world was non-
existent; but was instead pointing to the self-contained 
nature of the world of human meaning, which; :it will be 
remembered, we have already discussed. 
For Nietzsche, however, uthe world exists" because uit 
is not something that becomes, 
away" (1968, p548); and this 
not something that passes 
therefore places it in a 
different order of existence than human life, where a sense 
of • solidity' has been achieved only by the imposition on 
the state of Becoming of a sense of Being, which has been 
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bequeathed by the 'supreme' will to power. In other words, 
appearance is to be worshipped above the 'Real' , because 
appearance is the true realm of existence for the human 
life-form, since there is none other available to it. 
If there is then added to this Nietzsche's conception 
of the great 'third eye', the 'theatre eye' which looks out 
'from behind the other two', it should begin to become 
clear that Nietzsche, by arguing that only the subject 
exists - and that only the self was 'demonstrable' - is 
effectively saying that the nature of self-consciousness is 
its structuration as a viewed performance of itself, and 
that this structure is inescapable, total and reflective. 
Lacan, of course, was making the same point when he stated 
that 
the whole ambiguity of the sign derives from 
the fact that it represents something for 
someone ... Any node in which signs are 
concentrated, in so far as they represent 
something, may be taken for a someone. What 
must be stressed at the outset is that a 
signifier is that which represents a subject 
for another signifier, 
(Lacan, 1979, p207). 
This, then, is the crux of Nietzsche' s advocacy of 
appearance over the 'Real'. Having rejected the notion of 
a 'real' self - the 'signified' that is assumed to exist.'.·. 
under any •signifier' Nietzsche had to construct a 
philosophical system that presented as positive this lack 
of a deeper reality. He did so, as we have seen, by 
advocating the disciplined and crafted use of the 
signifying structure known as the 'self'. In other words, 
as Grotowski was noting, the most 'truth' that can be 
obtained from existence as a 'self' will not rest in the 
directness or othen~ise of access to the 'real' self, since 
this does not exist, but will, instead, be found in the 
self-conscious and disciplined structuring of the 
signifying system that constitutes the •self'. It is 
appearance that is, as Nietzsche maintained, the site of 
the 'divine'. In this sense we can see that Nietzsche' s 
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philosophical working through of the disappearance of the 
'Real' from a schema of existence in fact occupies the same 
field of inquiry that Goffman touched on in his exploration 
of the performative nature of the self. However, whereas 
Goffman simply highlighted the fact that the self was 
constantly •produced' in interaction with others rather 
than a reflection of some constant 'inner self', Nietzsche 
provided a philosophy designed to underwrite both the 
acceptance, and the powerful manipulation, of this fact. 
Now, there are two points that it will be helpful to 
understand here. The first is Lacan's assertion that "the 
I is an Other" (1977, p23) - which is really another way of 
stating Nietzsche's concept of the 'theatre-eye'; and the 
second, which is an outgrowth of this first, is that it is 
on this terrain, of the relation between self and other. 
that what might be called the 'ethics' of selfhood, and 
therefore subjectivity, are constituted (2). 
Lacan's notion of 'the I as an other' derives from his 
concept of the 'imaginary' relation of the self to its own 
image, which dictates that the self is always constituted 
as at a distance from itself, viewing itself simultaneously 
as both 'self' and 'other'; and since this structuration is 
total and inescapable, this necessarily means that the 
subject, in dealing with the world outside of itself, 
structures it according to the same schema, seeing alL . 
. .r .. 
things within the casts of 'self' or 'other'. 
Elin Diamond (1992) notes that this characterisation 
of identity has ramifications for the notion of 
identification, ramifications which, in Lacanian theory, 
tend to be portrayed in a negative light. She says that, 
in Lacan identification, always in the register 
of the imaginary, is always narcissistic; the 
percieved other is always a version of me. 
Difference, contradiction are all occluded in 
the subject's initial and continuing capture 
in the mimetic mirror, 
(in Reinelt & Roach [eds], 1992, p395). 
It is possible to present the same problem in 
Nietzschean terms by explaining that the 'will to power', 
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whose extent is the extent of its own form - what is 'self' 
rather than what is •other• - is portrayed in the Lacanian 
schema as unable and unwilling. unless forced,. to do so, to 
shrink its own form in order to accommodate the existence 
of an other. It will, therefore, subsume this •otherness• 
under the guise of 'sameness' through the process of 
identification. thereby effectively abolishing the other 
and installing itself in their place. 
Diamond points out, however, how Freud viewed 
identification more as a two-way model, or dialectic, where 
"we are continually taking in objects we desire, 
continually identifying with or imitating these 
and continually being transformed by them" (p396, 
in original) . She goes on then to concentrate 
objects, 
emphasis 
on the 
positive nature of this conceptualisation, stressing how it 
maintains that identification is, 
an assimilative or appropriative act, making the 
other the same as me or me the same as the other, 
but at the same time it causes the I/ego to be 
transformed by the other. What this suggests is 
the borders of identity, the wholeness and 
consistency of identity, is transgressed by every 
act of identification, 
(p396). 
Now, considering the professed position 
thesis, which has maintained a commitment 
of this 
., 
to the"'· 
dialectical nature of the human organism's relation to the 
world outside of itself, it is clear that it is Freud's, 
rather than Lacan•s, presentation of the structure of the 
identificatory process that will be viewed as the more 
acceptable proposition, since it is seen to grant adequate 
status to the propensity of the •exterior• world to effect 
change in the world of the subject. It is also, clearly, a 
characterisation that, through its insistence on the 
existence of an 'innate' dialectic in the relationships of 
self to other, creates a theoretical space for the 
functioning of an activity such as performance, which is 
founded on the possibility of the potency of this 
relationship. 
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This notion of the ramifications of the processes of 
identification begins, then, to return us to Grotowski 's 
characterisation of a performance as being always a 
'confrontation• between the audience and the performer. 
For, in the performance event, the performer can be 
seen as offering him/herself up to the interpretive 
scrutiny of the audience, generally in the hope that their 
reception of what is presented will act upon them in 
desired ways; and in this sense, performers can be 
portrayed as working to attain the mastery that will enable 
them to work this innate 'violence' supposedly involved in 
the appropriations of identification to their own ends 
which, at least in the practitioners we have encountered in 
these pages, seem to be describable as somewhat 
'altruistic' in nature. 
Again, it is possible to define this situation in 
Nietzschean terms as the refusal by the will to power to be 
subsumed within the active desire to create sameness of the 
audience, by offering them instead the sincerity of a non-
aggressive otherness this non-aggression being 
instituted, at least partially, by the physical structure 
of the performance event, with its separation of the 
performer and audience. In this sense, then, the craft of 
the performer exists in their ability to stand before the 
appropriative gaze of the audience as the somehow~· 
irreducibly other. 
It is this same mastery that Nietzsche believed should 
be extended into the everyday practice of the self, since 
it was in the experience of the disciplined portrayal of 
self that the individual will to power would find its 
greatest strength, becoming capable of withstanding 
confrontation with the other due to the truth the 
discipline - that was contained within the crafted form 
that was being offered up for scrutiny. 
Working through this presentation of the performance 
event it becomes possible to see that it is in this manner 
that the self, which is nothing more than the structuration 
of consciousness, can be most legitimately viewed at the 
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level of metaphor as a performance event. As a result of 
this it can be suggested that it is therefore necessarily 
in an actual performance event that the will to power finds 
its most potent, its most concrete, field of existence. It 
is in the interplay of identification and non-assimilation, 
in the affective tensions produced by this manufactured 
conflict, that identity is focused and indeed tests out its 
limits. As Nietzsche was aware, "all associations are good 
that make one practice the weapons of defense and offense 
that reside in one's instincts" (1968, p486). 
To begin to draw the discussion in, then, it is 
possible to state that the basic structuration of self-
consciousness, imprinting all things with the same nature 
of self/other that obtains for itself, can accommodate and 
subsume otherness, and in fact extends itself by doing so. 
This characterisation of the self allows it full access to 
the process of identification, with the violence implicit 
in appropriation of the other as 'same', since it 
portrays the intersubjective field as the open field of 
play for the will to power, and suggests self-
responsibility and self-directedness as the methods by 
which the risks of involvement in this field can be 
traversed successfully. 
This, in turn, suggests that the activity of 
performance is based on an implicit acceptance of the, 
,z."'.. 
necessity for the realm of the intersubjective in the 
healthy functioning of the human organism - •communication 
is necessary' - as well as suggesting that it is in the 
nature of this particular activity to offer individuals 
some of their most potent experiences. 
As the introduction suggested might be the case, then, 
performance writing in the West in the last century, as 
represented by the practitioners mentioned, seems to embody 
an approach to the notion of the self that, to a large 
extent, mirrors that which is found in Nietzschean 
philosophy. This apparent similarity seems, also, to be 
argued for by the affirmatory attitude towards this 
'problematized' self that is the basis of all the 
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practitioners' efforts in the sphere of performance 
seen effectively 
import of their 
it appears to be 
activity, an attitude which we have 
defines both the direction and the 
performance practice. For all of them, 
the performance situation which offers, through a careful 
manipulation of the function 
identification, of the interpretive 
site within which the limits of the 
tested and, possibly, reconstituted. 
and processes of 
processes, a paradigm 
self can be exposed, 
(T] he subject has no prior identity; rather, 
identity is formed in the crucible of 
identifications; the subject is •specified', 
distinguished from all other subjects not by 
his immortal soul but by his identifications, 
and these identifications stem not from 
disciplined reason but from desire ... 
(Diamond, in Roach & Reinelt (eds], 1992, p392). 
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CONCLUSION. 
Theatre is the capacity possessed by 
human beings - and not by animals - to 
observe themselves in action, 
{Boa!, 1992, pXXXVi) . 
While constructing a reality of our own, 
we become aware of doing so and begin to 
reflect upon it. Thus, theatre turns out 
to be a field of experimentation where 
we can test our capacity for and the 
possibilities of constructing reality, 
{Fischer-Lichte, 1995, p104). 
The writings produced by and about Avant-garde 
theatrical practictioners in the West this century have 
consistently attempted to problematize received notions of 
the structure of human identity, and to offer in their place 
new versions of, and possibilities for, the nature of human 
reality. As Phelan {1993) notes, "the belief that 
perception can be made endlessly new is one of the 
fundamental drives of all visual arts," (p161); and it is 
this drive to present alternative versions of a 
hegemonically constrained reality that, in effect, 
characterises performance practices as radical. Artaud 
(1970) was clear that such practices attempt to "lead us to 
reject man's usual limitations and powers," and that in 
doing so they activate an experience which "infinitely 
extends the frontiers of what we call reality," (p6). In 
essence, then, such experiences offer a chance to reclaim a 
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level of fluidity and morphological instability for the 
human form, a strategy which represents an attempt to refuse 
·. 
the restraining influences of the normative regulation of 
perception and interpretation that operates outside of the 
theatrical space. This is true even in the case of 
practitioners such as Brecht and Boal since, although it 
cannot be said that they attempt a total deconstruction of 
the structures of the social reality as much as they do a 
revelation of them, it is nevertheless clear that it is a 
re-constitution of the individual's concept of the reality 
that contains them that is aimed for. The depth of the 
problematizing impulses needs to be seen as simply limited 
in such cases by the specificity of the envisaged social 
project, which is by nature context-dependent and therefore 
less driven to reject that social context entirely. This 
characteristic clearly does not mean that such practices 
should be entirely displaced from the spectrum of 
performance practices which share a common ground in 
attempting to problematize the translation of reality into 
commonly-held representations. It simply means that they 
can be viewed as occupying a different position within that 
spectrum from other particular practices; and, as we have 
seen, such disparities as become visible between particular 
practices when it 1s their specific forms which are the 
object of attention, tend to recede somewhat once it is the 
ontological premises upon which they are built that are 
foregrounded. In this sense, an experimental attitude to 
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form can generally be said to indicate a problematized 
notion of what constitutes reality, as well as an attempt to 
offer a re-interpretation of it . For instance, Boal (1992) 
states that •we want to experience phenomena, but above all 
we want to know the laws which govern these phenomena, • 
before going on to assert that this "is the role of art -
not only to show how the world is, but also why it is thus 
and how it can be transformed, • (p47). Now, a clear 
contrast to Boal's approach to theatre would seem to be the 
work of, for example, the American experimental troupe The 
Wooster Group, whose productions are much more concerned 
with the complexities of textual interplay than they are 
with direct social intervention. However as Savran (1986) 
notes, their pieces tend to "insist on a complexity of 
vision and refuse the moral highground," (p55), which 
effectively forces the spectators to analyze their own 
associative choices regarding the material of the 
performances; and since the material is often of a 
controversial nature, this scrutiny of their qwn 
. :· .. 
interpretive preferences can often be an uncomfortable 
experience. Savran cites the piece "Route 1&9" as 
example of such a process : 
perh~ps the most powerful effect of "Route 1&9" 
is that it leads admirers and deprecators alike 
to re-examine racial attitudes, not simply on a 
gross cultural level, but in one's minute personal 
interactions, not with a view toward an 
impossible escape from racism but towards an 
understanding of how it functions and how it 
corrupts us, 
(p40, emphasis added). 
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So, in the case of both Boal and The wooster Group at least, 
the difference 1n the type of theatrical practice is 
subsumed within what might be termed the common purpose 
behind them which is in some way to initiate a re-
examination of a generally accepted reality, a re-
examination that destabilizes the representation of that 
instance of reality within comfortable normative criteria. 
This adds weight to the proposal that radical theatre 
practice shares a common agenda. 
As this thesis has made clear, it can also be stated 
that the effectivity of any type of performance, whether it 
takes the form of the physical involvement of the spectators 
in the action or in the encouragement of a reflexive 
attention towards their own production of meaning, could not 
occur without the impulse supplied by the creative agency of 
the performers and the audience. This makes it evident that 
agency needs to be seen as a pre-condition for'the existence 
of a performance of any type, since it is agency alone which 
1s capable of effecting a deliberate presentation of form. 
Now, since performance is always a deliberate presentation 
of form, it is always also the result of agency. This in 
turn allows us to see that the theoretical model of the 
performance event provided in Chapter One seems adequate as 
a description of the basic structure of what are widely 
divergent instances of performance practice, since it 
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provides this central role to the effects of agency. It 
then becomes possible to say that the writings of radical 
performance practitioners in the West this seem todisplay an 
intention to involve spectators in an active 
transfiguration, or re-conceptualization, of what is 
normatively prescribed as an unproblematic • reality •, by 
establishing performance modes which seek to engage their 
interpretive capacities in new ways. Any differences 
between specific practices therefore do not occur at this 
basic level, but at the level of the specific targets they 
wish to present for scrutiny. In a sense, this can be seen 
as self-evident in that 'Feminist• theatre, for example, 
will clearly focus on received notions of women as its 
target in a way, and to an excent, that, perhaps, • Forum • 
theatre might not. Again, what joins these practices is 
their common strategy of using their performances as chances 
to disrupt, rather than simply enter, the dominant economy 
of representation; as Phelan (1993) notes, "to the degree 
that performance attempts to enter the economy :,of 
.::_ 
reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own 
ontology," (pl46). A certain feature of the fundamental 
ontological position of radical performance is its positive 
endorsement of the creative agency of its spectators. This 
seems very clear. 
What, then, of the model of self-identity developed by 
this thesis ? Does it offer itself in the same way as a 
theoretical structure that can contain the various 
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directions and ways in which the notion of the self has been 
tested and attacked in theatre practice in the West ov~r the 
last hundred years or so ? Is it a model that can operate 
in the midst of the critique of the notion of the coherent, 
centred self that has been such a feature of that practice ? 
The answers to these questions are : yes, it does and yes, 
it can. The concept of the self presented in these pages 
is, as has been explained, the pre-social, prior structure 
with which different societies work to produce the different 
cultural variants of self-identity. What have been called 
the 'basic building blocks' of a will to power and a 
capacity to learn are those, essentially neutral, 
characteristics which are the pre-conditions of the 
specificity of the human form. It is not they, but the 
social contexts in which they are developed, that determine 
the particular structures of the human form later on in 
life; and just as social contexts are dynamic and variable, 
so are the possibilities of the forms of identity produced 
within them. It is this fact - that identity is a variable 
phenomenon - that might be called the central ontological 
assumption underlying radical theatre practice, and it is 
not an assumption that is contradicted by the model of the 
self offered by this thesis, which places particular social 
constructions of identity as secondary phenomena which are, 
by definition, subject to constant reformulation. 
Clearly, the cross-over term here is agency, since it 
is agency (or practice) that effects change both within and 
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outside of performance spaces. This was the reason for the 
constant emphasis on the need to centralize the concept of 
agency during the earlier development of the model of the 
self - if it is marginalized or refused as a positive force, 
the possibility of liberatory action is seriously reduced; 
and it is difficult to know how to characterize the theatre 
practices we have discussed if not as attempts at liberatory 
action. 
So, the model of the self presented by this thesis can 
be seen as a theoretical support to the activities of the 
avant-garde this century, one which underscores their field 
of practice as a site of genuine liberatory force and 
affirms their effectivity as a radical critique. At the 
same time it highlights the need for some sort of 
irreducible basic structure of the human form, a structure 
that is not dispensable or alterable in the way that 
particular societal configurations might be. There is 
therefore nothing in such a model of the self that acts as a 
bar to the drive to experiment with the structures :;of 
,.:: . 
identity that is so central a feature of radical performance 
practice. In fact, the model of the self presented 
deliberately calls into question the social formation of 
identity by emphasising its status as a construction. By 
doing so, it highlights this process of construction as an 
ideological product, and thereby marks attempts to interfere 
in this process as a valid political strategy, one which 
intends to rupture the fixed representations of the social 
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prescriptions of identity. As Coward and Ellis (1977) note, 
such a system of representations "has the character of 
tending towards a structural closure : it defines the limits 
for, and works to fix the individual with, a certain mental 
horizon," (p74). The interventions of radical performance 
practice, with their manipulations of the systems of 
representations to alternative ends, are an effort to re-
open the available horizon, in that they offer individuals 
the chance to re-interpret, or re-evaluate, aspects of 
themselves and their world. The model of self advanced by 
this thesis takes care to place the capacities of 
interpretation and evaluation in an absolutely central 
position. 
Perhaps the last central strand of this thesis is the 
contention that the basic structure of consciousness is 
mirrored in the concrete structure of the performance event, 
allowing it to be viewed, like performance, as dependent on 
the dynamic produced by the relation of self to other. It 
has been suggested that it is at the point of this meeting, 
played out (and on) again and again in performance, that 
identity is constantly tested and formed, making an 
understanding of performance central to a proper 
understanding of the workings of identity. As a 
characterising of identity-formation, this is clearly 
related to the 
where the self 
product of the 
type of schematic advanced by Goffman, 
is seen as the constantly evolving joint-
social interaction of individuals; but 
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it advances beyond Goffman•s formulation by investigating in 
greater depth the complexities of this transferential 
matrix, doing so largely by the inclusion of psychoanalytic 
theory such as Lacan•s, where the specific field of focus is 
the relation of self to others and self to self-as-other. 
This particular field of inquiry is one of the most 
prevalent in contemporary performance theory and practice in 
the West ( 1), and plays itself out in a more concentrated 
attention to the intricacies of representation and 
reception, giving rise to a growing interest in the 
problematics of reflexivity. Savran (1986), for instance, 
notes the presence of such an interest in the productions of 
The Wooster Group, explaining that the work "proceeds not 
from the self-identical, but from division within 
consciousness and explores the 'other• within the self ... It 
defines the self as 'the-many-in-the-one' and performance as 
the pre-condition of being,• and in doing so it registers •a 
break with the mimetic tradition by positing the self 
constituted by a freeplay of forces and moods - as always 
already immersed in performance, in schism representation 
to, of and by self,• (p64). It is this type of 
conceptualization of the self-as-multiplicity, as a dynamic 
performative event, that this thesis has, through its 
importation of Nietzschean philosophy, provided a model for. 
The fo~us on the importance of the relation between self and 
other inscribed within this model allows the malleability of 
the human form to be foregrounded and, perhaps more 
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importantly, asserts that the true site of the self is the 
the inter-subjective realm rather than the 'inner world' of 
individuals. This in turn suggests that-the chosen manner 
of self-presentation will be guided not by some 'inner 
nature' which demands expression, but by whatever forces are 
operating to contain and license presentations in the inter-
subjective realm, in the social world. This is the 
particular process that Foucault was attempting to examine 
in his writings, and the analysis of his work conducted in 
Chapter Three allowed the discussion to move beyond 
Goffman's characterisation of social structures as a 
"natural" phenomenon. 
In conclusion, then, it can be stated that the central 
assertions of this thesis propose a theoretical model of the 
self that is offered a paradigmatic site of liberatory 
practice through radical performance events. These events, 
by deliberately intervening in the fundamental processes of 
meaning-construction, act to subvert the functioning of 
these formative processes and thereby destabilize and weaken 
.::-:-
any attempt to interpret what is presented according to 
normative criteria. This problematization of meaning 
generally aims to call the interpretive capacities of the 
spectators into a more active role, and therefore relies on 
the power of creative agency at the same time as it seeks to 
extend the sphere of influence of such agency. In their 
insistent reformulations of reality, such performances can 
be seen to be clearly seeking to address those 'who still 
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have ears for unheard of things', and by doing so, they 
surely continue 'the undefined work of freedom'. 
As soon as we are shown something old in the 
new, we are calmed. The supposed instinct for 
causality is only fear of the unfamiliar and 
the attempt to discover something familiar in 
it - a search not for causes, but for the 
familiar, 
(Nietzsche, 1968, p297). 
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more fully in the chapter coming up. 
CHAPTER FOUR THE PROBI.EMATIZEQ SELF AS A PERFORMANCE 
EVENT. 
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Genealogy of Morals, (New York : Doubleday, 1956). 
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For a very good discussion of the potential violence 
involved in appropriative discursive inclusions of 'other' 
voices, and the possibilities that exist for avoiding it 
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CONCI.IJSTON. 
1) 
For writers who work either with, or consciously against, 
Lacan's reading of the structures of identity in the field 
of performativity, see the references given by note 11 for 
Chapter One, as well as Butler,J. (1993) Bodies that 
Matter, (London: Routledge), especially pp187-222; and 
Goodman,L. (1993) Contemporary Feminist Theatres, (London 
Routledge) especially Chapter One, pp14-37. 
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